

Edited by
Alan McPherson
Ivan Krastev

The Anti- American Century



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THE ANTI-AMERICAN CENTURY

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Edited by
Ivan Krastev and Alan McPherson



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Introduction

Ivan Krastev

When in 1941 in a *Life* magazine editorial its publisher Henry Luce coined the phrase “The American Century” nobody knew how the world viewed America and its policies. The age of the opinion polls—this opium for the people—was not born yet. A son of a missionary and a visionary himself, Henry Luce urged the United States to forsake isolationism for a missionary’s role, acting as the world’s Good Samaritan and spreading democracy and freedom. And his call for creating the “first great American Century” was heard. For more than half a century many people thought the US as the savior of the Western world. The world was fascinated with America’s democracy, technology and culture. The 20th century turned into the American Century. But the American Century is now over. In less than a decade, America has lost more moral self-confidence and credibility than most nations accumulate in their history. Anti-Americanism is becoming a defining feature of our time. It is a defining political issue in a world that is suffering not from a deficit of elections but from a deficit of politics. The hollowness of post-ideological and post-utopian politics, its subversive dullness, is transforming the nature of democratic regimes. And in this post-political world anti-Americanism is more and more the content of

national politics.

The global rise of anti-Americanism poses questions with far-reaching political and security consequences. Do we witness a transient phenomenon or something that goes much deeper and will not decline with the change of the George W. Bush administration or the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq? Are the sources of the global revolt against America to be found in the US's policies, in the US's values or in America's hegemonic role in the world order?

The six essays collected in this volume are organized more on the principle of jazz improvisation rather than on the principle of a classical symphony. The pieces are not disciplined by a common theoretical framework but at the same time they are in a constant dialogue with each other. The authors are coming from different academic disciplines—history, political science, economics, sociology, and philosophy. They voice different national experiences and intellectual traditions. They share neither the same politics, nor the same obsessions but at the same time they are united by a common intuition: we are living in the anti-American century.

They argue that anti-Americanism has become a global reflex and a *master framework* with broad and flexible appeal, and that any serious attempt to analyze the phenomenon must encompass an understanding not only of its various sources in different corners of the world but also of the variety of purposes for which anti-Americanism is used as a political resource.

What makes the volume distinctive in the growing “anti-Americanism cottage industry” is its ambition to challenge the thesis that the spread of democracy will lead to the decline of anti-Americanism and that the lack of

democracy in certain parts of the world is to be blamed for the current wave of anti-Americanism. Alan McPherson, on the example of Latin America, convincingly argues that the spread of democracy contrary to the popular claim of official Washington will not lead to the decline of anti-Americanism but that the rise of anti-Americanism is a by-product of the global democratic revolution. By comparing three generations of anti-Americanism in Latin America—1920s, 1960s and 2000s—McPherson demonstrates that through the twentieth century, anti-Americanism has moved its strategic center from the marginal non-state actors in the early century, to elite state actors at mid-century and finally, to a new combination of old and new in more recent years: state actors who encompass the socially marginal. This new combination is more than ever threatening to the United States because, unlike the elites during the Cold War, the socially marginal in the era of neo-liberalism no longer find that they have much in common with the United States, and they are more than ever ready and able to use the nation-state to break with Washington's policies.

In the case of South Korea, Youngshik Bong and Katharine Moon reinforce the link between democratization of society and the rise of anti-Americanism. In their view the collective expressions of anti-American feelings in South Korea reflect much more tumultuous new political dynamics in the country marked by the clash of generations than the weakening of geopolitical constraints imposed by the Cold War. In the case of Southeast Asia, Farish Noor argues that the Islamists' negative perception of the United States in turn has to be understood in the context of the wider background of a resurgent Asia that feels itself burdened by an overbearing partner who has simply thrown its weight around the region. Thanks in part to their role in exacerbating the eco-

conomic inequalities and deficiencies in the developing world, successive American governments have helped to create the socio-cultural, political and economic circumstances that favor the rise of radical groupings in search of a change and a new socio-political order. America's cavalier and mercenary approach in dealing with the "Communist threat" in South-east Asia from the 1960s to 1980s did achieve its military goals, but in the course of doing so also eliminated scores of other progressive, secular political trends that might have served as the foundations of a democratic civil society today. In the void that was created with the extermination of the leftist opposition came the Islamist conservatives, to whom the United States was initially oblivious, and of whom it was only recently wary.

The missing anti-Americanism in Central and Eastern Europe is the center of the Janos Kovacs's essay on "Little America." Kovacs is convincing when he asserts that there is no such thing as a pro-American Sonderweg in the region. And contrary to the popular explanation of anti-Americanism as resentment against capitalism and globalization, Janos Kovacs demonstrates that Central and Eastern Europe is receptive to American style capitalism and not particularly attracted by American foreign policy. Kovacs's argument has a particular importance because the misreading of the East European experience in 1990s is at the center of Washington's failure to predict the backlash towards US hegemony in different parts of the world. Washington's attempt to turn the rise of pro-American democracies in Eastern Europe into a universal paradigm to be applied globally was a fatal intellectual mistake. The link between democratization and pro-Americanism that captured the imagination of the American political elites in the view of Kovacs has two faults—it was not realistic with respect to the rest of the world but it was also not true for

Central and Eastern Europe.

In his subtle analytical piece “A Plea for Distinctions: Disentangling Anti-Americanism from Anti-Semitism” the Oxford philosopher Brian Klug argues against the view that in the current world anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism are inseparable. In his opinion the propensity, in certain quarters, to see Americans and Jews as the joint victims of global prejudices, is both misleading and politically dangerous at a time when the world is experiencing, on the political plane, the equivalent of global warming; and one of the most incandescent spots on the planet is the Middle East, where both America and Israel, separately and (to an extent) together are involved in conflicts that are on the boil.

The essays collected in this book are not pamphlets blaming America or anti-Americanism. They urge us to reject the easy generalization or the comfortable banalization of the politics of anti-Americanism. What this volume pleads for are complexity and context when we try to imagine how the anti-American century will look like.

The Anti-American Century?*

Ivan Krastev

The twentieth century was “the American century.” Championing democracy and capitalism, the United States won the Cold War and emerged as the only global superpower—not only in military, but also in economic, technological, and even cultural terms. The widening currency of the English language and the continued desire of millions around the world to emigrate to the United States underlined the reality of U.S. predominance. The future, it was said, looked like a country, and that country was the United States of America.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, however, sharply punctuated the end of the American century. Indeed, the era we are now entering may well come to be recalled as “the anti-American century.” The rise of anti-Americanism around the globe is a distinctive feature of the post-September 11 world. The expressions of anti-Americanism vary from acts of terrorism against American citizens or property to dramatic increases in the global public’s negative attitudes toward the United States and its policies, as registered in the latest global polls conducted by the

* The article was published first by *Journal of Democracy* Volume 15, Number 2 April 2004.

Pew Research Center.¹ Burning American flags, boycotting American commercial products, and mobilizing electoral support through unrestrained anti-American rhetoric are common in many parts of the world. Today there are two basic types of anti-Americanism: murderous anti-Americanism and anti-Americanism “lite.” The first is the anti-Americanism of fanatical terrorists who hate the United States, its power, its values, and its policies—and who are willing to kill and to die in order to harm it. The second is the anti-Americanism of those who take to the streets and the media to campaign against the United States, but do not seek its destruction. The first kind can be dealt with only by “hard power.” The second, however, must be better understood in order to devise effective strategies to counter it.

It is becoming clear that anti-Americanism is not a passing sentiment and that it cannot be explained simply in terms of the unpopularity of the George W. Bush administration or widespread hostility to the American-led war in Iraq. There is a growing consensus that anti-Americanism is a *master framework* with broad and flexible appeal, and that any serious attempt to analyze the phenomenon must encompass an understanding, not only of its various sources in different corners of the world, but also of the variety of purposes for which anti-Americanism is used as a political resource.

Some observers rightly argue that anti-Americanism is not a new phenomenon, but they often fail to grasp the importance of its present re-emergence. It can be argued that anti-American discourse has not changed much, but what *has* significantly changed is the world. What matters most is not that America suddenly has become hugely unpopular, but that blaming America has become politically correct behavior even among America’s closest allies.

What is new is the way in which anti-Americanism is becoming an instrument in post-Cold War politics. Decoupled from communism, which gave it a certain strength but also placed limits on its appeal, anti-Americanism has worked its way more than ever before into the mainstream of world politics. In a sense, Francis Fukuyama's "end of history" has come to pass, with democracy and capitalism today lacking powerful ideological rivals. But as we arrive at the end of history, we can see anti-Americanism there waiting for us. It has turned into a conjurer's hat, where pieces of different ideologies, anxieties, and political strategies come together to be recombined and recycled for a new life. The appeal of anti-Americanism transcends Left-Right divisions, and works equally well with anxious governments and angry publics. It fits the definition of an all-purpose ideology. What we are seeing is not so much the rise of anti-Americanism in the singular as the rise of *anti-Americanisms* in the plural. Anti-Americanism assumes different guises in different political contexts. It can be a pro-democratic force in Turkey and an antidemocratic rallying point in Central and Eastern Europe.

Thus any attempt to find a global explanation for current anti-American sentiments is doomed to failure. The popular view that America is hated for being hostile to Islam may have some explanatory power when applied to the Middle East, but it is a nonstarter in the case of the Balkans, where the United States is hated for being pro-Islamic and pro-Albanian. In Islamic fundamentalist circles, the United States is castigated for being the embodiment of modernity, but Europeans accuse it of not being modern (or postmodern) enough—for practicing capital punishment and for believing too much in God. The United States is blamed both for globalizing the world and for "unilaterally" resisting globalization.

The return of anti-Semitism in Europe and its interconnection with the rise of anti-Americanism can also be interpreted in different ways. One's view of America usually reflects one's view of Israel, and vice-versa. It is easy to believe that many on the European Right are anti-American because America is perceived as pro-Jewish and pro-Israeli. This explanation is more problematic, however, for the European Left, where it seems not that anti-Semites have turned against America but rather that a profound distaste for America has turned Leftists into anti-Zionists and anti-Semites.²

AN ELUSIVE DEFINITION

The definition of anti-Americanism will always be elusive. The label cannot and should not be applied to just any vocal criticism of U.S. values or policies. Opposition to the policies of the U.S. government surely does not qualify as anti-Americanism. But opposing any policy simply *because* it is endorsed by the U.S. government comes close to being a definition. The trick is to distinguish the sometimes subtle difference between these two stances in real life and in real time. Anti-Americanism is a systemic opposition to America as a whole. It is a critique of the United States that transcends mere disagreement over specific policy questions or government decisions.

The most obvious and logical way to define anti-Americanism would be as opposition to Americanism. The problem is that when you search for "Americanism" on Google or on Amazon.com, what appears first is James W. Ceaser's article "A Genealogy of Anti-Americanism" and Jean-Francois Revel's book *Anti-Americanism*. In other words, the current notion of Americanism is not only a reflection on American character and experience, but also on the inven-

tion of anti-American discourse.³ The fact that any specific political context and any political discourse can invent its own version of America as a hate object endows anti-Americanism with its irresistible charm.

The variety of its forms of expression further complicates the study of anti-Americanism: Terrorist acts against American citizens, unfavorable verdicts in opinion polls, commercial boycotts, hostile campaign speeches and media coverage, and graffiti on city walls all appear on the menu of the day. But what are the policy consequences of these very different forms of opposing America? Should the United States be more concerned about countries where anti-American attitudes are prevalent or about countries where the public is basically friendly but the government is overtly anti-American? Terrorists do not require mass anti-American sentiments in order to target American citizens, and there is no certainty that negative perceptions of America registered in opinion polls will have any political consequences.

Historically, dissecting anti-Americanism has been the business of the Right, and this has politically colored all discussion of the subject. In the view of many on the Left, any focus on anti-Americanism is just an excuse to ignore or discredit criticism of U.S. policies. For them, “anti-Americanism” is a protest, not against America itself, but against its apparent failure to live up to its own ideals. In the words of Chalmers Johnson, “the suicidal assassins of September 11, 2001 did not attack America ... they attacked American foreign policy.”⁴ From this perspective, the only meaningful way of analyzing anti-Americanism is to present a critique of U.S. foreign policy.

By contrast, for many Americans on the Right, the rise of anti-Americanism is a rejection of America’s civilization and style of life: “They hate our values, not our policies.”

In this view, a more pro-Arab U.S. policy in the Middle East would not decrease the current levels of anti-Americanism in the Arab world because Arab hatred is driven not by what America does, but by what America is and stands for. Left and Right also take diametrically opposite views regarding the impact of America's military power on the rise of anti-Americanism. In the view of the Left, America is hated for relying too much on its hard power. In the view of the Right, it is America's hesitancy to use its hard power that stimulates the rise of anti-Americanism.⁵

What these two radically different perspectives share is a common conviction that anti-Americanism is about America. But it is precisely this point that is most questionable in my view. For both anti-Americanism and the local responses to it are driven to a significant extent not by concerns about America but by the intrinsic contradictions of post-ideological politics. Anti-Americanism is becoming a defining political issue in a world that is suffering, not from a deficit of elections, but from a deficit of politics. Nowadays democracies are societies with invisible enemies and unspoken dreams. Their economies may grow, but people still do not feel happier. In many places in the world, voters feel caught in a trap: They are free to dismiss governments, but they do not feel that they can influence policies. As a result, conspiratorial fantasies have replaced common sense as the basis for public deliberations. This hollowness of post-ideological and post-utopian politics, its subversive dullness, is one of the major reasons for the seductive power of anti-American discourse. People are against America because they are against everything—or because they do not know exactly what they are against.

The latest surveys in Western Europe indicate an important change in the profile of the anti-American constituency. The pattern long typical for France has now

become common throughout Western Europe. Elites have become more negative toward the United States than the general public, and younger people are more critical than their elders. Elites in search of legitimacy and a new generation looking for a cause are the two most visible faces of the new European anti-Americanism.

In the aftermath of September 11, America was shocked to discover how hated it is in the Arab world, and Arab anti-Americanism became a special concern of U.S. foreign policy. Yet it is anti-Americanism's resurgence in Western Europe that has made this attitude a major factor in global politics. Hence, understanding the split within the EU over U.S. policies toward Iraq is of critical importance for analyzing anti-Americanism's political potential. A re-examination of the controversy over the Iraq war helps to reveal that both the new anti-Americanism in Western Europe and the anti-anti-Americanism of the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe have almost nothing to do with Iraq and very little to do with America.

EUROPE AND THE ANTI-AMERICAN TEMPTATION

Politics often demands the manufacturing of useful clichés. So when British Prime Minister Tony Blair, in his July 2003 speech before a joint session of the U.S. Congress, stated that the EU's new members will transform Europe "because their scars are recent, their memories strong, their relationship with freedom still one of passion, not comfortable familiarity,"⁶ he was practicing good politics. But good politics does not always make for sound explanations. Some American conservatives were even more persistent than Blair in stressing the "value dimension" in the decision of East European governments to ally with the United States regarding Iraq. The only problem with this analy-

sis is that it is not supported by the polls. Public opinion surveys indicated that there was a strong anti-war majority (70 to 75 percent) in all the post-communist countries.⁷ The “coalition of the willing” was really a “coalition of the reluctant.” The only difference between Sofia and Berlin was that in Sofia the anti-war majority was visible only in the polls, not on the streets. The conservative reading of events was equally wrong with respect to the motivations of East European elites. The “commitment to freedom” argument may explain the support that the United States received from former dissidents such as Václav Havel and Adam Michnik, but it can hardly account for the behavior of the ex-communist governments that today run half of New Europe. “Commitment to freedom” was never their trademark.

Washington’s opponents were quick to portray New Europe’s falling into line as satellite mentality. In their view, the conspicuous loyalty that these governments demonstrated toward the United States was not much different from the loyalty that they used to display toward the Soviet Union in the days of the Cold War. Far from a commitment to freedom, it was the instinct of the vassal whose behavior is motivated by carrots and sticks that explained the course taken by East European governments. This interpretation is also difficult to justify. In terms of power politics, France and Germany, with the European Commission behind them, were both able to wield bigger sticks and offer bigger carrots to the East European countries than was the United States. So, if the satellite mentality had really been at work, New Europe should have gone “Old.”

In short, neither a commitment to freedom nor the satellite mentality offers an adequate explanation for East European support for Washington. The real difference between Poland and France was their differing judgments

about the advantages and risks attendant upon encouraging anti-American sentiments. Paris looked at the rise of anti-Americanism and saw an opportunity for increasing French influence in the world. Warsaw looked at the same phenomenon and saw a threat to all its hard-won gains from a decade of arduous political and economic reforms.

THE ANTI-ANTI-AMERICANISM OF NEW EUROPE

The real cause of the division between Old and New Europe during the Iraq war was the seductive charm of anti-American rhetoric for certain West European leaders. For New Europe, by contrast, flirting with anti-Americanism was not simply in bad taste, it was politically dangerous. Post-communist governments have important domestic political reasons for worrying about the rise of anti-Americanism. The democratic and market changes that Eastern Europe experienced over the past decade came wrapped in the American flag. When democracy came to Eastern Europe, it was singing in English, it was in love with the U.S. Constitution, and it was promoted by American foundations. For the reformist elites in post-communist countries, attacks on America appeared politically (and not just symbolically) subversive.

Another major factor dividing Europeans were the conflicting legacies of 1968. In Western Europe, the protestors of 1968 were openly anti-American and in many respects anti-capitalist. In their view, the United States was “Amerika”—the very embodiment of imperialism and capitalist exploitation. In the imagination of the 1968-generation in the East, however, America was the symbol of democracy and the free world. When German student leader Rudi Dutschke went on a solidarity tour in 1968 to Prague to ask Czech students to join in a common struggle against capi-

talist democracy and the dictatorship of the market, Czech students told him that this was exactly what they were struggling *for*. For Western Europe, “the third way” was a road to escape from capitalism; for Poles and Czechs, it was a road to escape from socialism. This difference in the socialization of many of the political and cultural elites now in power in Europe led to their divergent reactions to the rise of anti-Americanism during the Iraq crisis. Both Berlin and Warsaw remained loyal to the legacy of 1968, but it is a legacy that divides East and West.

East Europeans were quick to realize that the recent wave of anti-Americanism, celebrated by some of their Western neighbors as marking the birth of a genuine European public posed the clear and present danger of delegitimizing the East’s reformist elites and reversing their policies. At a time when many people in post-communist Europe have been feeling let down by the “decade of change,” anti-American rhetoric, once declared legitimate in Paris or Berlin, opens the door to populist parties of both Left and Right. In the words of Ian Buruma, “European populism historically almost always was anti-American.”⁸

A June 2003 public opinion survey conducted by the Centre for Liberal Strategies and BBSS Gallup International in five Balkan countries underlines the validity of Buruma’s point.⁹ In responses to this survey, hostility to the United States correlates with hostility to markets and democracy, as well as hostility toward Jews. Those parts of the public that are favorable to the United States are also the most pro-democratic and the most favorable toward the EU. In the Balkans, in contrast to Western Europe, it is the younger, better-educated, and more active part of the population that most often expresses positive attitudes toward the United States. Thus New Europe’s political elites perceive the U.S.–EU rivalry as an extremely negative factor in their

efforts to reform their own societies. In the early 1990s, Eastern Europe was ready to embrace democracy in large part because democracy was associated with the American dream. Today many East European politicians and intellectuals side with America because they understand that, in the local context, the fashion for blaming America opens the door to attacks on democracy and the market.

Antidemocratic forces in the East, lacking any positive vision for an alternative future and inspired by growing public criticism of the status quo, see anti-Americanism as a catchall platform for protest-vote politics. The power of anti-Americanism lies in its very emptiness. For politicians such as Serbia's Vojislav Šešelj (who is currently awaiting trial before a UN war-crimes tribunal in the Hague), anti-Americanism provides an opportunity to recast the nationalist agenda at a moment when Serbs are no longer ready to die for Kosovo or to kill for Bosnia. For the old communist elites in countries like Bulgaria, the new political correctness of anti-Americanism offers a way to reinsert themselves into the democratic political landscape on their own terms. It is astonishing to observe how many ex-communists in Eastern Europe embrace the notion of Europe as the anti-America. For this new New Old Left, blaming America is a strategy for pitting democracy against capitalism. For some corrupt post-communist governments, anti-Americanism is an instrument for redirecting public anger. For disillusioned publics, anti-Americanism is a vehicle for expressing anger at their betrayal by the elites. Although socialist solutions are considered dead in these "end of history" societies, socialist *attitudes* are as alive as ever. When winning the protest vote is the name of the game, anti-Americanism is the favorite tactic.

The anti-anti-Americanism of New Europe is usually perceived as simple pro-Americanism, but the failure to

appreciate the distinction between these two concepts can have grave consequences. Some political circles in Washington flirt with the idea of using New Europe as an instrument for dividing and weakening the EU with respect to foreign and security policy. Such a strategy would be based on dangerously unrealistic assumptions. The decision of almost all the new democracies to side with the EU over the International Criminal Court should be a sign to American policy makers that taking Eastern Europe's support for granted would be a major foreign policy miscalculation. For East Europeans, backing the United States during the Iraq crisis was a triumph of history over geography. But history itself teaches us that geography is stronger in the long run.

Nonetheless, New Europe has strong political (and not merely sentimental) reasons to resist the tendency to make anti-Americanism the foundation of a united Europe. For neo-Gaullists and die-hard social democrats, Europe is the center of a new world that will confront America in the same way that the old New World had confronted monarchical Europe in the eighteenth century. In their view, anti-Americanism should be the common European political language. Europe's new democracies do not share this view.

The problem with the European challenge to America is that Europe sees this competition less as an opportunity for promoting its existing model of welfare capitalism and more as a tactic to buy public support for profoundly transforming this model in a more market-oriented direction. The reality is that the EU is becoming less and less "European" in terms of pursuing the welfare-state policies developed in post-war Western Europe. It is striking to observe that, when the EU supports projects to promote economic development beyond its borders, it exports a version of the same type of neo-liberal orthodoxy it denounces at home.

New Europe's rejection of the negative definition of European identity supplied by anti-Americanism is its real contribution to the European debate. United Europe needs a positive identity.

At present Europe and America are allies divided by common values and common interests.

THE DANGEROUS CHARM OF ANTI-AMERICANISM

There are strange functional similarities among the three discourses that largely shape global politics today—antiterrorism, anticorruption, and anti-Americanism. All three of them flourish at the end of history, when no universal alternative to democracy and the market is in play, but disappointment with democracy and the market is growing. Today democracy may often be redefined or distorted but it is not openly opposed. Anti-market and anti-capitalist sentiments are enjoying a subterranean resurgence, but on the surface they take the form of a debate between Joseph Stiglitz and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). What used to be a class struggle has now been reduced to a quarrel in the faculty lounge. The three dominant discourses are “empty boxes,” easily filled with vague anxieties and cynically designed political strategies; each is a response to the growing gap between voting publics and their democratically elected elites. All three discourses can be used to criticize the status quo without incurring the odium of openly attacking democracy or the market. Groups with totally conflicting purposes can exploit all three to serve their own agendas.

When anticorruption rhetoric burst upon the stage of global politics in the early 1990s, it was conceptualized as a way to mobilize support for deepening market and democratic reforms. Anticorruption campaigns were designed as

a coordinated effort by civil society and the international community (the World Bank, the IMF, and Western governments) to pressure national governments into delivering good governance. The anticorruption rhetoric shared by Washington and local civil society actors was intended to answer the question of what had gone wrong. Mass publics were ready to sign on. But the result has been that political competition in many democracies is now reduced to a confrontation between a government accused of corruption and an opposition that claims to be slightly less corrupt. Anticorruption campaigns have undermined politics understood as a matter of representative government and clashing ideas and programs. Far from contributing to a narrowing of the gap between publics and elites, anticorruption discourse has enlarged the gap.

When terrorism captured the global imagination after 9/11, antiterrorist discourse was designed to highlight the common threat that would help shore up the new world order. In fact, however, various governments have hijacked the antiterrorist agenda in order to destroy their local political opposition and to gain control over civil society. Antiterrorist discourse has been skillfully used to foster suspicion of NGOs and independent media and to curb civil liberties. Governments seized the opportunity and began manufacturing terrorists. A successful mixture of antiterrorist and anticorruption rhetoric, moderate anti-Americanism, and old-style administrative politics has enabled Vladimir Putin to consolidate an “acceptable” authoritarian regime in Russia. This model has the potential to be replicated. Governments that had found their freedom of action modestly weakened by the spread of democracy and global interdependence have used antiterrorism to bolster their control and enhance the secrecy of their operations.

The impact of anti-American discourse is likely to be similarly harmful to democracy. Washington adopted a high profile in promoting the anticorruption agenda, attempting to bypass governments by telling civil society actors that corrupt governments are the problem. In the case of anti-terrorism, Washington allowed discredited governments to label their domestic opponents as terrorists in return for support in the global “war on terrorism.” In the case of anti-Americanism, governments are trying to convince frustrated publics that America is the problem. The anticorruption drive was designed to promote the spread of capitalism and deepen democracy. It failed. Antiterrorist discourse was designed to rally the world around America. It failed. Anti-Americanism has emerged as a hostile response to America’s growing influence but also to the spread of democracy and the global market. Unfortunately, it has a chance to succeed.

AMERICAN RESPONSES TO ANTI-AMERICANISM

In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the United States viewed public diplomacy as the proper response to the rise in anti-Americanism. A Council on Foreign Relations report declared that improving the U.S. image through public diplomacy is directly linked to the country’s most fundamental national security needs.¹⁰ Now the strategy has changed. Aggressive promotion of democracy is America’s current response to both terrorism and anti-Americanism. Can it work?

It is true that the United States has been most popular and powerful when it allied itself with the cause of democracy and freedom. This is the lesson that America learns from its own history. But promotion of democracy can suffer collateral damage from the unholy struggle among the

discourses of anticorruption, antiterrorism, and anti-Americanism that shape our world today. The threat of terrorism has already confronted democratic societies with the need to renegotiate the borders between civil liberties and public safety. Each society should answer the question of how much freedom it is ready to sacrifice to have a better chance to defend itself in the face of the global terrorist threat on its own. The problem occurs when the answers are given, not by society, but by undemocratic governments.

The new security focus in American foreign policy has resulted in its inflating the democratic credentials of a number of tyrannies, beginning with those in Central Asia. The way in which the U.S. government handles the tradeoff between democratic performance and security cooperation can antagonize democratic movements in some places and become a real obstacle to promoting the democratic agenda. Washington paid the price for such policies in Latin America in the days of the Cold War, and is paying the price for such policies in the Middle East today. Yet, ignoring the reality of the terrorist threat is also not an option. The objective of combating terrorism through military and police cooperation and the objective of spreading democracy will remain in tension and at times even in outright conflict.

The rise of anti-Americanism could become a major obstacle to promoting democracy in the world. In the context of the new suspicion of the United States and its policies, many non-democratic, semi-democratic, or even almost-democratic regimes are tempted to criminalize any internal pressure for democracy, labeling it "American-sponsored destabilization." The recent events in Georgia provide a classic illustration of this point. At the very moment when Georgian civil society took to the streets in defense of their right to fair elections, former Presi-

dent Eduard Shevardnadze was quick to label the popular movement an American-inspired conspiracy. The strategy of authoritarian governments is to try to force democratic movements to dissociate themselves from the United States, thus isolating them and depriving them of international support. For the United States, promotion of democracy is a vehicle for winning the hearts and minds of people around the world. But if anti-Americanism can succeed in identifying pressure for democracy with "American imperialism," this will undermine the prospects for the spread of democracy.

The transatlantic rift increases this risk. Guided by the understandable desire to protect themselves from the rising wave of anti-Americanism, many European governments and foundations are trying to distance themselves from American democracy-promotion efforts in environments where there is strong antipathy to the United States. This stance can jeopardize any chance for democratic breakthroughs in many parts of the world. The democratic momentum of the 1990s was possible because Europe and America shared a common democratization agenda; in many areas, their democracy-promotion programs were coordinated. A transatlantic divide in the field of promotion of democracy will erode the very idea of internationally backed democratization efforts.

America's new commitment to spreading democracy will face another critical challenge. The miracle of 1989 cannot be repeated. In Eastern Europe, democratization gave birth to pro-American governments and pro-American societies. A similar result cannot be expected in the Middle East or some other parts of the world. Iraq is not another Poland. Faced with the prospect of the emergence of anti-American democracies that present a security risk for the United States, Washington may be forced to trim its

democratization agenda. But such a reaction could have a grave impact on the politics of democratization as a whole, resulting in the adoption of democracy-building strategies that are “security-sensitive,” and wherein democracy is misconceived as a political regime that can redirect and keep local conflicts under control, even if it fails to provide much freedom.

Introducing free elections into ethnically divided societies is not equivalent to democratizing these societies. Weak and non-functioning states are as much a threat to freedom and human rights as are the oppressive governments they have replaced. The Middle East will provide the stiffest test of whether U.S. democratization strategies can remain committed to the principle that democracy also means an open society.

What America has failed to recognize until now is that in many places in the world the rise of anti-Americanism provokes the emergence of anti-anti-American constituencies. Even when they disagree with U.S. policies, these constituencies understand that less American influence means less freedom and that anti-Americanism is a stalking horse and platform for antidemocratic and anti-market forces. This naturally emerging, home-grown anti-anti-Americanism offers the United States its best means for countering the politics of anti-Americanism. In other words, it is *supporting* democracy, more than *exporting* it, that constitutes America’s best strategic option.

NOTES

- 1 The author is deeply grateful to the German Marshal Fund of the United States for their support for the Centre for Liberal Strategies' work on anti-Americanism.
See "Views of a Changing World 2003. War With Iraq Further Divides Global Publics," available at <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=185>. "A Year After Iraq War. Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists," available at <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=206>.
- 2 Historically the Left has denounced the instrumentalization of anti-Semitism in European politics.
- 3 Kazin M. and J. McCartin, eds. *Americanism: New Perspectives on the History of an Ideal* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).
- 4 Johnson, C. *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire* (Owl Books, April 2002), viii.
- 5 As Barry Rubin has written, "It has been the U.S.'s perceived softness in recent years, rather than its bullying behavior that has encouraged the anti-Americans to act on their beliefs." Rubin, R. "The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism." *Foreign Affairs* 81 (November/December 2002).
- 6 Blair, Tony. Address to Congress Accepting Congressional Gold Medal, delivered 18 July 2003, available at www.american-rhetoric.com/speeches/tblaircongressionalgoldmedal.htm.
- 7 Asmus R., Everts P. P. and P. Isernia. "Across the Atlantic and the Political Aisle: The Double Divide in U.S.– European Relations," available at www.transatlantictrends.org/doc/2004_english_analytical.pdf.
- 8 *Weekend Financial Times* (London), 9 January 2004.
- 9 The Anti-Americanism in the Balkans Survey was conducted by BBSS Gallup International and funded by the Open Society Foundation in Sofia. The survey covers Bulgaria, Macedonia, Kosovo, Romania, and Serbia. June 2003.
- 10 The Council on Foreign Relations report, available at www.cfr.org/pubs/Task-force_final2-19.pdf.

“Little America”

EASTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CULTURES IN THE EU

Janos Matyas Kovacs

*“Why do we want to become members of the European Union?
Because we haven’t been invited to join the United States.”*

Let us imagine the eternal *Wessi* and the eternal *Ossi*, typical figures in German popular discourse, talking in a pub about what the *Wessi* calls Eastern Enlargement. For him or her, EU membership not only covers all the civilizational benefits the “West” generously and light-mindedly offers to the “East” but also refers to the Westward expansion, a sort of “Western Enlargement” of the dangers originating in the former Soviet Empire. The *Wessi* is anxious about what will happen to his job, family and savings after “those over there” (the infamous Polish plumber and Hungarian truck driver) are allowed to enter the Union, either as employers or employees, for more than brief visits. Will you pay taxes properly? he asks the *Ossi* with deep distrust in his voice. Won’t you accept lower wages, less safe working conditions than us? Will you protect *our* environment? How long do you want to capitalize on our budgets? Won’t your “Wild-East” entrepreneurs ignore the social standards in our country? Will they observe the business contracts? Will they leave the mafia behind?

As a mirror image of how populists in Western Europe portray the Eastern “savages” *ante portas*, one witnesses in

Eastern European nationalist discourse the icon of the “honest” and “creative” Croat, Czech or Romanian worker and businessman who, while matching their Western colleagues in terms of capitalist virtues, are allegedly better-educated, respect family values, religion and rural bonds. Accordingly, Brussels should feel honored to receive the new members and be lucky to gain so much “fresh energy and culture” at such a low price.

This pride mingles with the worries of our *Ossi*. For him, Eastern Enlargement seems risky because, as a result of it, he may also lose his job (true, not via wage dumping, but via high-productivity competition). Similarly, he is also anxious about the lowering of social standards in his country (e.g., he would insist on his traditionally relaxed work ethic). Moreover, he fears both the erosion of his pre-communist traditions and the filtering of his new entrepreneurial freedoms, consumption habits, etc. through the world of the *acquis communautaire*, the oversized body of EU regulations. For instance, as an employer he will have to comply with equal opportunity rules, and as a consumer he may be forced to abandon shopping around the clock. Or, to quote even more profane examples from my country, Hungary, occurring right after the Accession, he is not allowed to slaughter pigs in his backyard, distill *pálinka* in the bathroom, and the *non plus ultra* of his fears, must reconcile himself with the fact that according to the EU regulations the Romanians may also call their traditional drink, the *tuica*, *pálinka* (a Slovak word by the way).

Won't you use us as cheap laborers and buyers of low-quality consumer goods—a poorhouse of the Union? Will you not paralyze our innovative spirit and abuse our talent? Will you accept our quest for informality or will you simply subsume it under the heading of lawlessness or corruption, and keep on stigmatizing and monitoring us? Questions such

as these reflect the concerns of our *Ossi* who would prefer to see a kind of Western Enlargement that brings his old and new virtues to the EU.

What, on the surface, seems to be a regular *Ossi*–*Wessi* conflict of perceptions, a two-person game, is, on a closer scrutiny, an interplay of at least three actors, including a powerful challenge by global (basically American) capitalism. As the aforementioned reference to an imaginary “Wild East” suggests, Eastern Europe and the United States are supposed to forge a peculiar coalition in this game, and the eternal *Wessi* finds himself in the crosshairs of similar economic cultures. If he cherished anti-American sentiments in the past, watching America emerge even from his immediate Eastern neighborhood may strengthen them. I have bad news for those who tend to think that this kind of *Wessi* mentality is only characteristic of the potential losers and of a few noisy trade unions, chambers and small populist parties that do their best to instrumentalize the fear from that coalition. That fear already sits in the minds of a whole series of influential European leaders, such as the French conservative Nicolas Sarkozy or the German social-democrat Franz Münterfering, when they are heaping curses on Eastern European tax dumping or U.S.-based *Heuschrecken-Kapitalismus*—a metaphor portraying financial investors as swarms of locusts. Ironically, these politicians are in turn surprised to watch their own citizens reject the European Constitution.

In any event, these statesmen would feel reinforced in their passions if they knew the irreverent joke circulating in Eastern Europe before the first round of the Enlargement, which introduces this paper. Is this joke indeed a proof of popular sentiments or rather just another expression of the legendary pro-American attitudes of the opinion leaders in the region? A great many analysts do not really worry about

this distinction, just as they do not ask if these attitudes are stable and deep enough, if the notions of America in general and the United States in particular are really interchangeable, or if, in other words, the United States actually represents what it is presumed to represent, or whether it is also united in terms of its economic and political cultures. America is America and Eastern Europe is America-friendly—period. The whole world is becoming increasingly anti-American, goes the argument, yet, as usual, Eastern Europe is an exception to the rule. Proper definitions and large-scale comparative surveys lacking, anecdotal evidence and bold generalizations prevail in both journalism and scholarship.¹

It might appear that my paper will carefully dissect these generalizations to prove that there is no such thing as a pro-American *Sonderweg* in the region. On the contrary, in what follows, I will not challenge this assumption. Instead, in order to support it, I will experiment with just another bold generalization while mapping America in post-communist Eastern Europe. In explaining certain pro-American leanings of Eastern European societies, it is not sufficient to focus on the ideological commitments made by the political and cultural elites, the businesspeople and the younger generations, or on mass consumption (popular culture) in general, i.e., on typical carriers of US-style capitalism all over the world. One cannot ignore a massive and robust process of Americanization over the past decades in which people at large vote with their feet for institutions, policies and concepts that *they* regard as American *and* good, and build institutions such as the flat tax, private pensions, or Valentine's Day into their daily life. Conversely, Eastern Europeans who embrace these and other U.S. signifiers are often not aware of the fact that they have chosen the "American option" of post-communist transformation. For

brevity's sake, I call the result of this multi-faceted selection process "Little America."

Let me immediately add that my words should be treated with extreme caution. They rest on a yet-unfinished research project on comparative economic cultures in eight Eastern European countries,² as well as on a forthcoming one, an offshoot of the original project, that will focus on a possibly accurate mapping of the "American" features of economic cultures in the region. Mapping will not necessarily imply meticulous measurement, because the concept of economic culture in these projects is defined in rather broad—qualitative—terms. It encompasses not only the values, norms, beliefs, habits, attitudes, etc. of the economic actors, but also the institutional arrangements, policies and concepts in which these elements of culture are embedded. The term "culture" is frequently used in plural to express the prevailing diversity of cultural types and to cover as many subcategories of economic culture (such as work culture, consumption culture, financial culture, management culture, etc.) as possible.

With respect to the notion of Americanization, this is at least as value-loaded and ambiguous as it is old. It may refer both to imposing US-type institutions/policies/concepts on certain countries and to voluntarily borrowing them by others. It is used in both the normative and descriptive/analytical sense. It pertains to dreaming about the United States as well as to implementing detailed societal reforms that follow certain American patterns, and it can rest both on devotedly pro-American and harshly anti-American sentiments. In this paper I will take a possibly detached look at the notion, and a) concentrate on the *actual* processes of taking over certain institutions/policies/concepts of U.S. origin by the Eastern Europeans and b) disregard the ideological context of imposition versus borrowing, with all the heated debates

on cultural colonization, Orientalism, neoliberal conspiracy, and Americanization that leads to Latin-Americanization, etc.³

Finally, why conceal the fact that my research hypotheses would have a considerably different tone, if I did not commute weekly between Austria and Hungary, that is, between a formerly Western country with a rather weak record in Americanization and a formerly Eastern one that emulates American patterns with pleasure? If I had not had friends in Vienna who asked me to bring along, not salami or paprika, but bagels from Budapest who, when visiting me there, had not urged me to show them, not the best dentist, but the closest Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant, or simply a food shop that does not know the sacred principle of *Ladenschluss* (i.e., closing early in the evening and not opening on Sunday), I am not sure this paper would have ever come into being.

The same applies to the recurrent complaints by Austrian environmentalists about pollution coming from the East and, conversely, to the admiration expressed by Austrian businessmen of American-style loose regulations allowing them to export garbage (in its literal sense) to the new EU member states. Also, the same businessmen praise the “trade union-free zone” in the ex-communist countries, while the Austrian trade unions cannot help accusing Eastern Europe of wage dumping (in the words of their left-wing activists, “Vietnamization of wages”) due to the “Americanization of the labor market and social policy”—a social disease spreading in Eastern Europe, and which allegedly can destroy the welfare state in the West.⁴

MAPPING AMERICA IN EASTERN EUROPE

After having postulated the existence of Little America in Eastern Europe, I will first provide a bird's-eye view of its main territories. Then, returning to our Ossi-Wessi dialogue, I will say a few words about how this small *impe-rium* might fit in with the scheme of cohabitation of economic cultures as conceived by many in the Western half of Europe, and Brussels in particular.

By and large, the conventional explanations for the pro-American leanings of Eastern European societies rely on the following three assumptions:⁵

- 1) that a majority of the political, cultural and business elites in the region are pro-American, partly out of anti-communist nostalgia and/or neophyte exaggeration of liberalism, partly for pragmatic reasons such as geopolitics, and that they are also "anti-anti-American," to use Ivan Krastev's term, because in many countries of the region the discourse of anti-Americanism has been expropriated by their nationalist-populist opponents;
- 2) that it is the younger, better-educated, and more active groups of society who are the actual carriers of pro-American attitudes, while a great majority of citizens oscillate between their views and those of the anti-American populists;
- 3) that the principal vehicle of Americanization in the region is the McWorld.⁶

Below, I would like to go beyond these assumptions, and ask why even many older and less educated Eastern Europeans have been enchanted by American-style capitalism over the past decades.

Probably, the rough language of historical materialism will help make me understood. I cannot imagine the anti-anti-Americanism of a great many representatives of the political elites in Eastern Europe without presuming an apparent pro-Americanism of influential social groups. To avoid misunderstandings, I do not wish to narrow the notion of influential social groups down to the new capitalist “ruling class” of the region, with its “Americophile intelligentsia.” Instead, I include a good part of the “exploited masses” within the large camp of the sympathizers (without considering them opportunists or naïve victims of cultural imperialism). A large section of the political elite is, in my view, not simply committed to certain American ideals and geopolitical considerations and/or afraid of its domestic rivals, but is also exposed to the support by electorates, business lobbies, and NGOs, who respect the United States precisely because they are confident it embodies an attractive and useful destination for post-communist transformation. It would be foolish for the elites to distance themselves from the people by challenging what the latter regard as American *and* accept with pleasure, be it a new pattern of consumption (shopping malls, online banking), a particular lifestyle (wellness fashions and suburban housing) or an economic institution (the credit card and partial privatization of health-care).

Pop culture leads to Americanization, but only part of the way. This kind of pro-Americanism has also been contingent on the robust and massive Americanization of Eastern European economies and societies during the past decades.

Actually, Little America is rather large, though its territories are distributed rather unevenly among the countries. This imaginary realm intersects the national borders within Eastern Europe the way blue jeans, Madonna albums and Hollywood movies do. Obviously, one may scrupulously calculate the sales figures of similar icons of popular con-

sumption in the region to identify the real phenomena of Americanization, if... if one does not meanwhile overlook another set of similarly real phenomena, the deeply penetrating Americanization of Eastern European societal regimes during the past two decades. At least since the collapse of the Soviet empire, a whole series of economic, political, welfare, and other regimes wearing a U.S. trademark have put down roots in the region. They range from basic constitutional arrangements through the configuration of the labor markets, all the way to the management of hospitals, universities and churches.

In drawing the imaginary boundaries of Little America, its breadth takes the observer by surprise. NATO membership, the omnipresence of U.S.-based transnational companies, US AID, and the Soros network and other large American NGOs are just the most conspicuous components of this realm. The other, less visible components may prove to be even more powerful. Here we are getting closer to economic cultures in their broad sense. A low share of public ownership in industry, banking, and housing, emerging forms of "managerial capitalism," privatized pension schemes, non-progressive tax systems and decreasing tax burdens, a low rate of unionization, permissive hiring and firing regulations, a high degree of social polarization, lax rules of environmental protection—could anyone disregard these *systemic* features of the new Eastern European capitalism? Is it possible not to recognize the striking similarity between the region and the United States in terms of the style of entrepreneurship (reckless rivalry, informal business-making, under-regulation), propensity for self-exploitation, individualism and self-reliance, suspicion toward the state, and so on?⁷

Undoubtedly, commonalities can also be found in the broader culture. They range from the freedom of hate speech and strict privacy rules, as well as the elimination of com-

pulsory military service in the Czech Republic and Hungary, through the large-scale privatization of the electronic media, all the way to the system of academic titles. Moreover, the all too evident features of pop culture-oriented Americanization render many observers blind to the rapid increase in imported high culture from the United States. These cultural goods, which are incorporated in scientific theories, religious beliefs, administrative skills, work routines, legal procedures, and the like, are widely used in designing post-communist government reforms, managing privatization, organizing civic initiatives or restructuring the universities. Or should one simply place the imported textbooks of microeconomics, the know-how of organizing a neo-Protestant church, and the rules of privatizing a public telephone company or ways of establishing a human rights NGO under the heading of the McWorld?

It was not a desperate search for the sources of pro-Americanism that aroused my interest in mapping America in Eastern Europe. On the contrary, a few years ago, I began to study a kind of anti-Americanism in Hungary—that is, latent, passive and spontaneous resistance to global (primarily American) cultures. With a dozen colleagues, we looked for “globalization failures” in cultural exchange⁸ in fields ranging from the first American military base in the region, through feminism and new religious movements to the local reception of a prominent, U.S.-based NGO. For us, it seemed intellectually much more exciting to see fast food being consumed slowly than a McDonald’s pagoda being destroyed by anti-globalization activists. Similarly, to refer to my own discipline, political economy, we were less interested in overtly anti-liberal economic propaganda than in the almost unconscious, everyday interventionism of even those economists (like Vaclav Klaus in the Czech Repub-

lic or Leszek Balcerowicz in Poland) who, rhetorically, subscribe to a sort of libertarian theory.

However, in identifying the failures of Americanization in Hungary and beyond, one also learns of success stories that show a clear popular choice of what people consider to be "the American way." Examples include the large-scale acceptance of the private pension schemes in Poland, Hungary, the Baltic states, and Slovakia; the introduction of the flat-tax system in Estonia and the other Baltic states, Slovakia and Romania, and, more recently, in Georgia, Russia, Serbia and probably soon in Hungary; the recent attempts at privatizing health care in Slovakia and Hungary; the upsurge of small entrepreneurship; and a lack of collective action in industry (Poland is a rare exception). A politician running for re-election has to think twice before challenging these institutional arrangements. Otherwise, he risks his future the same way as if he campaigned for the prohibition of Coca-Cola and soap operas.

Little America is not always a result of direct importation. Oddly enough, it displays quite a few Russian or even Chinese features. Consider, for example, the business practices of Moscow-based transnational oil companies or international trading networks of Chinese small entrepreneurs. The EU also conveys American cultural messages and transfers American institutions to Eastern Europe. Maybe the most important is the very idea of the single market, including its economic theory and business law foundations. And, vice versa, quite a few items of contemporary American cultural export were originally imported from Europe: think about the underlying constitutional philosophy of the political system of the United States, or that even the Austrian School of economics arrives in Prague, Budapest or Warsaw, not from Vienna, but from Chicago, Fairfax, Virginia, or even Texas.

In addition, the United States delivers not only itself but also its self-criticism to the region: freedom of speech versus political correctness, the macho idols of Hollywood versus feminist values, health safeguards versus junk food, and so on. Finally, to comfort those who worry about U.S.-driven colonization, there are a couple of items of potential cultural import from the United States that face resistance in Eastern Europe. Capital punishment, widespread gun ownership, the omnipresence of lawsuits, and the role of psychiatry in everyday life are a few examples. Incidentally, these also have something to do with economic culture. As regrettable as it may be, less contested cultural values such as community spirit, civic patriotism and religion, or charity are also often received with distrust in the region. Hence, any thesis of sweeping Americanization in Eastern Europe today—McDonaldization, Coca-Colonization, or, more recently, Sili-Colonization, to quote the Salzburg historian, Reinhold Wagnleitner—would be a gross overstatement.

Nevertheless, there is, I believe, sufficient evidence for the existence of Little America to launch a research project that would map it out in due detail. (By the way, I would be interested in mapping the little Germany of Eastern Europe as well.) It would be good to know how to draw a balance between the parallel and contrasting changes caused by Americanization and Europeanization. Who is likely to win the contest of the most Americanized country in Eastern Europe? As far as government-led Americanization is concerned, Poland and Hungary were the frontrunners in the 1990s. Over the past years, however, Slovakia took the lead by introducing a package of radical liberalization, which included a number of original measures, in particular in health care. The new leftist-populist Slovak government is about to stop these reforms, while Hungary has just begun to emulate them.

How could a project on Little America contribute to the research of anti-Americanism in general? I guess it could certainly do so in one way: by discovering the popularity of U. S.-style capitalism in Eastern Europe, the observer might cease to focus on harsh anti-Americanism, and recognize the intermediary versions between the two poles, for instance, the one called "America-skepticism"⁹ by Timothy Garton Ash. Evidently, in dealing with those who reflexively identify the United States with imperialism, Zionism, materialism, junk culture or social irresponsibility, the social scientist may overlook a large array of softer or harder "America-skeptics," even "America-realists," who frequently form their judgments on the basis of *reasonable* arguments as to the common good, individual merits, the concept of culture and the like. Disregarding these arguments, one not only becomes unable to explore the overall capacity for, and the potential supply routes of, passionate anti-Americanism, but also deprives him/herself of the study of rather complex cases such as, for example, pro-European, British or French-style ("civilizational"), or post-colonial America-realism, not to mention their Eastern European variants—juicy fruits for an analyst, aren't they?

RETURN TO EUROPE

Let us come back to our Ossi and Wessi, and their dialogue of the deaf, full of mutual distrust. I am wondering what the Wessi would think of his interlocutor if he knew that the robust and massive nature of Americanization of economic cultures in Eastern Europe is largely due to a rather peculiar coincidence with part of the communist legacy. Here I am referring to certain unintended consequences of communism that produced American-style norms, attitudes, and

habits that would have probably withered slowly if the region had been co-opted and “disciplined” by the EU and its social market economies right after the revolutions of 1989.

What kind of unintended consequences do I have in mind? Was the proverbial *Homo Sovieticus* actually implementing the American Dream? I would not go so far, but if we look behind the mask of the once “really existing” communist type of man, we discover a Janus-faced economic culture based on state paternalism *and* informal markets, public ownership *and* private redistribution, central commands *and* decentralized bargaining, over-regulation *and* free-riding, collectivist economic institutions *and* individual (or family-based) coping strategies, learned helplessness *and* forced creativity. It sounds paradoxical but, in a distorted manner, communism was a school of capitalism. In that school, hard work bordering on self-exploitation, calculative behavior, risk taking, competitive attitudes, and negotiation skills were obligatory subjects to learn. If part of these features can be considered to be typically American, then this sort of Americanization took place by default, not by design, in the informal economy rather than in the formal one.

Communism conserved/reproduced a sort of capitalist ethos, rooted in trust rather than formal rules, personal rather than institutional transactions, small rather than large organizations, and human rather than physical capital. While it began to erode in a large part of the West, it is being reconstituted today under the aegis of global network capitalism, knowledge-based society, flexibilization, and a risk society, to use current catchwords. Ironically enough, this ethos may grant some comparative advantage to the Eastern Europeans in global competition, thereby worrying their Western European partners. At any rate, locusts are also quick, mercilessly flexible and have an extremely dense

network regardless of whether they come from the East or the West.

Obviously, this capitalist ethos does not reproduce the old Weberian prototype of the Protestant entrepreneur, and does not have much in common with such neo-capitalist success stories as Confucianism and evangelical Protestantism, either. It has no specific religious mission, contains weaker feelings of responsibility for the family or the community, and it is less self-denying and less savings-oriented. Surprisingly, most respondents in our comparative economic cultures project do not attribute any importance whatsoever to religious foundations in their economic behavior—a rather non-American attitude.

Our interviewees use a different language to reveal their preferences. In quite a few in-depth interviews, especially those made in Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Serbia, the local entrepreneurs and managers often use the word “warmness” when talking about the relationships with their business partners from Italy, Greece, or Spain, representing as a rule small and medium size firms, frequently in family ownership. They say that if they could choose, they would opt for a sort of “Mediterranean economic culture” as they call it as opposed to a “Nordic” one (meaning German in the first place), which they describe as megalomaniacal, rigid, and impersonal. The Americans, although they are not depicted as champions of Mediterranean mentality, also receive a couple of compliments for their easy-going, non-hierarchical, flexible, and informal business practices.

Does the Wessi understand this “thermometric” language? As far as our Western European respondents—largely entrepreneurs and managers working in Eastern Europe—are concerned, they exhibit some confusion when narrating their cultural encounters with the “natives.” They

still tend to insist on a traditional, one-dimensional, version of the *Homo Sovieticus* and characterize their local business partners and employees by means of old adjectives such as collectivist, egalitarian, unorganized, short-termist, irresponsible, passive, negativist, lazy, rule-bending, corrupt, nepotist, paternalist, even alcoholic and thievish. Such Soviet-type people, according to Western Europeans, prefer improvisation to following routine procedures, free riding to cooperative behavior, conflict to compromise, and promise to contract, and mix up politics and business, work and private life, public and private property, etc.

Ostensibly, our respondents had great difficulties harmonizing this list with many of their new experiences: on the one hand, with the clear upswing of entrepreneurship in Eastern Europe, and, on the other, with the ongoing changes in the economic cultures of the Western European welfare states. In other words, they struggled to understand their own Americanization/ globalization process, while traditional pride *vis à vis* Eastern Europe faded. They see less and less helpless, dependent, egalitarian-minded economic actors there, while at the same time witnessing the emergence of increasingly risk-taking societies with a rather creative, informal and socially-not-too-sensitive economic culture.

Brussels, I believe, also has a split ego. On the one hand, in demonstrating its liberal, perhaps even American, face, it is resolutely expanding the single market with all its freedoms toward the East. On the other, it has expropriated the old slogan of the anti-communist dissidents of the region: "Return to Europe." Two decades ago, the dissidents wanted their region to leave the Soviet empire for the West. Currently, however, the same region is strongly urged to come back from Little America to the imaginary "European Social Model" and stop flirting with the idea of a "New Europe" that allegedly has more in common with the United States

than "Old Europe" ever had. Eastern Europeans respond to this request with some indignation by saying, "we turned to America partly because after 1989 we were neglected by Europe for a decade or so." In its lack of a protective integration, the region was doomed to adjust to global pressures—a new aspect of what I earlier called "Americanization by default."

Another important aspect is provided by the enormous urgency of very painful stabilization measures throughout Eastern Europe during the so-called transformational recession in the early 1990s, and the relative ease with which the region adjusted. Because of the lack of powerful pressure groups, including the trade unions, austerity programs could be connected with a radical liberalization of the ex-communist economic systems to balance the state budgets. Because of the devotedly neo-liberal discourse that justified some of the austerity packages, shock therapy was often mistaken by observers for a programmatic and general breakthrough of the spirit of American capitalism in the region. Yet, again, that breakthrough was at least as much forced by the economic crisis and allowed by the weakness of institutional counter-power as it was designed by the much-accused "Chicago Boys" and awaited by the citizens.

Meanwhile, however, much of the liberalization has proven successful, popular, and difficult to reverse. As a consequence, Eastern Europe has become considerably different from the societal model(s) offered by Western Europe. This may, in turn, impede cohabitation between the old members and the new entrants after the Accession, for the former will be too fearful of it, while the latter will be fearful of too little diversity amid such unity. Today in Eastern Europe, when eight plus two countries of the former Eastern Bloc have almost completed the legal harmonization of their societal regimes with the *acquis communautaire*, the rivalry between

the European and the American traditions is about to enter a new stage.

From now on, the question is whether the legal alignment required by Brussels will be followed by the actual de-Americanization of societies in the region. As a matter of fact, Brussels already scored some points during the Accession talks, for instance, in labor legislation (working hours, collective agreements, equal opportunity, etc.); today it is the taxation rules and the so-called Bolkestein guidelines that may become a tumultuous battlefield.¹⁰ Undoubtedly, it would be a slight exaggeration to assert that Europe and America have already begun to wage a culture war in Eastern Europe. The region is currently testing the consistency and durability of American-style economic cultures under pressure from a powerful drive of EU-style social engineering that represents an alternative pattern of capitalist culture.

All things considered, in terms of rival cultures, the hot issue is not *how* the new members of the EU will choose between Europe and America but to *what extent* the EU will be willing to regard the choice as such as a legitimate act. Will it count Little America as an asset the EU can capitalize on, or rather a liability that has to be written off as soon as possible? Will it treat the newcomer nations as at least partly successful globalization laboratories, in which one can try out, for example, welfare reforms, or rather as dustbins of globalization, which should be cleaned before they start to smell? I would be happy to say that these are open questions. However, in studying, during the past couple of years, high-level political discourse in Western Europe on the Eastern Enlargement, I have not come across too many sentences thus far that would have praised the "American" virtues of the ex-communist countries. While every week hundreds of officials leave Brussels to visit the new member states with the aim of monitoring their convergence with the old ones,

those who would go East to learn something "American" are, I am afraid, still sitting in their offices.

NOTES

- 1 Recently, an anecdotal and foreign policy-centered approach was taken even by authors such as Timothy Garton Ash and Tony Judt who otherwise cannot be accused of a lack of interest in and knowledge of the deeper roots of Americophilia in Eastern Europe. See Garton Ash, Timothy. *Free World* (Penguin Books, 2004); Judt, Tony. *Postwar* (London, 2005); and Judt, Tony. "Europe versus America," *New York Review of Books*, 10 February 2005, 37–41. The same applies to a new collection of essays, Mack, Arien, ed. *Their America. The U.S. in the Eyes of the Rest of the World. Social Research* 72, no 4 (winter 2005): 787–952.
- 2 The Dioscuri project ("Eastern Enlargement—Western Enlargement. Cultural Encounters in the European Economy and Society after the Accession") embraces eight countries of Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia). It is supported by the European Commission in the Sixth Framework Program.
- 3 For the first experiments with this approach, see my "Rival Temptations—Passive Resistance. Cultural Globalization in Hungary," in *Many Globalizations. Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World*, eds. Berger, Peter and Samuel Huntington (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 146–183; "Approaching the EU and Reaching the US? Transforming Welfare Regimes in East-Central Europe: Rival Narratives," *West European Politics* 25, no. 2 (April 2002): 175–205. These experiments profited from works written by Richard Kuisel on France, Kaspar Maase on Germany or Reinhold Wagnleitner on Austria, which are still missing in Eastern Europe: Kuisel, Richard. *Seducing the French. The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Maase, Kaspar. *BRAVO Amerika* (Hamburg, 1992); Wagnleitner, Reinhold. *Coca Colonization and the Cold War. The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994). See also Nolan, Mary. "America in the German Imagination," in *Transactions, Transgressions, Transformations*.

American Culture in Western Europe and Japan, eds. Fehrenbach, Heidi and Uta Poiger (Providence and Oxford, 2000); Lüdtkke, Alf et al., eds. *Amerikanisierung. Traum und Alptraum im Deutschland des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart, 1996). An earlier version of my paper emerged from a debate with Ivan Krastev on anti- versus pro-Americanism in Eastern Europe (see "Little America," *Transit* 27 (2004): 71–81).

4 <http://news.glb.at/news/article.php/20060221081129683>.

5 For a recent critique of these explanations, see Krastev, Ivan. "The Anti-American Century." *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 2 (April 2004). For their origins, see Barber, Benjamin. *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York, 1995); Bauman, Zygmunt. *Globalization. The Human Consequences* (New York, 1998); Huntington, Samuel. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, 1996); Ritzer, George. *The McDonaldization of Society* (Thousand Oaks, 1993); Sassen, Saskia. *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York, 1998); Tomlison, John. *Cultural Imperialism* (Baltimore, 1991); Wallerstein, Immanuel. *Geopolitics and Geoculture* (Cambridge, 1997). For a caricature of the conventional views, see Burbach, Roger et al. *Globalization and Its Discontents. The Rise of Postmodern Socialisms* (London, 1997); Latouche, Serge. *The Westernization of the World* (Cambridge, 1996). Unfortunately, even many of the recent scholarly attempts at defining Americanization in Eastern Europe are burdened with anti-American prejudices. See Conversi, Daniele. "Post-communist Societies between Ethnicity and Globalization." *Journal of Southern Europe & the Balkans* 3, no. 2 (2001); Meardi, Guglielmo. "The Trojan Horse for the Americanization of Europe? Polish Industrial Relations Towards the EU." *European Journal of Industrial Relations* 8, no. 1, (2002). See also an interview with the Polish sociologist, Jadwiga Staniszkis ("Dangerous Americanization," *Rzeczpospolita*, 9–10 June 2004).

6 What Peter Berger and Samuel Huntington call Davos culture (op. cit), that is, values, habits, lifestyles, etc. spread by the global business elite, plays a secondary role in most explanations. This is rather surprising, especially if one remembers the frequent references made by the media to the Eastern European Chicago Boys and the Wild-East adventurers in the early 1990s. With the exception of Poland, the same applies to the migrant communities, the migrants and the repatriates.

7 To be sure, I would not put the culture of tax evasion on the list of similarities.

- 8 Kovacs, Janos Matyas, ed. *A zárva várt Nyugat. Kulturális globalizáció Magyarországon* (The West as a Guest. Cultural Globalization in Hungary.) (Budapest, 2002).
- 9 Garton Ash. *Free World*, 198.
- 10 Western observers witness with surprise that even the social democrats of Eastern Europe vote against a stricter coordination of the economic policies, the introduction of a minimum wage and the harmonization of tax rates at the EU level. Nevertheless, it is the Bolkestein guidelines of the free movement of services in the Union that currently trigger the most heated debates. In contrast to the constraints of labor migration which could be forced upon the entrants by the old member states as a *conditio sine qua non* of the Accession, today the latter face eight plus two member states representing the new (Americanized) entrepreneurial elites of Eastern Europe. These elites are more powerful in their countries than the workers were during the Accession, and not less eager to cross the borders. (See Busemeyer, Marius et al. “Politische Positionen zum Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialmodell—eine Landkarte der Interessen.” *Internationale Politik-analyse*, FES, August 2006.)

Anti-Americanism in Latin America and the Caribbean

“FALSE POPULISM”
OR COMING FULL CIRCLE?

Alan McPherson

After becoming Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice accused Latin American leaders such as Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez of practicing “false populism” against the United States.¹ Examination of the anti-U.S. sentiment—be it populist or otherwise—that has swept Latin America in the mid-2000s may be served by asking a series of questions about the past of anti-Americanism. It is increasingly clear that anti-Americanism is widespread, robust, and both a cultural and political phenomenon. These are the observations of journalists or commentators on present U.S. relations with the most anti-U.S. region in the world today, the Middle East. To be sure, many of these modern-day observers ask questions that are historical in nature—for example about the long-term sources of anti-Americanism or the resentment of injustices that were perpetrated long ago. But few have asked about long-term changes *within* anti-Americanism: Who have been the proponents of resisting U.S. influence in the past? Who were their audiences? What mechanisms did they use—passive resistance, demonstrations, media campaigns, or the state? In short, how have different generations of “anti-Americans” defined themselves *vis-à-vis* the United States and how did their strategies change?

These questions are especially pertinent to Latin America and the Caribbean. When I first heard of the conference that prompted this volume, I was amused to read that the conference organizers dated “old” anti-Americanism in Europe as recently as 1968. That date seems quaintly contemporary by the standards of Latin Americans, who, by then, had already been subjected to massive U.S. power for several generations. In response to that power, they had developed complex, interlocking identities and strategies. Resentment had simmered throughout the nineteenth century, but widespread protests appeared most particularly in response to events from the War of 1898 through World War I and throughout the Great Depression, when U.S. Marines occupied several sovereign nations and U.S. investors bought up land there. The peoples of the hemisphere resisted these incursions through guerrilla warfare in the countryside and peaceful protests in the cities. As the twentieth century wore on, both violent and peaceful resistance continued, reaching their apex with the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the election of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1970, the leftist insurgencies in Central America the following decade, and, finally, the recent upsurge of Rice’s alleged “false populism.” Because of this long experience, countries south of the United States make up one of the most valuable laboratories for isolating generational or longitudinal changes within anti-Americanism and thus for applying the historian’s craft to this timely topic.

This chapter situates itself within this long-term laboratory to ask how today’s most hostile regimes in Latin America compare and contrast with those of past generations. Let us set aside the continuing anti-Americanism of Cuba, whose seemingly eternal leader Fidel Castro gave up power for the first time temporarily in August of 2006. At the top of the list of other hostile regimes were Chávez’s Venezu-

ela and Evo Morales's Bolivia. Significantly further behind were Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva's Brazil, Néstor Kirchner's Argentina, Tabaré Vázquez's Uruguay, and Michelle Bachelet's Chile. These regimes together made up what some called a new leftist consensus and others described as a new populism in Latin America.² In varying degrees, all these leaders rose to power because of their constituencies' widespread displeasure with U.S.-crafted neo-liberalism. As a result, the regimes backed policies that would reduce the political or economic power of the United States in the hemisphere. This new variant of anti-Americanism is not particularly cultural, but it *is* anti-American in that it identifies the United States as a systematic source of their troubles and aims to minimize Washington's influence.

This chapter argues that a historical cycle closely tied to generational change explains this anti-Americanism, and that the nation-state is at the center of this cycle. Such a view suggests that a circle is soon to be completed—or, worse for Washington and Wall Street, that an anti-U.S. spiral increasingly threatens U.S. power in the Western hemisphere. The circle spirals in this manner: through the twentieth century, anti-Americanism has moved its strategic center from marginal non-state actors in the early century, to elite state actors at mid-century, to a new combination of old and new in more recent years: state actors who encompass the socially marginal. This new combination more than ever threatens the United States because, unlike elites during the Cold War, the socially marginal in the era of neo-liberalism no longer find they have much in common with the United States, and are more than ever ready and able to use the nation-state to break with Washington's policies. Finding their support in groups ranging from indigenous peoples to *Afro-latinos* and from the Zapatista towns of Chiapas to the slums of Brazil, new popu-

list regimes may prove to be true representatives of an alliance bearing an essentialist vision of the United States that allows little room for collaboration.

A FEW NUMBERS

The new post-9/11 anti-U.S. populism is not a purely political movement, drummed up by a few disgruntled intellectuals or radical students. By every measure, it is the most widespread resurgence of popular anti-Americanism ever in Latin America. Public opinion polls from the 1950s to the present tend to solidify this argument and help place the new anti-Americanism in context. The Cold War period provided dozens of polls taken in Spanish in major Latin American countries from 1955 to 1972 by local firms in association with the United States Information Agency (USIA). It is possible, therefore, to compare Cold War era public opinion with more recent polls. Since Venezuela offers some of the most complete data, and since its responses were largely typical of those of the rest of Latin America, it presents a good case study.³

Before the 1990s, ordinary Venezuelans reported highly favorable views of the United States in all matters, as did most Latin American respondents. During the Cold War, polls of Venezuelan public opinion showed Venezuelans consistently trusting U.S. leadership in global affairs. The first of these, from 1955, asked "All things considered, would you say that the U.S. is really a good friend and neighbor to Venezuela or not?" Caracans answered "Yes" at a rate of 82 percent (with 3 percent saying "No" and 15 percent, "No opinion"). When asked, "Do you think that the U.S. is doing all it can to prevent another world war?" 72 percent said "Yes" (4 percent "No"; 24 percent "Don't know").⁴

This trend toward friendliness continued even after Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba in 1959, stirring up much anti-U.S. sentiment in his wake. In 1961, only 2 percent of Venezuelans said that what they liked about Castro was that he “ended dependency on the U.S.” and 70 percent opposed the expropriation of foreigners’ land.⁵ Throughout the Cold War, Venezuelans were within the norm for Latin Americans in favoring the United States over the Soviet Union militarily, economically, and culturally.⁶ And when asked to “Tell me your feelings... about the U.S.” in 1963, 70 percent answered “Very good” or “Good” while only 4 percent answered “Bad” or “Very bad” (“Neutral” got 16 percent and “No opinion,” 10 percent).⁷ Even after the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, a move reminiscent of past U.S. “gun-boat diplomacy” and widely resented by Latin Americans, Venezuelans still gave the United States a net favorable rating of 34 (“Good opinion” minus “Bad opinion”). And in 1972, at the height of global anti-Americanism over the Vietnam War, Venezuelans’ “Respect for the U.S.” was 53 percent favorable.⁸

Early in George W. Bush’s first mandate, Latin Americans maintained their optimism. In two surveys taken in 1999/2000 and in 2002, Venezuela’s “favorable view of U.S.” dropped, although only from 89 percent to 82 percent. Seventy-nine percent of Venezuelans agreed that “U. S. foreign policy considers others” and only 48 percent agreed that the “the U.S. increases the gap between Rich/Poor.” Latin Americans were generally enthusiastic regarding the “Spread of American ideas and customs,” “American popular culture,” and “American ideas about business practices.”⁹ Despite the overall drop, these were still relatively high rates, especially when compared with the rest of the world’s declining opinion of the United States.

Polls taken in 2004 and 2005, however, confirmed a worsening of opinions. In mid-2004, Venezuela's net favorable views of the United States were still positive, around 30 percent. Yet these were far below the net favorables of up to 79 during the Cold War. By 2005, only 41 percent of Venezuelan respondents had a "*buena*" or "*muy buena*" image of the United States, below the 61 percent average for the region but similar to other large countries such as Argentina (32 percent) and Brazil and Mexico (both 53 percent). Worse yet, 61 percent had "little" or "no confidence" in "North Americans."¹⁰ Another poll from 2005 added that about 70 percent of Latin Americans believed the United States was an "imperialist" country, that it did not promote world peace, and that the White House was not concerned with their country's problems.¹¹ Now in 2006, we must ask ourselves whether these unprecedented numbers are due merely to changes in U.S. policies, or also to more fundamental political changes within Latin America.

STATE ANTI-AMERICANISM OLD AND NEW

A first clue to answering this query lies in comparing and contrasting recent anti-Americanism to the anti-U.S. movements of the middle of the twentieth century. The governments of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala and Fidel Castro in Cuba were arguably the most important of these movements because they took control of state resources and turned them against powerful U.S. interests in their country. Many now fear that the Chávez and Morales regimes are similar to these. This paper contends that they are, but that they might be even more serious. Movements such as Castro's, which took power during the Cold War and fought against U.S. power, were in fact a limited threat to

that power. In the future, Castro may be considered in retrospect to have been a rather moderate anti-American.

The generation of Arbenz and Castro was not as seriously anti-U.S. as the one today because it concerned itself as much with imitating the United States as with challenging it. Arbenz, Castro, and their peers did not know the U.S. occupations of the 1910s and 1920s personally; many were born as the last U.S. ships left their nations' shores. They also came of age politically under dictatorships or corrupt democracies that were national in their ability to administer and repress, but not nationalistic in their plans for development or social justice. The dictatorial enemy—Jorge Ubico in Guatemala and Fulgencio Batista in Cuba—was one who operated a state whose system of repression was strong and widespread. But, to Arbenz and Castro, the enemy was of their own nation, and anti-Americanism entered the equation more indirectly. The mission therefore, was to clean out U.S. influence by taking over the state apparatus. Those, such as Peru's Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, whose anti-Americanism remained rhetorical without translating into a takeover of the state, ultimately failed in their reforms.

In his own reform efforts, Arbenz learned how deep the influence of the U.S. government ran, even when one seemed in control of one's state. The Guatemalan rose to power and popularity through a democratic election in 1950, and therefore felt entitled to push ahead with massive public works programs, indigenous participation in politics, and especially an anti-U.S. land reform, all of which would cement the nation to the state more than ever. But Arbenz failed to purge the military, and once it became clear he would not negotiate generous compensations for U.S. landowners, the CIA and the State Department planned his overthrow by infiltrating the military. In June 1954, a

tiny invasion force crossed over from Honduras, also jamming radio signals and pretending that the invasion was, in fact, huge and unstoppable. A week later, Arbenz fled into exile.¹²

A few years later, Cuban revolutionaries took their lessons from Arbenz, especially from his mistakes. They were far more focused on decisively taking over the state. Militarily, Castro and his companions had the advantage of sharing no border with any other nation. As soon as the revolution caused Batista to flee in early January 1959, Castro quickly purged the military of any of the departed dictator's sympathizers, jailing and shooting hundreds of them for good measure to instill fear in those whose loyalties might still be uncertain. Also learning from the example of Arbenz, who had been too publicly cozy with labor radicals for Washington's taste, Castro and his close associates kept their distance from communist allies until they had firm control of all the Cuban ministries. And, economically, Castro's 26th of July Movement secretly devised major programs for land and financial reform while using liberal democrats to convey a public impression of moderation.¹³

By the end of 1959, Castro had complete control of the Cuban state—its security, its administration, and its income. All these takeovers affected the ability of the United States to influence Cuban developments from the inside. Washington thus thought itself forced to strike back from outside: by imposing an embargo and by invading with the use of Cuban proxies whom Castro could plausibly call “anti-nationalists.” Castro thus defined his generation's most effective anti-Americanism by using the state to quickly undercut the power of the U.S. government and U.S. corporations in his country.

Yet Castro paid a hefty price for his independence from the United States. First, he immediately established an alternative dependence on the Soviet Union. He signed a massive trade agreement with the Soviets in February 1960 and then maintained a decent standard of living for Cubans only by trading Cuban sugar for Soviet petroleum and finished goods at artificial trade terms. This system kept Cuba afloat but also prevented it from diversifying its economy. Second, Castro bartered Cuba's political freedoms for political unity. While alienating the United States in 1959 and 1960, he also effectively shut down all independent media and political organizations. In these ways, Castro turned his back on his promise to his generation: to use anti-Americanism to pursue models of industrialization, freedom, and consumerism based on that of the United States.

As Castro learned from Arbenz's mistakes, Hugo Chávez—and later, Evo Morales—learned from Castro's. To be sure, the Venezuelan and Cuban regimes shared similarities, beginning with their two leaders. Both men rose to prominence through a failed coup and imprisonment (Castro in 1953, Chávez in 1992); both had military experience and dressed in uniforms on a regular basis; both purged unfriendly institutions; both had the populist touch in public appearances and made long, charismatic speeches; and, most importantly for U.S. interests, both undertook agrarian and other redistributive reforms that defied U.S. models of neo-liberalism. After coming to power in early 1999, the Venezuelan president placed more and more of his associates in the three branches of government, in addition to the state-owned oil company *Petróleos de Venezuela* (PDVSA). And throughout his rule Chávez has been friendly with Castro, hosting lavish receptions for him

and even organizing baseball games in which the two men coached or played. Ties between the two countries have included increased trade and, as *U.S. News & World Report* has alleged, Cuban infiltration of Venezuela's secret service.¹⁴

Yet Chávez was careful not to cut off all ties to the United States. He showed an understanding that, with more than half of Venezuela's petroleum exports still going to Uncle Sam, it made no sense to eliminate the U.S. economic stake in his country or the political and consumer freedoms that Venezuelans hold dear. Even while Chávez has tightened his grip on government and the media, Venezuelans have remained generally free to protest and there are no political prisoners in the country.¹⁵

So why has the U.S. government been so worried about Venezuela and Bolivia? Because Chávez and Morales's brand of state-centered anti-Americanism has not aimed to emulate former U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, but rather has rejected U.S.-defined neo-liberal models that many Latin Americans feel have failed the continent. Also, Chávez and Morales are perhaps more dangerous to the United States because they have won the reins of the state—and defined these anti-U.S. goals—with the support of the socially marginalized. Because Castro ruled over a state as an autocrat, with Marxist ideology and strict Communist Party discipline, he largely did not contend with the desires of the majority or identity-based groups such as women or Afro-Cubans (though he did relatively little to oppress them). Chávez and Morales, however, survive by the grace of the will of the previously disenfranchised majority. From 1998 to 2006, Chávez won three elections, one coup, and one referendum, all of which confirmed that he ruled with about 60 percent support among

Venezuelans. For Morales, legitimacy came with an absolute majority vote for the presidency in 2006.

Herein lies the danger of both men's anti-Americanism. Because the Venezuelan and Bolivian leaders legitimately won the reins of the nation-state, they have seemed more willing to use the state apparatus as a weapon in a contest against the United States. In recent years, Chávez has locked in his control over the National Assembly, announced major arms deals with Russia and trade deals with China, and offered alternatives to U.S.-dominated media in Latin America through the Bolivarian News Agency and the satellite television channel Telesur, which bills itself as the "anti-hegemonic network."¹⁶ And he has repeatedly threatened to cut off oil to the United States. Joining Chávez in this new state anti-Americanism, Morales signed on to the Cuban-Venezuelan trade pact alternative to the U.S.-led Free Trade Area of the Americas in April 2006, and on May 1, 2006 he announced the nationalization of the natural gas industry, much of which was owned by U.S. investors.

This marshaling of state authority against the U.S. presence in Latin America garnered Chávez and Morales even more popular approval. In 2005, while calling for the expulsion of U.S. missionaries from Venezuela and ending a military exchange program with Washington, Chávez still enjoyed a 71 percent approval rating among Venezuelans.¹⁷ That popularity was due to the new ability of anti-Americanism to identify state power with the previously disenfranchised.

NON-STATE ANTI-AMERICANISM OLD AND NEW

Chávez, Morales and other may be in fact more fundamentally anti-U.S. than Castro, not only because of their state-centered anti-Americanism, but because they have also embraced the non-state, essentialist anti-Americanism of another generation, that of those who fought U.S. marines in the previous generation. From the 1910s to the 1930s, a generation of relatively marginal groups resisted U.S. military occupations in much of Central America and the Caribbean and protested U.S. economic power in the whole of the hemisphere. This resistance was particularly intense from 1912, when U.S. Marines landed in Nicaragua to initiate a twenty-one year occupation, to 1934, when more disillusioned Marines finally left Haiti after almost twenty years there.

One observes a common thread during these occupations: nation building was everyone's goal. The peasants, bandits, and local bosses (*caudillos*) who united to take up arms against the Marines regularly claimed to be true patriots who fought for the *patria* and against the "nation-sellers" (*vendepatrias*) who occupied the bureaucracy under the boot of U.S. imperialism. The rhetoric of these groups—called *sandinistas* in Nicaragua, *cacos* in Haiti, and *gavilleros* in the Dominican Republic—was sincere, but they lacked the means for implementing national unity.¹⁸

The U.S. occupiers, too, were builders of nations, and perhaps even more so. In each country they occupied, U.S. administrators, both military and civilian, quite explicitly set about constructing the infrastructure they thought a modern nation required. Roads, telephones and telegraphs, sewers, hospitals, and schools would all assure the stability of the central element in modernization, a functional, effective, and efficient government staffed by technocrats.

In Haiti, “modernization” came in the nefarious form of reviving the *corvée*, or forced-labor law, which U.S. officials used to re-create a dynamic close to slavery in order to build roads in the poverty-stricken nation.

As a result of U.S.-led state repression, those who resisted U.S. power attacked the institutions built by U.S. intervention. U.S. observers were often correct in pointing out that those who most wanted the occupations over with were the political “outs” who wanted back “in.” What they did not understand was that anti-U.S. activists were deeply conflicted: the occupation forced them to attain their goal of uniting the nation only by assaulting the state apparatus they wanted to take over. They had to destroy the nation in order to save it.

Perhaps the clearest incident of non-state actors attacking the state to express anti-Americanism was the series of strikes in the town of Aux Cayes, Haiti, in December 1929. As the Great Depression sank in upon U.S. citizens and the world community, the Haitian occupation entered its fifteenth year. Haitian patience with the Marines was at a boiling point. Several anti-state grievances suddenly coincided in this nationwide protest movement: elite students in U.S.-run schools revolted at having to learn practical skills such as farming and engineering alongside simple peasants; alcohol distillers and tobacco growers rejected new taxes that fortified the state but squeezed out small businesses; and, yes, politicians who had been out of power for too long feared the permanent destruction of the spoils system on which they had always counted for their livelihood. All of these grievances were rejections of the ways the U.S. government had transformed the nation-state to the disadvantage of certain Haitian groups.

The protests built up over several weeks, as more and more towns and institutions laid down their pencils and

plows and picked up banners to fly and stones to throw. On December 6, 1929, a group of perhaps 1,500 on horseback threatened to enter the town of Marchaterre, on the outskirts of Aux Cayes. About twenty Marine officers and their local constabularies met the group, panicked, and shot into the crowd. Depending on who counted, the U.S.-controlled force killed from 12 to 24 and wounded another 23 to 51.¹⁹

The result of the “Massacre at Aux Cayes,” as Haitians called it, was to accelerate the process of handing over the reins of the nation-state back to Haiti in Washington. Soon enough it became clear that two sets of attitudes poisoned the process. On the U.S. side, there was scarcely any trust of the Haitians’ abilities, and, as a consequence, few U.S. administrators devoted enough resources towards training them to run the modern apparatus now in place. On the Haitian side, partisanship had only intensified during the occupation, as had the identification of U.S. citizens with Haiti’s long-held opposition to white occupation. “Haitianization,” in its ideal U.S. form, would have kept the U.S.-engineered state intact and merely replaced Americans with Haitians. But two decades of racial oppression on one side and xenophobia on the other—a fatal mixture producing anti-Americanism—shaped a Haitian political system that, soon after the occupation, reverted to dictatorship.

Many Latin Americans gave up completely on their desire to take over the nation-state during this time and reveled in marginality itself. Nicaraguan rebel Augusto Sandino found lasting fame and his most important military victories against the Marines after he fled to the Segovia Mountains in the mid-1920s. Chilean writer Gabriela Mistral called Sandino’s followers the “crazy little army” because of their desperate challenge to the great U.S. military machine.

Sandino may have been desperate, but he was not crazy. Though he called himself a nationalist or patriot, he found his support and his goals largely outside the nation-state. His ideology then turned from nationalism to internationalism as he allied himself with Hondurans, Salvadorans, Dominicans, Mexicans, and even U.S. citizens. Sandinism was so transnational in scope that it became a symbol for those fighting imperialism everywhere. In 1928, Chinese nationalists marched through Beijing with banners of Sandino, and one of their divisions was named after him.²⁰ Guatemalans sold a cigarette called "Cigarrillo Sandino," and El Salvador, a liquor called "Néctar Sandino."²¹ Marxists and leftists throughout the world supported the Nicaraguan struggle. As one French journalist wrote in support, "Today attention is directed towards General Sandino, whose figure resembles those of the great historical Liberators, and who according to the words of Manuel Ugarte, represents with his heroic troops the popular revenge of the Spanish-speaking countries against the Anglo-Saxon imperialism and against the treacherous local oligarchies, opposed to every movement of liberation."²²

By 1930, Sandino even suggested separation from Nicaragua. He turned inward and founded an affiliate of a Latin American mystical society called the Magnetic-Spiritual School of the Universal Commune. Its teachings combined a millenarian vision of anti-Americanism with a self-sufficient economic cooperative movement, both indicating that Sandino had given up on reforming the Nicaraguan state.²³ Sandino even minted coins to be used in the Segovias that called the region the Northern Republic of Nicaragua—and featured one of his rebels beheading a U.S. Marine.

Few, however, gave Sandino much of a chance for victory. One U.S. journalist who had been in-country for half a year noted how Sandino was indeed popular as a symbol,

but not powerful as a leader. "He did not represent public opinion in Nicaragua. He had the sentimental sympathy of great numbers of Nicaraguans, but the voluntary support of only a few... Few people in Nicaragua were really interested in throwing the Americans out of the country, even though they might not love them... It is not easy to weigh Sandino or his movement, but this is certainly true—that his chief significance was that he served as a focal point for all the undoubted dislike and jealousy and distrust toward the United States in Latin America."²⁴ When Sandino refused direction from Communists in Mexico, his weakness—the lack of a state—became apparent. He still could hide from U.S. Marines, but grew more desperate for supplies and adherents. The rest of the story is well-known: Sandino soon sued for peace and secured the departure of the last Marines, but was betrayed by Anastasio Somoza, head of the U.S.-created National Guard, whose men soon thereafter took Sandino out to an airfield and shot him dead.²⁵

Why are these events relevant to today? Because current leaders in Latin America are reviving the self-conscious marginality of the 1910s and 1920s while—and this is key—fusing them with the strategies of the 1950s and 1960s to take over the state and use it against neo-liberalism. Castro in 1959 achieved power backed mostly by white middle-class youths and relatively comfortable rural workers, groups well acquainted with the standards of U.S. culture, political democracy, and consumerism, and who often aspired to those standards. Castro himself was of landowning Spanish ancestry, well educated, and an admirer of Franklin Roosevelt. Chávez and Morales's supporters, in contrast, included a broader representation of gender, age, and skin color—groups who were poorer, more desperate, and angrier.

Let us take Venezuela again. There, Chávez's failed coup of 1992 was not merely the effort of one elite group against another. It both fed on and coincided with uprisings by those traditionally left out of middle-class party politics during the Cold War. On February 27, 1989, the announcement of higher transportation fares to pay for a fuel hike sparked violent confrontations in twenty cities, in which as many as fifteen hundred Venezuelans died. This violence was novel because it involved not students or guerrillas but slum dwellers. For that reason the 27th became known as "the day the shantytowns came down from the hills." "For five days, large crowds of people took over the streets, entering shops, looting, breaking windows, burning tires, and stealing cars," as one scholar described it. "The poor and the marginalized residents of the shantytowns, as well as many considered middle class, were no longer passively accepting price inflation, food shortages, and the collapse of social services."²⁶

This same popular element rioted after two attempted coups in 1992, one of these being Chávez's. Meanwhile, the proportion of public opinion favoring radical changes grew from 51 percent in 1995 to 63 percent in 1999.²⁷ Not surprisingly, this proportion was similar to that of Venezuelans living in poverty (55 percent) and those working in the informal economy (53 percent). These numbers support the claim that Chávez was not an instigator but a follower of a popular revolt.

Chávez himself comes from the interior plains, far away from the cultural cosmopolitanism of Caracas, and his base lies largely in the *ranchos*, the slums surrounding the capital. In both these areas, the desire for a better life has long been present, but was rarely associated with the United States. As explained by a friend of Chávez who came from

the same area, "It's like we're from West Virginia or a place like that. We don't have the same codes or cultures. City people know rock-and-roll. We don't know rock-and-roll."²⁸ Moreover, Afro-Venezuelans are now estimated at between 12 and 15 percent, and they also have found in Chávez—a mixed-race Indian-black—a new champion who denounces racism and celebrates diversity.²⁹

The poor, blacks, and women have supported Chávez because he had made drastic changes in their lives. The most common comment from a Chávez supporter is that the government had done something for him or her *for the first time ever*. "I have lived through lots of different governments," said one poor woman. "This is the first time in my life that the government has done something for me."³⁰ For instance, the government subsidized food markets and laid potable water pipelines in slums. It pushed through land reforms. It traded cheap oil to Cuba in exchange for seventeen thousand doctors and teachers to provide free and accessible services. It built housing, health clinics, railroads, and literacy programs. Millions for the first time had access to medical and dental care, education, and micro-credit. One Latin American analysis estimated that 73 percent of Venezuelans have benefited in some way from Chávez's reforms.³¹

Besides supporting Chávez in every election, the formerly disenfranchised are actively involved in his defense. Not only did they give him their support at the ballot box several times, but, in 2002, when opponents staged massive demonstrations, similar or larger numbers came out on the side of their beloved leader. When the anti-Chávez media encouraged work stoppages, slum dwellers kept showing up for work.

Like Sandino, Chávez has also made efforts to identify his regime with the dispossessed, not only inside his

country but outside of it. Not only did he extend favorable petroleum rates to several Latin American countries, but he heartily welcomed the World Social Forum to Venezuela for the first time in January 2006. During this protest from “below” against U.S.-led globalization, tens of thousands marched through Caracas to oppose the U.S. war in Iraq. A few months before, in November 2005, Chávez slipped away from the other heads of state gathered in Argentina’s Mar del Plata for the Summit of the Americas to address 25,000 activists at a “counter-summit” in a nearby soccer stadium.

This revolt did not necessarily need to be anti-American, but the opportunity was there and Chávez seized it. Chávez set himself against the political parties long allied with U.S. capital and the U.S. government. He also punished the well-to-do by cracking down on corporate tax evasion, and pursuing the likes of Coca-Cola and McDonald’s. But it was U.S. actions, especially the George W. Bush administration’s failure to condemn a coup attempt against Chávez in 2002, that allowed Chávez to further identify with marginal Venezuelans, for instance by portraying himself as a Jesus-like martyr. When Chávez accused the Bush administration of “wars of domination,” he added that if Jesus were alive, he “would be confronting the U.S. empire.”³² On another occasion he said, “There has been no way of talking with this administration. They don’t respect us. I’m tired of trying to carry out the mandate of Christ, turning the other cheek. I’ve been slapped so many times, my cheeks are purple.”

Chávez even spoke of Bush as an associate of his domestic opponents, whom he called “the Devil”: “*El diablo* has an owner from the north that is capable of anything,” he said. “Here in Venezuela we are confronting a savage conception of privilege that dominates the world... This

is the same idea that Christ fought against when he confronted Roman imperialism.” During the referendum, he likened the “no” vote against his recall to the “no of *Cristo* against imperialism.”³³ Chávez is no doubt guilty of overheated rhetoric—he’s called President Bush “Mr. Danger” and “asshole” and in March 2006 he asked that the white horse on Venezuela’s flag face left rather than right so as to no longer be “imperialist.”³⁴ But it is more important that, in the end, he joined many in identifying his state with the fortunes of the traditionally marginalized.

Though Chávez, like Castro, is an original, in several countries of Latin America groups identifying overwhelmingly with racial or ethnic profiles have been articulating anti-U.S. visions. In 2003, for instance, protests by Aymara Indians in the highlands of Bolivia led to riots that caused the death of seventy and the flight to Miami of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada. The exiled president, a free market economist, was hated for his plan to export the country’s natural gas to California while, back in Bolivia, the Aymaras, dwelling thirteen thousand feet above sea level, continued to live without heat. One Bolivian described the “gas revolt” as part of a “mountain chain of indigenous uprisings in reaction to U.S. neo-liberalism in Latin America, the most radical thing that has appeared in thirty years.” An indigenous leader, known as the “condor,” suggested a more unforgiving race-based vision: “Whites are here as renters on our land, and we need to put a giant fence around them, a reservation, a safe place for white people to be.” He felt himself at war “against gringo neoliberalism and racism, and [wanted] to change our government to an Indian one.”³⁵

Out of this ethnic frustration has emerged Morales, the first indigenous president in Bolivia’s 180 years of independence. The champion of indigenous coca growers who

tired of the U.S. government's attempts to crack down on them as suppliers rather than stamp out the U.S. demand for cocaine, Morales declared in his acceptance speech, "long live coca and down with the *Yanquis*."³⁶ He added that "the [U.S.] zero-coca policies haven't worked," and when he met with Secretary of State Rice, he presented her with a *charango*, a traditional Bolivian musical instrument decorated with coca leaves.³⁷

For the U.S. government, perhaps the only silver lining in this cloudy situation is that the poor have traditionally not been as anti-American as other groups in Latin America. Unfortunately, few polls during the Cold War asked the poor what they thought, especially neglecting the *campesinos* in the interior, who often lived in near-feudal desperation. One exception proved this rule. A USIA poll in 1961 claimed to be "the first time anyone had systematically sought the views of the semi-literate, poor campesinos" in Latin America. Interviewers completed the study "despite great difficulties" as local elites denied them permits and jailed them. The elites, it turned out, were right to worry. According to the poll, peasants rejected both capitalism and communism as a way of life. They preferred "socialism," by which they meant land reform. They also felt, interestingly enough, that the U.S. government was rather sympathetic to these hopes.³⁸

A 2004 poll from Venezuela confirms this perhaps universal concern of the poor with economic progress over anti-U.S. protest. As a whole, Venezuelans showed more concern with economic bilateral relations than with any other issue. When asked what came to mind when thinking of the United States, the most common answer was economic power, at 32 percent. More important, socio-economic differences clearly emerged, when a whopping 45 percent of the least educated Venezuelans answered

“Don’t know,” while only 3 percent of those with a university degree answered similarly. Furthermore, those with less education who had a specific answer tended to focus on economic and military power, while those with more education disproportionately emphasized cultural and social issues. The poll, when coupled with other evidence, suggested that the poor in Venezuela have generally not had enough exposure to “Americanization” to form much of an opinion about it; or else they were too suspicious of poll-takers to venture an answer. It is this economic desperation, coupled with unfamiliarity with the United States—this lack of “knowing rock-and-roll”—that makes the poor the great “swing” factor of anti-Americanism. If Washington can persuade them that their economic well-being lies in greater collaboration with the United States, and not with handing over the state to hostile populists, it may yet have a chance to reverse the current trends.

Generations of anti-U.S. resistance movements in Latin America provide a surprisingly rich backdrop for comparing and contrasting anti-Americanism. Through the three generations portrayed here—the 1920s, the 1960s, and the 2000s, each separated from the previous one by forty years—the state was the locus of power, but not always of anti-U.S. activity. Anti-Americanism arose outside the state when U.S. power acted within it, and inside the state when U.S. power loosened its hold on it. For this reason, opponents of U.S. occupations early in the century called themselves nationalists, but they developed anti-U.S. campaigns both “below” the state at the local level and “above” it at an international level. Castro’s generation saw U.S. power over dictatorial states weakened, and so moved to take over the state. Perhaps the most important conclusion is that, now that U.S.-led neo-liberalism appears to show little

concern for both the poor *and* the state, these two are uniting against U.S. power all over Latin America.

While it is true, therefore, that Castro still remains in power partly by exploiting the theme of vigilance and unity against a constant U.S. threat to his island, he is no longer the model of anti-Americanism. That model resides in several disparate groups of indigenous protesters from Mexico to Bolivia, who suggest that anti-Americanism has come full circle while having evolved in its identities and methods. These groups share characteristics with the generation of Sandino, such as a non-European identity and the ability to operate outside the nation-state. Unlike the Sandino generation, however, they make use of new communication tools such as the Internet, decades of political organization, and their focus on the ballot box. They are potentially the most powerful anti-U.S. movements in Latin American history.

NOTES

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- provided a more decent standard of living. A second reason for caution is that I said Venezuela's responses were "generally typical" because they moved along with Latin American opinion, but they were also, perhaps surprisingly, friendlier than that of other countries. This is perhaps partly explained because polls were taken uniquely in Caracas, the capital, which was, more than other South American capitals, wealthier and whiter than the rest of the country and so more prone to identify with the United States.
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Rethinking Young Anti-Americanism in South Korea

Youngshik Bong
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In December, 2002, a U.S. court martial of two servicemen who had been charged with driving an armored vehicle over two Korean school girls and causing their death found the defendants not guilty. This decision triggered the outbreak of a widespread and intense anti-American protest movement in the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea). More than two hundred thousand citizens participated in a series of daily candlelight vigils in front of the U.S. Embassy building near the City Hall of Seoul, mourning the death of the students and protesting the U.S. government's failure to acknowledge its moral responsibility for the accident and to sincerely appreciate the sensitive feelings of the Korean people, while hiding under the shield of the legal technicality of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

The movement also addressed South Koreans' displeasure with what they perceived as increasingly arrogant militaristic behavior on the part of the United States and reflected the fear that the U.S. might choose to render South Korea's national security and efforts at reconciliation with the North expendable. The anti-American movement erupted only two weeks before the 2002 presidential election and made a huge political impact. The widespread criticism toward the United States clearly favored Roh Moo-hyun, the

progressive-minded Democratic Party candidate who had advocated that South Korea prepare herself to take an independent stance from the United States in engaging North Korea. With the electoral victory of Roh, who had suggested during his election campaign that anti-Americanism was not necessarily a bad thing, many in and outside South Korea came to view the conventional foundations of the Korea–U.S. relationship as unstable and possibly broken.¹

Although anti-Americanism has become a handy buzzword for many, there are still a number of issues that remain unexplained or underspecified. Perhaps it is an opportune time for everyone who has engaged in the “anti-Americanism cottage industry” to ponder whether we have accumulated enough knowledge and gained a strong enough analytical grip from which to handle the delicate and complex nature of Korean anti-Americanism.

Despite the fact that the international media regularly covers Korea–U.S. relations, and that commentators of various political backgrounds and leanings have eagerly come out of the woodwork to offer their views on the status of the alliance and the causes of tension, there seem to be only two areas of agreement: 1) the alliance has outgrown the memory of the Korean War; 2) Korean youth are endangering the alliance with their sense of nationalism and anti-Americanism. This is a surprisingly meager yield, given all the political energy, policy interest, and academic inquiry that have been invested in this new cottage industry during the last few years. And yet, to what extent do Korean youth serve as what one analyst calls the “wildcard” in the future of the alliance relationship?² Are they such a distinct political group that new policies need to be developed to reflect their interests? To win them back to the old ways? To what extent does the youth factor (or generational gap)

explain the causes, characteristics, and consequences of the recent popular expressions of anti-American sentiments? This paper is intended as an exercise to rethink what we know and do not know about anti-Americanism.

There is a need to carefully examine the assumption that new nationalism among Korean youth generates anti-Americanism, which in turn endangers the bilateral alliance and the national security of Korea. We argue that numerical correlations between age and so-called anti-American sentiments are both limited and inconsistent. Rather, contextual analysis—the effect of democratization within Korea, the transnationalization of political movements, and the evolving regionalization of pop culture and identities—complicates the assumed nationalism and undermines the simplistic explanation of generational change. We emphasize that political sentiment and popular expression do not necessarily translate into political interest and policy choices. To that end, we illustrate the rather stable and practical responses to the new disruptions and changes in the bilateral relationship in the recent period, irrespective of generation and of sentiment towards the United States.

The complex inter-generational dynamics in South Korea today has definitely eroded the traditional *raison d'être* of the bilateral security relationship that had long been comfortably nested in the common experience of the Korean War and Cold War. The upsurge in a critical attitude among post-Korean War generations toward the United States indicates that, after half a century, the bonus of an unconditionally pro-American attitude since the Korean War no longer exists. Yet, it is erroneous to characterize the new dynamics in South Korea as a prelude to the termination of the security alliance with the United States.³

ANTI-AMERICANISM: YOUNG AND RECKLESS?

During 2003 and 2004, two years after the outbreak of the anti-American movement in South Korea, apocalyptic outcries and laments over the end of the bilateral security alliance—South Korea choosing North Korea over the United States and the United States abandoning “ungrateful South Korea”—prevailed.⁴ What particularly troubled Korean observers on both sides of the Pacific was the seemingly emotional and irrational basis of the drifting alliance. In particular, these observers felt that youthful ignorance, shortsightedness, and wishful thinking (that North Koreans are not so dangerous and that South Koreans can afford to alienate the United States) abounded. These factors supposedly created the notion that “such is the temper of the times that South Korea’s most popular ‘bubblegum pop’ girl band—a heretofore entirely apolitical group with a reputation for extreme wholesomeness—released a harshly anti-American MTV-style video.”⁵

In addition, a 2001 survey of fifth and sixth graders in south Kyongsang Province, one of the most conservative regions in the South, found that 42 percent identified North Korea as “the friendliest nation toward South Korea,” with the United States playing second fiddle at 39 percent.⁶ The Kim Dae Jung administration has been primarily blamed for turning the Korean public towards foolhardiness through its overly optimistic engagement policy.

A more serious Korean academic who has been following these issues similarly noted the ascendance of younger generations into the political fray: “One consequence of democratization and institutional reforms has been the economic decline of the older generation and the rise of the younger generation... The older generation is also being

pushed to the political and social sidelines. This generation is perceived as supporting the status quo and resistant to reform... In addition, [the younger generation's] easy access to information [technologies] and ability to create and mobilize political networks gives them the ability to be an effective political force."⁷

Indeed, age and support for the United States and the bilateral relationship do correlate. Even pre-democratization, in 1985, 78 percent of the youth (versus 56 percent of the general public) believed that "Korea was too closely identified with the United States."⁸ Major Korean surveys conducted between 1990 and 1992 also revealed that a higher proportion of those in their twenties (even more so among college students) held a negative opinion of the United States than people in their fifties and older.⁹ In the midst of heavy protests in the winter of 2002–2003, a U.S. State Department survey found that the younger generation viewed the United States less favorably than older respondents (favorable: 32 percent of 20s and 69 percent of 50s+). Moreover, only 22 percent of the group in their twenties versus 42 percent of the over-fifty group considered the U.S. military presence in Korea as "very important."¹⁰

It is true that past labors for a democratic society in South Korea have produced not only new laws, but also political institutions and unexpected configurations of social mobilization. They have also produced progressive-minded, experimentation-oriented, and outspoken youth who seem to confound the worldview and political sensibilities of older Koreans and most Americans. Although no one on either side of the Pacific outwardly blames democracy for making a mess of the fifty-year-old alliance, Koreans and Americans have eagerly echoed each other's

“explanation” that younger Koreans are to blame for the tensions, misunderstandings, and divergent interpretations and priorities between the two countries.

But younger Koreans are not unique in their critical attitudes towards the United States. According to the 2002 Pew Global Attitudes survey, 44 percent of Canadians below thirty had unfavorable views of the United States, compared to 20 percent in the 50–64 age group.¹¹ Two decades earlier, during a time of anti-nuclear/anti-U.S. protests led by the Greens and other progressives in West Germany, “the German rejection of and mistrust toward the United States” was “especially pronounced among the younger generation.”¹² Moreover, France and Germany, who in recent years have become the featured anti-American nations in Europe, defy the general correlation between nationalism and anti-Americanism. According to the categories of nationalism established by Pew in 2003, France and Germany “are among the least likely, of all nations surveyed, to say their culture is superior, that their way of life needs protection, and that other lands really belong to their countries.”¹³ Nationalism may be a compelling argument for those seeking a neat and quick explanation for the seeming anti-Americanism around the world, but the concept is difficult to define and disaggregate, and simply put, explains too little.

Similarly, however compelling the idea may seem, youth itself does not explain foreign policy orientation, and does not necessarily translate into historical amnesia, blind nationalism, radicalism, or anti-Americanism. For example, in Japan, the traditional “enemy” of the modern Koreans, it is the older generation that keeps its eyes, ears, and minds closed to the realities of Japan’s war atrocities. Despite the negative repercussions for Japan’s regional and international status, the younger generations are more eager to step up

to the historical plate and acknowledge past wrongs, mend old wounds, and forge new friendships with their regional neighbors. Younger Japanese busily exchange views on the Internet, work cooperatively with Korean Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and admire the cultural products (film, videos, music) imported from their nation's ex-colony. In turn, Korea's most popular Internet portal, Daum, recently hosted ten thousand blogs and cafés dedicated to introducing Japanese culture to South Korea. This is compared to just fifty blogs and cafés promoting anti-Japanese views. A newspaper survey also indicated that only a quarter of Koreans in their twenties said "they did not like Japan."¹⁴ Since the Kim Dae Jung administration's initial elimination of legal prohibitions against Japanese cultural imports in 1998, and the lifting of bans on imported Japanese music, films, computer games, and comics in early 2004,¹⁵ Korean youth have become avid consumers and producers of a pop culture that is sweeping the East Asian region. The *Financial Times* called this "Korean Wave" a "phenomenon."

In a sense, Asian youth are overcoming conventional nationalism through the regionalization of pop culture, making connections across national and historical boundaries and stepping away from old enmities that governments and older generations seem unable or unwilling to give up. Donald McIntyre of *Time* magazine's Asia edition describes the dizzying popularity of Korean pop music, or "K-pop," in recent years: "The \$300 million domestic market is the second largest in Asia, topped only by Japan's massive \$2.9 billion in album sales last year [2003]. K-pop has broken across borders: teenagers from Tokyo to Taipei swoon over performers such as singer Park Ji Yoon and boy band Shinhwa, buying their CDs and posters and even learning Korean so they can sing along at karaoke. BoA [an iconic

Korean female singer] this year became the first solo artist in more than two decades to have a debut single and a debut album reach No. 1 in Japan. 'Korea is like the next epicenter of pop culture in Asia,' says Jessica Kam, a vice president for MTV Networks Asia."¹⁶

Such developments are not without some cost to American power and influence. Japanese anthropologist Koichi Iwabuchi observes that there is a connection between the relative decline of American cultural power and the rise of "localized," "Asianized" pop in much of East Asia in the last decade.¹⁷

Such observations should not be mistaken for wishful thinking that hip hop and film can bridge decades of mutual suspicion and hostility and pave the way for cooperation and peace for the future generations in Asia. Indeed, a survey published in the well-known monthly, *Wolgan Chosun* found that 60.3 percent of Koreans in their twenties held unfavorable views of Japan, as opposed to 39.7 percent with favorable views. Yet the article emphasized that there is a substantial generational gap in anti-Japanese nationalist sentiment between the young and those in their fifties. Among the latter, only 17.7 percent had favorable views of Japan, while a decisive 73 percent had unfavorable views.¹⁸ The causes of the generational shift in such sentiments are not clear, but if "soft power" through cultural attraction, imitation, and adoption is as potent a facilitator of shared values and supportive actions between national communities as Joseph Nye purports, then the increasingly shared culture among East Asian youth may be more politically loaded than we currently recognize.¹⁹ It is not impossible to imagine the evolution of novel and creative regional identities among Asians during the next fifty years.

To focus on nationalism as a main cause of anti-Americanism without placing it in the context of broader social

and cultural trends in East Asia is misleading. Globalization and regionalization are powerful forces, coterminous and coexisting with nationalism. These forces challenge and transform norms, laws, and institutions within societies. For example, South Korea and the Philippines rank among the most nationalistic nations surveyed by Pew in 2003: 82 percent of Koreans and 81 percent of Filipinos believe that their way of life needs protection from foreign influence (compared to 51 percent of Germans, 63 percent of Japanese, and 64 percent of Americans). 90 percent of Koreans believe their culture is superior to others, compared to 33 percent of French, 40 percent of Germans, and 60 percent of Americans who hold such a view (Pew reminds us that majorities around the world, except in Western Europe, believe in the superiority of their own culture).²⁰

But despite such overwhelmingly protectionist tendencies regarding foreign influence in Korea and the Philippines, support for globalization among Asian nations is highest in Korea and second highest among the forty-four nations in the Pew 2003 Global Attitudes survey. A whopping 84 percent of Koreans view the impact of globalization on their country favorably.²¹

Again, Koreans, who are highly homogeneous in terms of language, ethnicity, and cultural practices and are often described as highly ethno-nationalistic, rank among the lowest in opposition to immigration restrictions. In 2003, only 7 percent “completely agree[d]” that more restrictions should be placed on entry into their country. This contrasts with 46 percent of Americans who “completely agree[d]” with the statement, even though Americans live in one of the most ethnically and culturally diverse societies. It is important to remember the rapid social, economic, and political changes that Korea has been undergoing since the 1990s. For example, nearly overnight in the 1990s, South

Korea became a labor-receiving country, with hundreds of thousands of migrant workers, documented and undocumented, coming from poorer countries, particularly China, Southeast and South Asia. Although some Koreans have exhibited xenophobic reactions to the foreigners, “the normative aspects of globalization—emphasis on human rights, democratization, pluralism and cross-culturalism—have helped fuel the MWMs [Migrant Workers’ Movements]” in Korea.²²

Even though resurgent nationalism can be a reaction to the pressures of globalization, Koreans tactically used globalization as a way to advance national power with outward-looking, cosmopolitan tendencies. Korean political scientist Chung-in Moon was one of many who emphasized the need for Koreans to adopt the more normative aspects of globalization: “Inward-looking and xenophobic biases cannot cope with the challenges of spontaneous globalization. Peace education, education for human capital formation and cross-cultural education constitute critical components of managed globalization... Cross-cultural education assists individuals in transforming themselves into citizens of the world.”²³

Given the dynamism of Korean youth and their environmental context, therefore, it is illogical to attribute historical amnesia and resurgent nationalism to them as if those are the only political and cultural influences that surround them. In reality, it is the younger people, in their twenties and thirties and even some in their forties, who have been developing a new consciousness about peace, human rights, and multicultural orientation in Korea and around the world. Leaders of the Korean House for International Solidarity (KHIS) and their people-to-people campaign toward Vietnam serve as just one example.

Since the mid and late 1990s, KHIS has investigated and publicized both the atrocities Korean soldiers committed toward Vietnamese civilians during the Vietnam War and the need for reconciliation between Korea and Vietnam. In 2000, they helped organize a “goodwill mission” to Vietnam, in which Korean dentists and other medical professionals volunteered their services to Vietnamese villagers and their descendants who had suffered violence by Korean troops. They have also organized and staged an annual music/arts festival to raise funds to assist Vietnamese victims of war, and have been working with *Hankyore Sinmul*, a progressive Korean newspaper company, to raise funds for a “peace park” to be built in Vietnam. They conducted such efforts while simultaneously participating in the social movement to revise the Status of Forces Agreement with the United States. In spring of 2002, one of the leaders of KHIS stated that their fundraising efforts for the Vietnam project drew larger sums than for any “anti-American” protest or program.²⁴

The work of KHIS is noteworthy for three reasons related to U.S.–Korea relations. First, in contrast to American officials’ oft-mentioned complaint that Koreans only seek to criticize U.S. policies and actions but overlook their own government’s and nation’s faults,²⁵ KHIS has insisted that Koreans must take responsibility for past wartime atrocities and assist those who have survived, and not merely point their fingers at Japan and the United States for military abuses. Second, contrary to the popular view that nationalism is what drives anti-Americanism, KHIS is addressing an issue that is quite “anti-nationalist” and unpopular among Koreans, especially among political elites and veterans. Third, KHIS is intent on using new democratic freedoms and the transnationalization of ideas and politics to address issues, interpretive frameworks, and audiences heretofore

neglected or ignored by other Korean NGOs/activists as well as the general population.

Younger Koreans have also been at the forefront of forging peace movements and challenging the near-sacrosanct institution of the military draft. This challenge has been made on distinct legal grounds that emphasize human rights and gender equality: 1) conscientious objector status;²⁶ 2) internal military violence against conscripts; and 3) gender discrimination (due to the work points system that automatically benefits males in employment situations).²⁷ Such moves were inconceivable, let alone impossible, during most of the Cold War years under military dictators. Regarding young Koreans as politically naïve or economically complacent because they grew up in times of relative wealth and stability does not make sense unless one also emphasizes the fact that they grew up in a social and political environment of relative freedom in the 1990s. They do not long for the right to speak out against the government or for independent opinions like their predecessors had in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s; they take it for granted. In addition, no form of authority—whether their own government or the U.S. government and its troops—is off limits to them. So, if political naiveté and economic complacency are consequences of political freedom, then Korean youth must not be singled out for blame or admonishment.

Most important is the need to distinguish between youthful expression and policy choices. In contrast to common belief, evidence shows that Korean youth are pragmatic and differentiate between sentiment and interests, both personal and national. For example, although 68.5 percent of Koreans in their twenties, versus 49.1 percent in their fifties, held favorable views of North Korea in June 2002 (compared to 29.6 percent and 40.5 percent of those in their twenties and their fifties respectively, who had unfav-

vorable views), 82.6 percent of both age cohorts had unfavorable views of Kim Jong Il.²⁸ Haeshook Chae's analysis of a college student survey that involved 1,076 college students in 22 universities in Korea supports this claim.²⁹

Chae finds that young Koreans know how to distinguish between their *feelings* toward North Korea as a people and their *judgment* of the North Korean leadership. She compares the mean scores of the respondents' sentiment toward North Korea, the United States, and the Kim Jong Il regime, measured in the ten-point scale (one being the most positive and ten being the most negative). Interestingly, the result suggests that young Koreans' negative sentiment toward the Kim regime (7.3 point) surpassed that toward the United States (7.2) or toward Japan (6.7), while their sentiment toward North Korea is the most positive among countries (5.9).³⁰ This finding implies that young Koreans are not as divergent as other generations in their collective attitude towards the issue of balancing national security and national reconciliation with the North. This is because they embrace North Korea as a part of the divided country, but loathe the regime as a source of threats and dictatorship.

Furthermore, the young generation in South Korea does not appear predisposed to prioritizing "nationalist" agendas at the expense of material gains. Young Koreans tend to approach ideological issues such as patriotism, nationalism, unification, and sovereign independence on normative and idealist grounds. But, once these issues directly affect their personal interests, they can exhibit a remarkable turnaround.

Such dualism results in apparently self-contradictory reactions and positions. For example, Koreans in their twenties and thirties may denounce the imperialist conduct of the United States, but many of them desire to have U.S.

citizenship and support the government's decision to join the U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq in order to secure U.S.-Korean cooperation over the North Korean issue.³¹ Again, the young know how to distinguish between perception/sensibility and choice/decision. More significantly, they have one constant: They acknowledge the importance of the alliance relationship and support it for the sake of national security and economic stability. In April 2003, after several months of intense public demonstrations against U.S. policies and decisions, *Donga Ilbo*, one of the leading newspaper companies in Korea, found that large majorities of Koreans in their twenties and thirties were in agreement with their older counterparts in acknowledging the importance of the U.S. military presence for security purposes on the Korean peninsula (20s: 78.1 percent; 30s: 84.3 percent; 40s: 86.4 percent; 50s: 89.3 percent).³²

Therefore, the alarmist arguments for "young and reckless" anti-Americanism brewing in South Korea and its pro-North Korean inclination are exaggerated in tone and underspecified in their causal mechanisms. It would be a gross misunderstanding if young Koreans were collectively deemed pro-North Korean dissidents or antagonistic nationalists, and their activism portrayed as one of destructive hostility.

"MISSING ANTI-AMERICANISM":

NATIONALIST SENTIMENT VS. POLICY PREFERENCE

There are reasons to be surprised by the way that both sides of the Pacific have come to terms with the phenomenon of anti-Americanism since the eruption of massive protests in the winter of 2002–2003. Considering all the disruption and commotion, policy has been managed in a surprisingly calm, effective, and unruffled manner.³³

For example, both countries successfully concluded a sixteen-month negotiation on relocation and reduction of U.S. Forces in South Korea (USFK). The negotiations were inevitably arduous, and checkered by push-and-pull and give-and-take between the two governments over the timing and scale of the reconfiguration of the security alliance. However, it should be noted that the negotiations were neither dominated by violent emotionalism by the public nor by a perception of any significant mutual abandonment. The negotiations were focused on streamlining the USFK in the context of global restructuring, while leaving no security void in Korea and augmenting the combat readiness and deterrent capability of the ROK forces.

Once the United States notified the Korean authorities of its decision to pull out a brigade of the USFK in May 2004, there were sporadic attempts by the conservative mass media to portray the U.S. decision as setting South Korea up as a model to demonstrate that the United States would never station its troops in a country where they are not welcome. In short, conservatives sought to prove how reckless and shortsighted young liberals had been with respect to national security. Yet, such attempts to stir up underlying fear among the Korean public in order to attack the government's foreign policy did not appear to be effective. The general perception of the change in the alliance system was remarkably measured and stable. It was largely in agreement with the message articulated by President Roh Moo Hyun in his Independence Day speech in 2003, wherein he emphasized that it was a necessary and somewhat overdue cost that Korea should be ready to assume. Considering the widely accepted warning a few years ago that, if mismanaged, talks on the reduction of the USFK could easily become "like the worst divorces [and] the emotional results of dissolving the alliance could be worse

than the situation that led to the break in the first place,”³⁴ one might well ask what prevented the negotiations on force restructuring from producing “profound bitterness and lasting resentment between the two allies.”

For starters, South Korea was consistent in rendering support for the U.S. war effort in Iraq. The Roh government sent 660 medics and engineers (*Jema* and *Seo-hee* units) one month after the presidential inauguration. In trying to cope with worsening situations in post-war Iraq, the United States subsequently requested that South Korea send additional troops, mainly composed of combat units, and on a far larger scale. After long deliberations, the National Assembly passed a bill sanctioning additional peacekeepers. The troops were officially deployed to help rebuild the Kurdish-controlled northern Iraqi town of Irbil in early August, 2004.

For those who acknowledge that the Roh regime was heavily indebted to anti-American sentiment for its victory in the 2002 presidential elections, these developments came as a big surprise. This is because the dispatch of the Korean troops in Iraq was one of the most divisive issues in domestic politics since the inauguration of that government. Enlarging its involvement in the Iraq war was hardly a popular political choice for the Korean political leadership. For example, according to a spring 2003 survey of 1,542 college students in Korea, 88.3 percent regarded the Iraq war as an “imperial invasion” by the United States. Only 4.7 percent of the respondents defined the war as a just war.³⁵

Results of the Gallup Korea opinion survey conducted with all age groups in March 2003 yielded similar results: Only 9.7 percent of the respondents said they agreed with the war aims the United States officially articulated to justify its decision to attack Iraq. Three quarters were against any type of military involvement, even in case the United

States would ask for more assistance. Only 16.1 percent said that Korea should send its troops to Iraq, about 13.1 percent down from the level of support during the 1991 Gulf War.³⁶ Opposition to Korea's involvement did not significantly diminish a few months after the actual outbreak of the war. In a poll conducted in September 2003, opinion against dispatching Korean troops far outweighed opinion in favor (56.1 vs. 35.5 percent).³⁷

In addition to such general aversion to the Iraq war, political events in early 2003 further complicated the decision to dispatch troops. The landslide victory of the ruling Uri party and the gains of the Korean Democratic Labor Party (KDLP) in the 17th National Assembly election in April 2003 provided huge momentum for progressive civic activist groups and liberal National Assembly members. Moreover, in June 2004, Kim Sun-Il, a Korean who had been working for a trading company in Iraq, was captured and beheaded by an Islamic militant group. Even before Kim's capture and death, coalitions of more than three hundred civic organizations launched a series of protests and candlelight vigils to force the government to reconsider its decision to send troops. About twenty members from both ruling and opposition parties, mostly elected for their first term, initiated collective action in collaboration with civic organizations to block the passage of the troop deployment bill. The Roh government had justified the decision to send troops mainly on the ground that it was indispensable to preventing the U.S. government from transferring part of the USFK to Iraq. Given the U.S. decision to go ahead with the plan prior to the Korean government's decision, the opposition groups argued that reneging on the promise to send troops to Iraq would be a rightful *quid pro quo*.

However, collective action against the troop deployment was never strong enough to produce a political impact

comparable to the massive demonstrations in December 2002. During the first half of 2004, the most controversial issue was the ratification of the free trade agreement between South Korea and Chile, *not* the dispatch of troops. The National Assembly passed the troop dispatch bill before that of the Korea–Chile free trade agreement (FTA); the process of voting to ratify the latter bill was postponed three times in less than a month. While the anti-Iraq war rally organized by activist groups drew only about fifteen hundred participants, a crowd about ten times larger gathered for the anti-FTA rally organized by the farmers' coalition. Moreover, while the FTA agenda caused major defections by ruling party members against the government's preference for immediate ratification, the troop deployment issue did not. In the general meeting held on June 17, 2004, the day after President Roh met its leaders, the ruling Uri party confirmed that it would be the party's official position to support the government decision to proceed with the troop deployment plan as scheduled.³⁸

Even more surprising than the conclusion of the two sensitive issues—U.S. troop reduction and the deployment of Korean troops in Iraq—was the fact that neither of the cases was converted into a violent anti-American movement. At no point during the entire period of negotiations for relocating and reducing the USFK did the revision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) emerge as a critical issue.

The absence of the SOFA discourse is a remarkable turnaround, considering that an opinion survey conducted at the peak of the anti-American movement in 2002–2003 revealed that 96.2 percent of South Koreans believed SOFA should be rewritten or revised.³⁹ Besides, the public reaction to the events was largely measured, devoid of

a wild sense of betrayal by the United States and panic over national security. There emerged a general consensus among academics, officials, and civic activists, reflecting a wide spectrum of different ideological and policy perspectives on the security alliance between South Korea and the United States, that it was best to understand the inevitability and positive benefits of restructuring the alliance system.


Phrases like “continu(ing) to reduce the American footprint on the peninsula,”⁴⁰ “more distance in the alliance,”⁴¹ “practice of distancing (遠美, *won-mi*)”⁴² were not interpreted as severance of ties, abandonment, or resentment. In fact, according to the 2004 foreign policy survey by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 60 percent of South Koreans thought that lowering U.S. troop levels in Korea would be “good for Korea” (11 percent said very, 49 percent somewhat), while 40 percent expressed concerns (6 percent very bad, 34 percent somewhat bad).⁴³

It is also quite miraculous that the hostage incident in Iraq did not galvanize public opinion in South Korea to place blame and responsibility for the tragedy on “imperialist America.” Nor did it lead to the forging of a strong consensus for immediate withdrawal from the U.S.-led campaign. Instead of accusation and blame, the South Korean public mostly approached the unfortunate incident from the perspective of human rights violations and anti-terrorism. For instance, when the progressive *Joengyojo* (Korean Teachers’ Union, KTU) announced its plan to mourn the death of Kim, it explained that the weeklong extra-curricular activities would mainly involve anti-war education. As for the main themes, these activities were designed to provide young students with opportunities to be reminded that peace is a universal value and that violence would only breed more violence.⁴⁴ In cyberspace,

Internet users engaged in a series of heated debates among themselves about whether their country should contribute more actively to anti-terrorist campaigns after this personal tragedy. On balance, grievance over the loss of life and a condemnation of violence, rather than blame and spiteful faultfinding, dominated the collective psychology of the Korean public.

These are certainly positive developments in the U.S.–Korea relationship. However, if we juxtapose what happened in 2002 and in 2004, these changes are perplexing anomalies. It should be recalled that almost everyone who wrote about anti-American sentiment in Korea said that there had been a series of events leading to its actual high-point in late 2002. There was no shortage of writing on the wall: Bush condemned North Korea as one of “the axis of evil;” Anton Ohno walked away with the gold medal at the short track final race of the winter Olympic games; Jay Leno mocked the disqualified Korean skater, joking that he was so angry that he ate his dog; and the two U.S. soldiers who had been charged with the deaths of two Korean female students were judged not-guilty by the U.S. military court.⁴⁵

The situation in 2004 was remarkably similar. South Koreans remained fearful of possible unilateral military action by the United States against nuclear North Korea, as they witnessed the Bush administration launch a war on Iraq without the endorsement of the United Nations. The war was soon followed by the scandal of abuses at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Again at the Olympics, Paul Hamm, an American gymnast, edged ahead of two Korean gymnasts and won the gold medal in the individual Men’s All-Around because three judges had failed to award a Korean the correct points (based on the degree of difficulty)

Figure 1: **Changing Image of the United States in South Korea**

for his routine. Then, the President of Harvard University mistakenly said that, “over a million girls in Seoul during the 1970s were prostitutes.”⁴⁶ And famous talk show host Oprah Winfrey made disparaging comments about Korean women for their “obsession with plastic surgery.”⁴⁷ In real-life politics, President Bush praised and thanked Japan for its support in the Iraq war in both his acceptance speech at the Republican convention and during the first presidential debate, but made no mention of South Korea’s contributions. And both presidential candidates affirmed that in dealing with North Korea, a policy of preemption would not be off the table. In short, if one compares the litany of small and large events, the general atmosphere between South Korea and the United States in 2004 was not markedly better than two years earlier. As a matter of fact, cumulative public poll data indicates that the image of the United States in South Korea, which nosedived in late 2002, returned to its pre-2002 level in 2004 (see Figure 1).

What accounts for this fluctuation of opinion? Why has there been no outburst of anger towards the United States?

After all, a period of two or three years is not long enough for either generational change to take place or for a certain age group to reverse its orientation on key political issues. For anti-Americanism, the passage of time has only augmented the voice of the age groups who are more critical of the United States, since the conservative and pro-American older generations are mostly retired or deceased.

One could suggest that both governments took measures that successfully prevented mutually sensitive issues from developing into full-fledged anti-Americanism. Although it is quite plausible that the governments might have learned a lesson or two from what they had experienced, there is no strong evidence that they actually made conscious and coordinated efforts not to repeat past mistakes, despite the advice of specialists on U.S.–Korea relations that it was essential for both leaderships to celebrate the solidarity of the alliance in a rather explicit and embellished way. According to them, this could abate the escalating tensions and antagonistic feelings fostered by aggressive media and public relations campaigns to educate both countries' citizens to the facts and the role of the SOFA, aggressive public diplomacy towards civic organizations, and the elaborate celebration of the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Mutual Security Treaty. But these suggestions were not seriously implemented.⁴⁸ In short, within a period of two years, anti-American rhetoric in South Korea dissipated regardless of political interventions.

The phenomenon of the “missing anti-Americanism” in South Korea leads us to rethink what we thought we knew but in fact did not know about Korean anti-Americanism, and to reassess what now seem to be known unknowns. For starters, anti-Americanism is a misnomer, a term that clouds rather than clarifies our understanding of what has happened in the domestic politics of Korea and

its relationship with the United States. Uncritical usage of the term easily creates perceptions of an anti-American movement in South Korea as something unprecedented, unfounded, unpredictable, and dangerous. This perception has promoted frustration, a sense of hurt and anger among the Korean people on the one hand, and between Koreans and American observers on the other hand. This has allowed analysts and policymakers to divert their attention from understanding the substantive characteristics of anti-Americanism in Korea and its complex nature. As William Watts observes, what the United States has observed may be more accurately characterized as a decline in *pro*-Americanism, rather than as the rise of anti-Americanism.⁴⁹

Moreover, we need to remember that anti-Americanism is a multi-faceted phenomenon. One consensus among researchers on anti-Americanism in South Korea is that anti-Americanism means many things to many people, defying a clean-cut definition.⁵⁰ Its definitions range from “critical views of the United States held by Koreans, including perceptions of U.S. policies and the behavior of individual Americans, especially those in uniform,” to “any hostile action or expression toward the United States, its government, domestic institutions, foreign policies, prevailing values, culture, and people,” to simply “an increase in criticisms of, and dissatisfaction with U.S. policies” or “South Koreans’ antipathy towards America.”⁵¹

The multiple definitions of anti-Americanism do not necessarily imply confusion among its observers. Rather, it casts doubts about regarding anti-Americanism as a monolithic concept. Anti-Americanism is a phenomenon and a trend, the analysis of which should be made in a particular historical and political context. Chung-in Moon and Chai-bong Hahm caution that it is important to distinguish between the different layers of anti-Americanism.⁵²

For example, anti-Americanism as a collective grievance towards the political entity of the United States is not fixed, but tends to fluctuate with changes in Korean domestic politics and U.S. foreign policy. In contrast, South Koreans as a whole have tended to embrace the universal values embodied in the American culture and system. The sporadic, inconsistent, and ambivalent manifestations of anti-American sentiment in Korea primarily result from the dynamic shift in the balance between these different strands: historical grievances, domestic politics, U.S. foreign policy and transnational values and norms.

Making sense of South Korea's ever-changing and complex sentiments towards the United States must be especially challenging for the United States, which has become so accustomed to believing that the majority of Koreans have only one image of the United States, that of a savior and patron responsible for Seoul's security and prosperity since the beginning of the Cold War. Victor Cha and David Kang highlight the irony of the long success of American military engagement with South Korea. They argue that, because the United States was so deeply accustomed to having South Korea as an obedient and dutiful ally throughout the Cold War, it has failed to remember that the anti-communist, conservative and dependent South Korea that existed during the Cold War may have been more of "an aberration than the rule."⁵³ Hence the sudden arrival of a vocal, independent, and democratic South Korea that refuses to manage the alliance according to American preferences and rules came as a total shock to U.S. policymakers and the American public.⁵⁴

What is needed today is for the United States to make an effort to maintain a sound working relationship with Korea despite the absence of the old premium it has enjoyed since the Korean War and the Cold War. With

the rapidly growing civic participation in domestic politics since the inauguration of the first civilian government in 1992, especially in the areas of national security policy-making, and the rising national pride and confidence fed by economic development, post-Cold War South Korea has increasingly refused to tolerate American heavy-handedness and the asymmetric structure of the security partnership. In the United States, the predominant response to such a different South Korea has largely been emotional bitterness and a grudge over the alleged breach of faith and ingratitude. Such emotional reactions in the United States stem from unrealistic expectations of a “feeling of genuine warmth towards the U.S.”⁵⁵ The image of America as a savior continued to dominate the national psyche of Koreans more than half a century after the end of the Korean War, and the military alliance forged in the aftermath of the Korean War fifty years ago should continue to operate without major restructuring. A vibrant, young, and democratic Korea is not an easy reality, but a reality to begin with nonetheless.

CONCLUSION

Democratization in South Korea began in 1987 when Koreans regained their political rights to freely choose their leadership through direct presidential election. The end of military authoritarianism also granted previously alienated political actors an access to debates and deliberations on the issues of national security and unification. The advent of the Roh Moo-hyun administration in 2003 was a symbolic affirmation of a steady trend in which the anti-communist and alliance-first principle of the conservative elite establishment became subjected to serious questioning and reappraisal both in and outside the leadership.

The generation gap is one of the most defining features in South Korean politics today. On the one hand, youth represents the rise of progressive or left-leaning politics, and threatens to dislodge the political establishment that has been in power. Young people who are politically active and former dissident activists who dominate the Blue House (President's Office) are referred to pejoratively as *ppalgaeng-i* ("reds," "commies"). On the other hand, progressives tend to pigeonhole conservatives as well, excoriating them for corruption, elitism, and dependence on big powers. Each fears that the other is misguided and ruining the nation. This Manichean tendency is the most regrettable consequence of the rapid democratization of South Korea. But it also reveals the ongoing transitional malaise and resentment that accompany the structural upheavals in political ideology, generation, class identity, regional and international competition, and related factors, in contemporary Korean society.

The collective expressions of anti-American feelings reflect tumultuous new political dynamics in South Korea. Yet, the task before policymakers and academics is to look past the great confusion and contractions in the political scene and carefully consider their nature, causes, and consequences. There have been generational transitions underlying the anti-American movement, but the connection between youth and the danger of anti-Americanism is underspecified and largely under-explained. Apocalyptic forecasts so popular just a few years ago seem misplaced and misleading in the face of placid but productive interactions between the two allies today.

In order to maintain and renew their working relationship, both sides of the Pacific first need to escape from their old inertia, and admit, beyond mere rhetorical concessions, that the context of the bilateral relationship as well as

the domestic politics of both countries has truly changed. There is no doubt that civic activism in addressing and protesting against the U.S. military presence will continue. Yet these political movements will increasingly tend toward “lawfulness” in procedure and moderation with pragmatism in goals. In the long run, democratic consolidation is likely to have a stabilizing effect on feelings of anti-Americanism among the youth, and lead to its pragmatic manifestations.

NOTES

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How “Big Brother” Became the “Great Satan”

CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AMONG THE MUSLIM COMMUNITIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

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Anti-Americanism is not a new phenomenon in Southeast Asia,¹ but over the past few years, and certainly in the wake of the attacks on the United States of America on September 11, 2001, it has taken on an increasingly religious character. While the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) region has always been troubled by insurgent, autonomous and militant movements,² the rise of religiously-inspired militancy with the United States as its primary focus is a new phenomenon that troubles the ASEAN heads of state. Understanding this new phenomenon of religiously inspired anti-Americanism requires some understanding of the history of the ASEAN region itself, and of its convoluted relationship with the United States, which has been a major player in Asia.

America's presence in Southeast Asia was felt during and immediately after the end of the Second World War. The United States came stepping into the void that was left by the former colonial powers, and established a firm foothold in countries like Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines³ as well as Malaysia⁴ and Indonesia. America's universities became the models for Southeast Asian universities, America's industries were emulated and replicated locally, and American political culture was seen as the stan-

dard against which constitutional democracies should be run and managed. American technocrats, consultants and specialists worked hand-in-glove with their Southeast Asian counterparts, helping to re-model the economies and societies of the region according to the American prototype.⁵

It should be noted that America's entry into Southeast Asia at the time was widely welcomed by the governments and political elites of the region, who regarded the United States as a crucial ally during the Cold War and the sole power that could stop the advance of communist forces that were on the move in countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. The American government in turn openly endorsed and supported the governments of Malaysia (under the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman (1957–1969), Tun Razak (1970–1976) and Hussein Onn (1976–1980), the Philippines, Thailand, South Vietnam as well as those of Laos and Cambodia.

From the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s, much of the support shown by Washington to its Southeast Asian allies during the Cold War was guided mostly by *Realpolitik* concerns. Yet, as commentators like Pilger (1990) and McMahon (1999) have argued, the conduct of the anti-communist campaign in Southeast Asia was to incur a devastating cost in terms of the loss of lives of Southeast Asian citizens and the loss of respect for the United States.⁶

In Vietnam, the American government proved to be the most stalwart and influential supporter of the embattled regime of Ngo Dinh Diem. Due to extensive media coverage of the war, news of the Vietnam conflict spread throughout the region and became the rallying point for anti-American activists in the neighboring countries of Southeast Asia.

In the Philippines, the legacy of American involvement has likewise been a sore point with many local oppo-

sition groups. While the Vietnam War was raging, Washington was keen to ensure that the Philippines would not fall under the sway of the communists. Through agencies such as the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) and the American-created Philippine Civil Affairs Office (CAO), the American government managed to reorganize the Philippine armed forces and intelligence services and place pro-American leaders like Ramón Magsaysay in key positions of power.

A similar scenario was developing at the same time in the neighboring country of Indonesia, where American-Indonesian relations had been problematic from the beginning. When Indonesia unilaterally declared its independence from the Netherlands in 1945, it was the United States that attempted—on more than one occasion—to block subsequent attempts by the Dutch to regain control of their former prized colony. However, the Indonesian government under Sukarno was unwilling to accept any form of aid or military assistance from the United States for the simple reason that such a move would jeopardize Indonesia's neutral stance. In April 1955, in an attempt to keep the countries of the developing world beyond the sphere of influence of both the Western and Eastern blocs, Indonesia hosted the Bandung Conference, bringing together the leaders of the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa.

American intervention in Indonesia intensified in September 1958 when the Eisenhower government authorized its agencies to lend covert support to anti-government militias on the islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi that had turned against the central government of Indonesia. This tit-for-tat game of Cold War insurgency and counter-insurgency only came to an end in 1965, following the ill-fated *putsch* against the government initiated by Lieutenant-Colonel

Untung and members of the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, PKI).⁷

In the anti-communist crackdown that followed, it was the United States that was behind the right-wing elements of the Indonesian army and security forces. Working with other right-wing militias (including the more radical and violent Youth Wings of Islamist groups like the Nahdatul Ulama), the republican forces of the Indonesian army virtually exterminated the entire PKI membership and its support networks.

From 1965 onwards, the United States (with the backing of Australia and Britain) was the biggest supporter of the “New Order” regime of General-turned-President Suharto. With the rise of Suharto and the military elite, Indonesia embarked on a ferocious purge of leftists and communists; forcibly annexed Irian Jaya in 1968 and East Timor in 1974. Suharto’s government was dominated by American-trained military officers, such as General Benny Moerdani and General A. M. Hendropriyono, who were opposed to any form of dialogue or co-operation with the country’s Islamist parties and movements.

America’s support for anti-Islamist regimes like that of Suharto is one of the reasons why the image and perception of the United States began to shift from the 1970s onwards. During the 1950s to 1960s, the Islamist movements in Southeast Asia still regarded the United States as an important ally in the struggle against communism, an ideology they regarded as fundamentally un-Islamic.

But by the 1970s, due to the growing perception of the United States as a dominant military power in the region, Southeast Asia had become a fertile ground for dissenting groups, agents and actors primarily opposed to their own governments, and by extension the American government that was seen as the main pillar of support behind these lo-

cal regimes. In Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, 1974 marked a turning point in local politics as student movements in these countries rose in protest against their own governments and what they regarded as their Western backers. The event that sparked the round of protests in all these countries was the proposed visit of Japan's Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka to Southeast Asia. By then Japan was seen as yet another pro-Western country bent on exerting its will and economic clout against a defenseless Southeast Asia, and the condemnations of both Japan and the United States were uttered in the same breath.⁸

During the protests of 1974, students in Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur marched to the Japanese embassies as well as the American embassies, calling for the withdrawal of American troops in Vietnam.⁹ It is important to note, as Kamarazaman does, that by the 1970s the discourse of anti-Americanism in predominantly Muslim countries like Malaysia and Indonesia had shifted from a secular-leftist to a more Islamist register, and that many of the campus-based student movements were led by Islamist activists.¹⁰

The first step to understanding how the discursive shift to Islamism and its political expression took place in the 1970s has to begin by taking into account how the local political dynamics of a predominantly Muslim society ends up limiting the range of options for that society to act upon. In the case of the countries of Southeast Asia, this occurred as a result of the anti-communist struggle, which in turn eliminated a number of other democratic alternatives along the way. The second factor that contributed to the emergence of Islamism as a counter-hegemonic force in these societies is the process of globalization, which hastened the rush towards a global market and the dismantling of the older institutions of the state in the developing South. Developments in communications technology also brought the Mus-

lim world closer together, and helped Islamist opposition groups in Southeast Asia interact with one another while keeping abreast of developments in other parts of the Muslim world.

By the mid-1970s, new student-led Islamist organizations such as the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, ABIM) that consciously rejected the developmental model of the West, valorized the Islamist policies of Iran and Pakistan, and hoped to struggle towards an “Islamization from below” in their own countries emerged in Malaysia and Indonesia.¹¹

During the 1970s ABIM condemned the American government for its role in the conflicts in the ASEAN region, particularly America’s involvement in the internal politics of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines and Indonesia. Supportive of the global trend of Islamic resurgence in the 1970s, ABIM then became the biggest supporter of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. The leadership of the ABIM movement (then under Anwar Ibrahim) then praised the Iranian revolutionaries for their commitment to Islam. In 1979, the leaders of ABIM visited Iran and met personally with the Ayatollah Khomeini. Upon their return from Iran, they called for an “Iranian Liberation and Solidarity Day,” to be held on March 16, 1979.

The emergence of movements like ABIM in Malaysia was symptomatic of the changes taking place in Southeast Asia’s Muslim society as a whole. At the same time, developments in Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Algeria and other countries demonstrated that the post-colonial elite in these Muslim states were unable to carry out their developmental projects to the end, as many post-colonial leaders instead succumbed to the temptation of living in now-vacant colonial palaces.¹²

As the crisis of post-colonial governance deepened, the sphere of contingency expanded to engulf practically all avenues of government and law. There seemed no hope of finding a cure within the system, so those who were disillusioned merely looked beyond the frontier of the state. Here they found what they were looking for: Political Islam, or "Islamism."¹³

Islamism began as an urban phenomenon and developed within the cosmopolitan environment of the modern Muslim city. The battle for the future of Islam was fought between secular elites and the newly emerging defenders of political Islam who combined the discursive tools of Islamist ideology with the instruments of modern communication, mass mobilization, networking, and political organization. It is no coincidence that the current wave of global Islamism has been most visible in Muslim states with the highest urbanization rate. It should also be noted that the first major Islamist revolution in the world took place in Iran, one of the most urbanized Muslim countries in the world (50 per cent in 1980¹⁴).

Funded in many cases by Saudi Arabia and other Arab donors and patrons, these Islamist movements quickly took up the social responsibilities that were once the prerogative of the state. They set up alternative education networks, communication and logistical infrastructures, and local organic linkages, as well as propagating their own brand of often conservative and oppositional Islamic politics. This was meant to serve as a corrective measure against what they regarded as the imposition of secular, liberal and Westernized ideas and values by their own Westernized elites and governments. Seen in this light, Islamism became, in a sense, the Muslim world's response to globalization and Western values. As Bobby Sayyid has argued, "The rise of Islamism

was only possible when the availability of Islam could be articulated into a counter-hegemonic discourse.”¹⁵

In the 1970s and 1980s, Islamist groups in Southeast Asia—like their counterparts in Iran, Pakistan, and the Arab world—began to articulate this new Islamist discourse with vigor. At its crudest, it manifested itself in the anti-Western rhetoric of the Ayatollah Khomeini, who summarily condemned the United States as the “Great Satan.” The simplistic oppositional dialectics of Khomeini were taken up in earnest by the Islamists of Southeast Asia, particularly by the leaders of the Malaysian Islamist party, PAS.¹⁶

It was in the 1980s and 1990s that the discourse of oppositional politics in the predominantly Muslim countries of Southeast Asia began to shift to the Islamist register. In Malaysia this was due in part to the fact that the only opposition parties and movements that could mount an effective challenge to the state were Islamist groups like PAS and ABIM. In Indonesia the depoliticization process had forced the Islamists to go underground and alter their tactics, opting for a culturalist approach to Islamization that sought to Islamize Indonesian society rather than its political institutions.

In both Malaysia and Indonesia the growing popularity of the Islamists was based on their claim that they were prepared to condemn the West (notably America) for its treatment of Muslims abroad, as well as on their willingness to accuse their own governments of being pro-American lackeys. In time the critique of American foreign policy (notably America’s perceived support for Israel and its policy towards the Arab world) was conflated with the critique of the weak governments of Malaysia and Indonesia, who were unable or unwilling to speak out on behalf of Muslims worldwide.¹⁷ Following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the leader of the Malaysian Islamic Party PAS, Ustaz Yusof Rawa, openly declared that his party was in opposition, not only to

America and Israel, but also to all the Muslim governments not prepared to take part in the war in Lebanon in support of the Muslims there. This necessarily included the Malaysian government as well. PAS’s leaders also expressed open support for groups like Hizbullah, which they regarded as allies in the struggle against both American military hegemony and Zionism.¹⁸

Throughout the 1980s and until the 1990s, the form and content of the oppositional discourse of the Islamists in Malaysia and Indonesia took on a more evidently anti-American character.¹⁹ By the time of the first Gulf War of 1990–1991, America had come to figure prominently in the discourse of oppositional Islamist parties and movements in Southeast Asia such as PAS. Denouncing the United States as an “imperialist power,” the leaders of PAS expressed their support for Saddam Hussein and the people of Iraq. PAS’s president Ustaz Hadi Awang was one of the international Islamist leaders who traveled to Baghdad to demonstrate support for Saddam’s government,²⁰ while PAS leaders called for all Muslim countries to support the *jihad* against the United States and Israel.²¹

The anti-American rhetoric of the Islamist groups in Southeast Asia was sustained throughout the 1990s and reached its peak following the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 and President George W. Bush’s declaration of a global “war on terror.” In Malaysia and Indonesia, Islamist groups and parties like PAS, Laskar Jihad, Fron Pembela Islam (FPI) and the Majlis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI) orchestrated massive demonstrations against the invasion of Afghanistan by American-led coalition forces. On October 8, 2002, the same day that American forces began their invasion of Afghanistan, the leaders of PAS mobilized their members for the biggest demonstration of Islamists in the streets of Kuala Lumpur. Carrying ban-

ners and posters with slogans like “We love Jihad,” “Crush America” and “Taliban are our brothers,” members of the party demonstrated before the gates of the American embassy in Kuala Lumpur while similar demonstrations were being carried out by Islamist parties and movements in Indonesian cities like Jakarta, Jogjakarta, Surakarta, Bandung and Surabaya.²²

PAS’s leaders then came out with their strongest anti-American statements yet. The party’s president Ustaz Fadzil Noor, stated, “The United States has attacked a small and defenseless country like Afghanistan without showing the world strong reason or proof; (and) they are war criminals. If the Americans are really waging a war against terrorism, why don’t they attack Israel, who are terrorists against the Palestinians?”²³ For the *Murshid’ul Am* (Spiritual Leader) of PAS, Tuan Guru Nik Aziz Nik Mat, the attack on Afghanistan was clearly an attack on Islam and Muslims in general. Speaking out in defense of the Taliban government, he claimed that “the U. S. hates the *Taliban* because the latter is firmly committed to upholding Islamic values. Osama bin Laden is just an excuse for the U. S., which has time and again shown its hostility towards Islam, to wage war against the religion.”²⁴

In neighboring Indonesia, groups like the Front Pembela Islam and Lashkar Jihad immediately mobilized and took to the streets as soon as America announced its unilateral move to confront its foes abroad. But by 2002, Indonesia was also caught in dire straits of its own. The country’s President, Megawati Sukarnoputri, flew to Washington to discuss the implications of Indonesia’s involvement in the international campaign against Osama bin Laden and the Taliban—though it was soon clear that the sensitive matter of Indonesia’s spiraling debt problem was also on the agenda. *Realpolitik* considerations aside, the Islamist parties

and movements in Indonesia were less pragmatic in their approach to the problem. The Indonesian President was warned by the country's Islamist groups (and members of her own government, such as Vice President Hamzah Haz) that any attempt to appease the Americans would lead to a backlash at home with heavy political costs. The Philippines was likewise forced to deal with a backlash from Islamists in the troubled province of Mindanao in the south. Soon after the American response was made known to the international community, the Abu Sayyaf group renewed its attacks on Filipino government installations and outposts all over the province, and a new wave of hostage taking was soon underway.

The Bush administration's unilateral "war on terror" has therefore had many long-term and far-flung consequences for Muslim and non-Muslim relations. For the countries in Asia with sizeable Muslim minorities, it reopened old wounds after decades of internal civil conflict, and served as a justification for clamping down on local Muslim resistance movements.

President Bush's support of strong ASEAN leaders who are willing to join him in his global "crusade" against terrorism has reawakened widely held fears of "Big Brother" America intervening in the affairs of Southeast Asia all over again: Washington's active endorsement of the anti-terror campaign in ASEAN; its recognition of Thailand as a major "non-NATO ally;" and its open endorsement of ex-military strongmen like Thailand's Thaksin Shinawatra and Indonesia's American-trained Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono have all contributed to the popular perception that America has simply reverted to its old tactics of gunboat diplomacy and mercenary support of dictators working to serve the needs of Uncle Sam.

Washington's relative indifference to the methods and tactics used in the so-called "war on terror" in the ASEAN region has also been a cause of concern for Islamists, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), human rights groups, and civil society organizations all over the region. The resurgence of violence in Southern Thailand from 2004 to 2006—which received relatively less media coverage from the Western media compared to the problems in Darfur (Sudan), Palestine, Afghanistan or Iraq—confirmed the suspicion held by many Southeast Asian Muslims that Western double-standards were again at work and that the lives of Muslim were worth much less than that of non-Muslims.

The negative image of the United States persists for many of the Islamist groups and parties of Southeast Asia. Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon that began in mid-July 2006, Islamist parties and movements like Malaysia's PAS and ABIM and Indonesia's wide array of Muslim groups from the Majlis Mujahideen Indonesia to the Fron Pembela Islam once again took to the streets of Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta to denounce the United States alongside its allies Britain and Israel. While flags and effigies of American leaders were set on fire, the leaders of Islamist movements like PAS reiterated their calls for Muslim unity against the United States, which has by now been defined as the primary threat to the Muslim world and the enemy of Islam.²⁵ Clearly, the days when America was seen as the ally of the Islamists in the common struggle against communism are long over. The shift in the Islamists' perception of the United States from friend and ally to enemy was not accidental: It has as much to do with the effects of American foreign policies abroad (in particular in the Arab and Muslim worlds) as with the Islamists' reaction to those policies.

Today the image, standing, and perception of the United States in the eyes of Southeast Asia's Muslims is at an all-time low. Rightly or wrongly, America is seen and presented by the Islamists of the region as the true inheritor of neo-colonialism in ASEAN today. Among the Muslims and Islamist activists of the Southeast Asian region, America's standing and image has been doubly damaged: firstly due to its support of anti-Islamist and anti-Muslim regimes in the case of the Philippines and Indonesia; secondly for its perceived double-standard in dealing with Israel and the Arab-Muslim world.

Linked to America's support of repressive regimes in the ASEAN region was its singular failure to identify, assist, and promote genuinely progressive Islamist actors, agents, movements, and trends. This is particularly true in the case of Indonesia, which, as the world's biggest Muslim country, could and should have been allowed to play the pivotal role of model Muslim state for other developing Muslim countries in the South, as well as Malaysia, where political Islam is now a major factor on the Malaysian political landscape.

America's intervention in Indonesian affairs, as we have alluded to above, was primarily directed towards channelling military support and technical aid and training to the Indonesian regime and its military supporters within the Armed Forces of Indonesia. From 1965 to 1998, the United States paid little attention to the evolution of political Islam in both Malaysia and Indonesia, preferring to work almost exclusively with the governments of both countries. It was only in the wake of September 11, 2001 that Washington began to demonstrate a keen interest in the development of political Islam in Indonesia. But it was Washington's indifference to the growing currents of Islamist activism in Indonesia and Malaysia over the past four decades that has left it out of touch with the new actors and agents on the local scene.

The Islamists' negative perception of the United States in turn has to be understood in the context of the wider background of a resurgent Asia that feels itself burdened by an overbearing partner who has simply thrown its weight around the region. If Southeast Asia's Islamists are angered by America's militarist adventures abroad, the economists and business community in Asia are angered by its fiscal neglect and follies as well. If the Islamists are outraged by America's mismanagement of affairs in Afghanistan and Iraq, the economists and business community of Asia are dismayed by the Bush administration's singular failure to impose even a modicum of discipline and normality on the American-Asian trade balance. Southeast Asian NGOs are, in turn, angered by the United States' intransigence on matters such as the Kyoto Treaty on the emission of polluting gases, as well as the fact that the United States remains the nation that consumes and pollutes more than any other on the planet.

America's failure on both fronts—economic and political-strategic—is the real reason why the image of the United States is so poor in the Southeast Asian region at the present moment. Thanks in part to their role in exacerbating the economic inequalities and deficiencies in the developing world, successive American governments have helped create the socio-cultural, political and economic circumstances that favor the rise of radical groupings in search of a change and a new socio-political order. America's cavalier and mercenary approach in dealing with the “Communist threat” in Southeast Asia in the 1960s to 1980s achieved its military goals, but, in the course of doing so, it also eliminated scores of other progressive, secular political trends that might have served as the foundations of a democratic civil society in the future. In the void that was created with the extermination

of the leftist opposition came the Islamist conservatives, to whom the United States was initially oblivious, and of whom it was only recently wary.

Washington's failure to appreciate the fact that there are really two ASEANS—divided between the islands of wealth, power and cosmopolitan culture of the cities and the underdeveloped seas of poverty and relative backwardness in the countryside as well as the urban slums —means that America's contact has been solely with the urbanized and Westernized elite of the countries in the region. In the predominantly poor Muslim-dominated countryside and urban ghettos of Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, it is a different story altogether. It is there that the battle for hearts and minds has been won, not by the United States and its ASEAN allies, but by the Islamists of Southeast Asia.

NOTES

- 1 For the needs of this paper, our definition of "Southeast Asia" shall include all the countries that were the founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), that is Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines. It also includes the countries of mainland Southeast Asia, which are Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Burma/Myanmar, as well as the tiny Malay Sultanate of Brunei.
- 2 For a more detailed overview of the security concerns affecting Southeast Asia and the governments of ASEAN, see Andrew Tan, ed. *Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Select Publishing, 2001).
- 3 America's return to the Philippines was not without precedent as it had previously colonized the country after defeating and ousting the former colonial power, Spain. For a detailed account of America's colonization and re-colonization of the Philippines, see Wolff, Leon. *Little Brown Brother: How the United States Pur-*

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- 4 The American presence in Malaysia came in the form of intelligence operatives that were sent to accompany the British military establishment that was ordered to restore government in Malaya following the defeat of Japanese troops in 1945. For a detailed account of the American presence in Malaya in 1945–1946, see Noor, Farish A. *Islam Embedded: The Historical Development of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party PAS, 1951–2003* (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 2004), 44–45.
 - 5 For an account of such direct government-to-government cooperation between the United States and ASEAN countries such as the Philippines, see Broad, Robin. *Unequal Alliance: The World Bank, The International Monetary Fund and the Philippines* (Manila: Ateneo De Manila University Press, 1988).
 - 6 See Pilger, John. *A Secret Country* (London: Vintage Press, 1990); and McMahon, Robert J. *The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
 - 7 For an account of the last days of Soekarno and the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party, see Degge, John D. Soekarno: *Biografi Politik* (Yakarta: Penerbit Sinar Harapan, 2001).
 - 8 See Kamarazaman, Yacob. *Bersama Anwar ke Penjara* (Petaling Jaya, Transgrafik, 1994), 45, 61.
 - 9 For an account of the anti-American demonstrations in Malaysia, see *ibid.*
 - 10 *Ibid.*
 - 11 For an account of the development of ABIM and other student campus-based Islamist movements in Malaysia and Indonesia in the 1970s, see Ahmad-Noor, *Islam Embedded*.
 - 12 For an analysis of the developmental problems in post-colonial Southeast Asia and its related social impact, see Rigg, Jonathan. *Southeast Asia: A Region in Transition* (London: Unwin-Hyman, 1991).
 - 13 For a detailed elaboration of the meaning and use of the term “Islamism,” see Sayyid, Bobby S. *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Rise of Islamism* (London: Zed Books, 1998).
 - 14 See Lubeck, Paul M. and Bryana Britts, “Muslim Civil Society and Urban Public Spaces: Globalisation, Discursive Shifts and Social Movements” in *Urban Studies: Contemporary and Future Perspectives*, eds. Eade, J. and C. Mele (London: Blackwell, 2001).

- 15 Sayyid. *A Fundamental Fear*, 73.
- 16 For an analysis of the discursive shift in the rhetoric of PAS's leaders during this period, see Ahmad-Noor, Farish. "Blood, Sweat and Jihad: The Radicalisation of the Discourse of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) from the 1980s to the Present" in *The Journal of the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies* (Singapore) 25. no. 2 (August 2003).
- 17 For a more detailed account of the anti-American and anti-governmental polemics used by opposition Islamist parties and groups in Malaysia in the 1980s and 1990s, see Noor, *Islam Embedded*, chap. 4, vol. II, 329–449.
- 18 Ibid, 344–349.
- 19 Ibid, chap, 5, vol. II, 450–566.
- 20 Ibid, 453.
- 21 Ibid, 455. Though it should be noted that despite the threats issued by the leaders of the Malaysian Islamic party, not a single member of PAS actually traveled to Iraq to take part in the Gulf War.
- 22 Ibid, 672.
- 23 Ibid, 669.
- 24 Mohd Irfan Isa, Osama an excuse to wage war against Islam: Nik Aziz, 10 October 2001, available at Malaysiakini.com.
- 25 See Noor, Mohd Musa and Wong Yeen Fern, "Demos End Peacefully at US Embassy," 28 July 2006, available at Malaysiakini.com.

A Plea for Distinctions

DISENTANGLING ANTI-AMERICANISM FROM ANTI-SEMITISM

Brian Klug

INTRODUCTION: THE GOLDEN CALF OF DAVOS

Davos, Switzerland, January 2003: the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum. Indoors, about two thousand distinguished guests, including political leaders and chief executives of some of the world's wealthiest corporations, are debating issues of global importance. Outdoors, a group of anti-globalization protestors who are engaging in street theater are captured on camera by the photographer Fabrice Coffrini. The picture features two masked figures, dressed in monkey costumes, representing U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (center foreground) and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.¹ Pinned to "Rumsfeld's" chest is a yellow six-pointed badge that strikingly resembles the yellow Star of David that Jews were required to wear during the Second World War in Nazi-occupied Europe and in concentration camps, except that it is inscribed *sheriff*.² On the left of the picture, standing slightly behind "Rumsfeld" and with right arm upraised, "Sharon" brandishes a club. The front portion of a yoke rests on "Rumsfeld's" shoulders. (Whoever is supporting the other end is not visible.) Perched on top: a massive dummy golden calf.

Like the Biblical story (*Exodus* 32) to which the protestors' model refers, the Coffrini image has acquired a significance that transcends its immediate context. In some of the

recent literature on anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism, it signifies how, according to the authors, the two sentiments or prejudices have converged.³ Josef Joffe uses the image to open his essay “The Demons of Europe,” interpreting its message as follows: “The United States is in thrall to the Jews/Israelis; both are the acolytes of Mammon; and both represent the avant-garde of a pernicious global capitalism.” He goes on to say, “This is the face of the new anti-Semitism.”⁴ Yossi Klein Halevi likewise introduces his essay “Hatreds Entwined” with a description of the Davos golden calf picture. He comments, “In that photograph is a convergence of the recurring themes of European anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism.”⁵ Daniel Goldhagen calls it an “emblematic image of globalized antisemitism” which, in the form of anti-Zionism, “has become interwoven with anti-Americanism.”⁶ Andrei Markovits, in the course of a long scholarly paper on European anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism, refers to the “openly anti-Semitic iconography” of the scene at Davos.⁷ He argues that “antipathy towards Israel and its accompanying anti-Semitism cannot be separated from a larger enmity towards the United States and what it represents.”⁸

The Davos golden calf image, in and of itself, is unquestionably anti-Semitic, and Joffe’s reading of this image strikes me as about right—as far as it goes. And there’s the rub. In this chapter, I shall take issue with the use to which Joffe et al. put such material in their arguments. Even in the present case, we need more evidence before we are in a position to make a judgment as to whether the message that the demonstrators *intended* to convey was anti-Semitic. And judging by the evidence I have seen, the Coffrini picture could be misleading. It turns out that Rumsfeld and Sharon were just two of several world leaders impersonated by the protestors. Most of them—not “Sharon” alone—were

wielding clubs; several can be seen in another shot using these clubs to bat a giant inflatable globe around.⁹ And while the U.S. Defense Secretary takes the lead in carrying the calf, the remaining figures (all of whom seem to be dressed in the same monkey costume) do not appear to be artfully posed.¹⁰ In particular, “Sharon” is caught in another picture standing apart from “Rumsfeld” and the golden calf ensemble, a face in the crowd, arms lowered, no longer looking dominant as the powerful taskmaster driving the American lackey.¹¹

Moreover, one of the protestors said subsequently that it had not occurred to anyone involved in the demonstration that the design of the badge worn by “Rumsfeld” recalled the Nazi version of the Jewish star.¹² If true, this bespeaks a degree of obliviousness or naivety that is not only astonishing but reprehensible: if you engage in political activism, then you are accountable for the predictable consequences of your political action. As Steve Cohen has written in his analysis of anti-Semitism on the left, “Any group which claims to be against anti-semitism should be ultra-vigilant in the imagery it evokes.”¹³ This group’s best defense is that it was ultra-negligent.

One way or another, the demonstrators are culpable. And whatever they intended, the fact remains that the juxtaposition of elements in the Coffrini picture conveys a message along the lines Joffe describes; which is why I called it anti-Semitic. Nonetheless, the distinctions I have been drawing are important. It is one thing to say that the image, in and of itself, is anti-Semitic; another to ascribe bigotry to the group; a third to attribute the same bigotry to a movement; and so on. In the literature that I shall be discussing in this chapter, the authors do not always respect such niceties.

But suppose the *Guardian* or *Le Monde* were to print a photograph of an Israeli soldier pointing a gun at a Palestinian child. And suppose someone who is sympathetic to the Palestinian cause were to seize upon this picture, interpret it to mean that the soldier was acting with murderous intent, and call it an “emblematic image” of Israel as a state or of Zionism as a movement: these authors would spring to their feet. They would point out, quite reasonably, that while the camera cannot lie, it does not necessarily tell the whole truth: all it can do is capture one angle at a given moment in time. Probably, they would go further. Detecting a bias, they would denounce both the “liberal press” for printing the picture and anyone who used it to defame the Jewish state. Yet, they do not suspect a bias on their own part when, starting from isolated incidents or anecdotes, they jump by leaps and bounds to conclusions about whole groups: the anti-globalization movement, the left, the liberal media, Europe, the Arab world, and so on.

The discussion in this chapter centers on the view—it is really a cluster of views not sharply distinguished from each other—that anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism are so intimately connected they cannot be prised apart. Rabbi Shmuley Boteach has given the idea its simplest possible expression: “Anti-Americanism and Anti-Semitism are the Same Thing.”¹⁴ It turns out that he does not mean that they are identical with each other; he means that they have the same “underlying causes” and that their victims share the same experience. (“Two hundred and eighty million Americans are getting a taste of what it’s like to be Jewish.”¹⁵) According to Daniel Johnson, however, the connection between the two “hatreds” is more profound. He refers to “the conflation of attitudes to the United States with attitudes towards Jews,” and concludes: “Put simply: anti-Americanism has become a continuation of anti-Semi-

tism by other means.”¹⁶ Natan Sharansky’s essay “On Hating the Jews” is subtitled “The inextricable link between anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism.”¹⁷ In a similar vein, Markovits calls European anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism an “inseparable tandem.” He says they are “inextricably intertwined”¹⁸ and talks about their “longstanding interaction.”¹⁹

This language suggests that anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism are distinguishable in principle, even if inseparable in practice. (Two things cannot be said to interact with each other—even to be inextricably intertwined with each other—if ultimately they are one and the same.) On the other hand, when Markovits says that anti-Semitism “has become one of anti-Americanism’s most consistent conceptual companions, perhaps even one of its constitutive features,” he makes it *internal* to anti-Americanism, integral to what it *is* (or has become).²⁰ These are just some of the variations on the theme of inseparability.²¹

I do not wish to contend that anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism are never connected, nor that they have nothing in common.²² But I do deny that they constitute a double-headed monster that is stalking the earth. St. George slew the dragon by the *force majeure* of his sword. I take a different approach: I aim to dissect this monster with a logical scalpel, taking it apart at the joints. I begin in the next section by contrasting the logic of “anti-Semitism” and “anti-Americanism,” arguing that the two terms are not, *au fond*, symmetrical. In the literature I am critiquing, the link between them proceeds partly via anti-Zionism and hostility to Israel.

Accordingly, in the following section I offer an analysis of “new” anti-Semitism. This completes the theoretical portion of the chapter. In light of the argument, I turn to the controversy surrounding an opinion poll conducted for

the European Commission in October 2003. The results showed that more respondents identified Israel as “a threat to peace in the world” than any other state, with the United States second on the list. I argue that certain reactions to the results of this poll are a clear illustration of a mindset that encompasses hostility to America, Israel and Jews: a predisposition either to misconstrue the nature of this hostility or to overstate it, or both, plus a tendency to conflate the different kinds of hostility as if they were ultimately one phenomenon. A brief conclusion places this chapter’s analysis in a larger context.

In speaking of a mindset I do not mean to suggest that the worldview I am criticizing has no basis in reality. No one with a sense of history can doubt that anti-Semitism in Europe runs deep. Furthermore, no one who has been following events over the last few years can think that Jews around the world can afford to be complacent as to their security.²³ In addition, surveys of public opinion attest to a groundswell of feeling against the United States, in Europe and elsewhere, especially in the context of American foreign policy in the Middle East.²⁴ Moreover, it is true that Israel and America are often bracketed together as objects of hostility, that this hostility is sometimes intemperate, and that bigotry can be a factor. Such, you might say, are the facts. However, facts do not speak for themselves. It is up to us to render an account of the picture they compose. The mindset of which I speak races ahead of the facts, knows in advance what they *must* be, and slots them into their predetermined position before they are even established.

Joseph Butler is credited with the elegant truism “Everything is what it is, and not another thing.”²⁵ I would add “No connections without distinctions!” This chapter is a plea for distinctions, but it is not just an exercise in logic. Unless we make clear and cogent distinctions between—

and, where necessary, within—anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism, we cannot make the right connections; and there is a price to pay in the *real* world for lack of intelligence in the *academic* world. Guided by these considerations, I try to distinguish one kind of thing—concept or phenomenon—from another in the following pages. My principal aim is to help lay an analytical foundation for the diverse and complex empirical inquiries that the whole question—the relationship between anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism—calls for, rather than to pursue that inquiry myself. In the process, I hope to show that the two-headed monster is a concoction of the mind, a chimera, a figment that is as fake as the golden calf of Davos.

RECOGNIZING THE “GRAMMAR” OF TERMS

“What is the meaning of a word?” This is the disarming sentence that opens the so-called “Blue Book” that Ludwig Wittgenstein dictated to students at Cambridge University in 1933–1934.²⁶ In a way, it is the sentence that ushers in the later period of his philosophical thought, which occupied him until his death in 1951. Wittgenstein’s question goes to the very idea of a word—any word—having a meaning. So, it can be glossed this way: What do we mean by the meaning of a word?

This might lead us to expect an answer in the abstract, a general theory of linguistic meaning. But this is precisely the approach to philosophy Wittgenstein rebels against in this work and throughout his later period. The opening sentence of the “Blue Book” turns out to be a point of departure for a long and winding path of philosophical investigation into what—idiosyncratically—Wittgenstein calls the “grammar” of words. Roughly speaking, this means paying close attention to a word’s actual use in the ordinary employment of

language. He pursues this activity, not for its own sake, but with a view toward “clearing misunderstandings away.”²⁷ But where do the misunderstandings of which he speaks come from? They arise, paradoxically, from language itself, from certain formal properties that in various ways “tempt” us into conceptual confusion.²⁸ “Philosophy, as we use the word,” says Wittgenstein, “is a fight against the fascination which forms of expression exert upon us.”²⁹

I mention this because disentangling anti-Americanism from anti-Semitism begins with recognizing a difference in the “grammar” of the two terms, a difference we are tempted to overlook due to the fact that the two expressions share a similar form. We are subject in this case (to quote Wittgenstein again) to “the fascination that the analogy between two similar structures in our language can exert on us.”³⁰ Markovits takes it for granted that anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism belong to the same logical category: “Both are ‘isms’,” he says, “which indicate they are institutionalized and commonly used as a modern ideology.”³¹ Similarly, Joffe asks, “What is the difference between criticism and anti-Semitism or anti-Americanism? What, indeed, are the elements of *any* ‘anti-ism’?”³² Thus both Markovits and Joffe assume there is a class of concepts called “isms,” or rather “anti-isms,” all of which are on the same logical footing. This is a natural assumption to make: the structural analogy is strong, and it is tempting to think that words with the same form perform a similar function. But in the case of “anti-Americanism” and “anti-Semitism,” appearances are misleading.

One way of revealing the underlying difference is to remove the affixes “anti” and “ism” from both words. A little reflection will show that the bits in the middle are not logically equivalent. There is such a thing as America: it is an existing political state. The territory, government, institu-

tions, people, culture and history: these are among the many things that the words “America” and “American” denote.³³ But what—in the real world—corresponds to the words “Semite” and “Semitic”?³⁴ Nothing. There is a black hole at the heart of the word “anti-Semitism”; or perhaps I should say a yellow star. Let me explain.

Consider “Rumsfeld’s” ambiguous badge. Viewed as the Nazi version of the Star of David, rather than as the insignia of the office of sheriff, it identifies him as Jewish.³⁵ But what is the meaning of the word “Jewish”? More precisely, what meaning attached to the yellow star that identified Jews as Jewish? Imre Kertész, the Hungarian-Jewish writer who survived a Nazi concentration camp, has reflected on this question in his essay “The Freedom of Self-Definition.” He writes, “In 1944, they put a yellow star on me, which in a symbolic sense is still there; to this day I have not been able to remove it.” What he is unable to remove is the meaning of the word “Jew” that the Nazis invested in the yellow star. He recalls Montesquieu’s dictum: “First I am a human being, and then a Frenchman” and comments: “The racist—for anti-Semitism since Auschwitz is no longer just anti-Semitism—wants me to be first a Jew and then not to be a human being any more.”

In a brilliant dialectical riff, Kertész works through the implications for the victim: “After a while,” he says, “it’s not ourselves we’re thinking about but somebody else.” That is to say, the self that we think about is not our own. I am not my own person. “In a racist environment,” he concludes, “a Jew cannot be human, but he cannot be a Jew either. For ‘Jew’ is an unambiguous designation only in the eyes of anti-Semites.”³⁶ I understand Kertész to be saying that the yellow star was not just a form of identification, picking him out as a Jew, but a whole identity. Pinning the star to his breast, they were pinning down the word “Jewish,” determining

what it means. This meaning or identity—this “unambiguous designation”—belonged to the Nazis, not the Jews.³⁷

When I say that a yellow star lies at the heart of the word “anti-Semitism,” what I mean is this: the star stands for—designates—that “Jewish” identity which was in the Nazis’ possession and which they pinned on Jews. And I call this a black hole because this identity is unreal: it corresponds to nothing. By which I do not mean that no Jews can be found who fit the anti-Semitic stereotype. But this stereotype is a construction, not a description; it does not *describe* what Jews *are* like but *prescribes* what they *must* be like. The “Semite” or “Jew” that is the object of the anti-Semite’s animus is *essentially* unreal: the *product*, not just the *object*, of that animus (or of the ideology informing it).³⁸ Simply, there is no Semitism without anti-Semitism.

But there *is* an America—and even Americanism—with or without anti-American protestors cavorting as apes and ridiculing Donald Rumsfeld.

The difference to which I am pointing is reflected in a difference in the orthography of the two terms “anti-Semitism” and “anti-Americanism,” or rather, in the fact that there is a question about the one but not the other. Which is the right spelling: “anti-Semitic,” “anti-semitic” or “antisemitic”? All three are standard usage. Yehuda Bauer, opting for the third alternative, remarks (very much in the spirit of what I have just been arguing): “Antisemitism, especially in its hyphenated spelling, is inane nonsense, because there is no Semitism that you can be anti to.”³⁹ The point is discussed in a recent landmark report on anti-Semitism in the European Union produced by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC). The authors also prefer the solid version of the word, which will, in their view, “allow for the fact that there has been a change from a racist to a culturalist antisemitism and shall in this con-

text help avoiding [sic] the problem of reifying (and thus affirming) the existence of races in general and a 'Semitic race' in particular."⁴⁰ Perhaps, although this might be overestimating the power of a hyphen or the efficacy of removing one. Be that as it may, my point is this: No one would think of questioning the spelling "anti-Americanism" on the grounds that it reifies America or that it affirms the existence of states; for there is such a thing as America, and states, as it happens, exist.

The argument I am making is open to the objection that the difference to which I am drawing attention, though real, is irrelevant. Yes, America is part of the external world. But the "America" that is the object of anti-Americanism is every bit as imaginary as the "Jew" who is hated by the anti-Semite. Such is the drift of the literature under discussion.

Or is it? The literature is somewhat confused on this point. Take, for example, the sociologist Paul Hollander, author of the classic *Anti-Americanism*.⁴¹ In his Introduction to the recent anthology *Understanding Anti-Americanism*, he says it is a "premise" of the book "that a proper understanding of anti-Americanism can only be achieved by balancing two apparently incompatible perspectives or propositions."⁴² He sets out the two contrasting views as follows: "The first avers that anti-Americanism is a direct and rational response to the evident misdeeds of the United States abroad and its shortcomings and inequities at home. In other words, it is a set of attitudes created and stimulated by U.S. actions and policies and by the character of American social institutions, policies, and the defects and injustices thereof, even by the behavior of individual Americans, especially those abroad in some official capacity."⁴³

In this first view, the "America" that is the object of anti-Americanism is the real thing. Not so in the alternative

view: "In the second and conflicting view, anti-Americanism is a largely groundless, irrational predisposition (similar to racism, sexism, or anti-Semitism), an expression of a deeply rooted scapegoating impulse, a disposition more closely related to the problems, frustrations, and deficiencies of those entertaining and articulating it—be they individuals, groups, nations, political parties, or movements—than to the real attributes of American foreign policy, society or culture."⁴⁴

Hollander goes on to say, however, that it is *only* those who are described by the second view "who qualify for the designation of 'anti-American.'"⁴⁵ Which means that the position described by the first view is not, after all, a form of anti-Americanism. Which means that the first view is wrong. Which obviates the need to balance the two views—which is the premise of the book. This is the logical equivalent of slipping on your own banana skin. The same confusion reappears a few pages later. "The two views of anti-Americanism," he writes, "cannot be easily reconciled." This reminds us of what he said earlier: that it is only by balancing these two views that we can properly understand anti-Americanism. And yet: "It bears repeating that anti-Americanism is a deep-seated emotional predisposition that perceives the United States as an unmitigated and uniquely evil entity and the source of all, or most, other evils in the world."⁴⁶

I have used the word "confusion" but perhaps "vacillation" would be a better word. Hollander seems to be pulled in opposite directions by two different considerations. One is the actual use of the word "anti-Americanism" which, in its ordinary employment, fits positions that are covered by both the views he contrasts. The other, I suggest, is the *a priori* conviction that *only* the second view *can* be right; as if it were somehow built into "anti-ism" words that they *must* function in the same way. In a sense, Hollander's two-mind-

edness does him credit: at least part of him resists the temptation—inherent in the pattern of the words—to insist that anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism *must* be the same sort of thing: an “irrational predisposition.” Most other writers in this genre do not rise to the level of vacillation; they remain sunk in a dogmatic mire.

The difference to which I have drawn attention—the difference between “the bits in the middle” of the two words “anti-Americanism” and “anti-Semitism”—is not irrelevant because it bears on their different “grammars.” Roughly, it comes down to this: whereas anti-Semitism is *necessarily* an “irrational predisposition,” anti-Americanism is not. This is partly because (as Hollander seems to recognize some of the time) the term “anti-American” is equivocal: it applies to a wide range of quite heterogeneous attitudes. Opposing American foreign policy; resenting America’s global influence; rejecting certain social values and cultural practices associated with the United States: all these—and more—might be called “anti-American” without there being a common denominator (except for the fact that in a very loose sense they are all “negative”). In each case, there could be good reasons for being “anti-American;” or reasons that, though insufficient or even bad, do not necessarily betoken an underlying prejudice. The same, however, cannot be said about being anti-Semitic. Recognizing this significant conceptual difference is, as I said near the beginning of this section, where disentangling the one from the other begins.

ANATOMIZING THE “NEW” ANTI-SEMITISM

As if the problem were not complicated enough, there is a third strand, which, in much of the literature I am critiquing, is woven into the argument: hostility to Israel and Zionism. We have seen examples of this in the comments by Joffe et

al. on the Coffrini image of the “golden calf” demonstration at Davos. The basic argument tends to go along these lines:

1. Hostility to America is inseparable from hostility to Israel and Zionism.
2. Hostility to Israel and Zionism constitutes a new kind of anti-Semitism.
3. Therefore, anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism are inseparable.

Is this argument sound? If we grant the first two premises, then the conclusion certainly seems to follow. Both premises, however, are problematic. The first, to say the least, overstates the case, although it does reflect the fact that America and Israel are closely linked in many people’s minds, and that they are often bracketed together as objects of opprobrium or hostility (especially as regards regional conflict in the Middle East). For the most part, weighing this premise is an empirical task and, as such, falls outside the stated scope of this chapter. The claim that is made in the second premise, on the other hand, raises conceptual issues that are crucial to the fate of the argument and, consequently, to the task of disentangling anti-Americanism from anti-Semitism. Discussion of these issues will occupy the remainder of this section.⁴⁷

The second premise says that there is a kind of anti-Semitism that is new, which implies, of course, the existence of an older variety and a contrast between them. This invites two questions: (i) What makes them different *kinds* of anti-Semitism? (ii) What makes both of them kinds of *anti-Semitism*? Let us consider these two questions in turn.

Jonathan Sacks, Chief Rabbi of Britain and the Commonwealth, describes anti-Semitism as “undeniably the most successful ideology of modern times.” He explains: “Its success is due to the fact that, like a virus, it mutates. At

times it has been directed against Jews as individuals. Today it is directed against Jews as a sovereign people.”⁴⁸ This is the standard account of the difference between the “old” and the “new,” and the metaphor of the mutating virus is ubiquitous. Gabriel Schoenfeld develops it into a full-blown conceit: he speaks of “an unexpected twist in the helix of anti-Semitism’s DNA.”⁴⁹ But note the title of his book: *The Return of Anti-Semitism*. Oddly, those who champion the view that there is a new kind of anti-Semitism emphasize that what we are witnessing is the *return* of something *old*; it is the *object* of this hatred which, according to them, is new.

But first of all it is not true that the focus of anti-Semitism in the past was primarily on Jews as individuals. Typically, anti-Semitism was directed against particular communities, while the aim of the Nazi Final Solution, of course, was to eliminate Jewry in its entirety. Furthermore, in the anti-Semitic construction of the “Jew,” there are, in a way, no individuals: the Jewish People are seen precisely as a collectivity that acts as one. If the Jewish *state* (“Jews as a sovereign people”) is a relatively new object of anti-Semitic attack, this is only because Israel is a relatively new entity. In essence, it is just another example of a Jewish collective.

Secondly, in any case, a new *object* is not a new *kind*. Hostility to Israel and Zionism would constitute a new *kind* of anti-Semitism if and only if it were *qualitatively* different from the old; if, for example, it entailed a modified image of the “Jew.” (I shall touch on this possibility later.) But, as I have been saying, when the authors in question talk about a “new kind” of anti-Semitism, they mean the return of the same old motifs, with Israel cast in the role of “the world’s Jew.”⁵⁰ They hear the thud of Nazi jackboots, the splintering of glass on *Kristallnacht*, and declare that the nightmare is back—but centered on the Jewish state. But in this case, they need a different metaphor: not a virus that *mutates*, chang-

ing its properties, but one that *migrates*, relocating from one organism to another.

They can, however, maintain their basic argument—that anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism are inseparable—by amending the second premise thus:

2. Hostility to Israel and Zionism is a form of anti-Semitism.

This revised version of the second premise sidesteps the question of whether, or in what sense, the focus on the Jewish state is “new.” But is the premise true? This brings us to question (ii), which goes to the heart of the matter, and which we can now put concisely as: What is anti-Semitism?

A simple working definition of anti-Semitism is this: hostility to Jews *as Jews* (or *for the reason that they are Jews*). The definition is imprecise but, as the historian Tony Kushner has said, it is “a useful tool.”⁵¹ So, let us utilize it to weigh the second premise. Consider the following two statements: (a) “Hostility to Israel is anti-Semitic for the reason that Israel is a Jewish state”; (b) “Hostility to Israel for the reason that Israel is a Jewish state is anti-Semitic.” There is a sharp logical difference, even if it does not leap to the eye, between these two statements. And, by our working definition, (a) is false and (b) is true. Accordingly, we can say that hostility to Israel and Zionism is a form of anti-Semitism only when the Jewishness of the state or the movement is the underlying reason (or *one* of the underlying reasons) for this hostility.⁵²

I specify “underlying” in view of an argument in the “new anti-Semitism” literature which goes something like this: If anti-Zionism means opposing Israel *as* a Jewish state (either its creation or its continued existence or both), and if anti-Semitism means hostility to Jews *as Jews*, it follows that anti-Zionism, by definition, is a form of anti-Semitism. But this argument contains a fallacy. The description “opposing Israel *as* a Jewish state” does not necessarily get to the *under-*

lying objection on the part of the anti-Zionist. There is a difference between opposing the existence of the state because it is Jewish, *simpliciter*, and opposing it because, *as* Jewish, it is not, say, Muslim. In the latter case, the Jewishness of the state is neither here nor there; it would face the same kind of hostility if it were, say, Christian. Indeed, the Medieval Crusader states, which *were* Christian, *did* face the same kind of hostility; and in radical Islamist rhetoric, Israel is often *called* a “crusader state.” This suggests that it is not on account of its Jewishness *per se* that the existence of Israel is anathema to such people. By the same token, Arab nationalists might oppose the existence of Israel as a Jewish state because, *as* Jewish, it is not Arab. Which is neither to justify their hostility nor the grounds on which it is based. The point is purely analytical. Anti-Zionism, insofar as it is a reaction against the non-Muslim or non-Arab nature of the state of Israel, is not a form of anti-Semitism.

A similar line of reasoning applies where anti-Zionism is grounded in the view that Israel, as a Western settler state, is a form of European colonialism or a tool of American imperialism or both. (This is a common view of Israel not only in the Arab Middle East and the wider Muslim world but also in certain sections of the left in the West.) Again, our question is not whether this view of Israel is true or adequate (which it is not), but whether, by our working definition, it is anti-Semitic; which it is not. So, once again, anti-Zionism, in and of itself, is not a form of anti-Semitism.

There is a familiar objection that takes the form of saying that anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli sentiment is a form of anti-Semitism *in disguise*. In the opening chapter of her book *The New Anti-Semitism*, Phyllis Chesler claims that “hidden behind that smoke screen of anti-Israeli fervor is, as we shall see, a familiar hatred of the Jew, the ‘other,’ the Christ killer, the Elder of Zion: the powerful, secret, international con-

spirator, the pariah and scapegoat of the Earth.”⁵³ Or as one correspondent to the *Guardian* put it: anti-Semitism is “usually hidden under the mask of anti-Zionism.”⁵⁴ Whether or not this is true, it is not a valid objection to the argument I have been making. On the contrary, it tends to confirm it. A mask whose appearance is identical with what it is masking is no mask. (This would be like a wolf in wolf’s clothing.) So, if anti-Zionism can function as a mask, hiding the “familiar hatred of the Jew,” this implies that, in and of itself, it is not anti-Semitic.

Nonetheless, the objection is not redundant. It says, in effect, that hostility to Israel and Zionism, though not *inherently* anti-Semitic, is so *in practice* because it conceals an anti-Semitic animus. Indeed, sometimes it does; and for that matter, the animus is not always concealed. If, on inspection, it turns out to be the case that this animus, whether concealed or manifest, is a recurring feature of anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli discourse, this might save the argument that anti-Americanism is inseparable from anti-Semitism. (It would shore up the amended version of the second premise in that argument.) But how can we tell? What criteria should we apply?

Let us recall our working definition of anti-Semitism: hostility to Jews *as Jews* (or *for the reason that they are Jews*). This is a useful formula provided we keep in mind the anti-Semitic image of the “Jew” that the Nazis evoked with the yellow star and which Chesler begins to unpack when she describes the “familiar hatred.” For, though the Nazis racialized and embellished it, the image of the “Jew” was not their invention. The main lineaments, which were part of the general culture of Europe, were transmitted from generation to generation down the centuries. Knowing that *this* is anti-Semitism, we know what to look for in anti-Israeli and anti-Zionist discourse: language or graphics that portray

Israel *for the reason that* it is a Jewish state (or Zionism *for the reason that* it is a Jewish movement) as the enemy of the human race, bent on ruling the world for its own diabolical ends, mysteriously controlling the world's banks and media, and so on.

If these themes are ambiguous, then we must scrutinize the context. If they are concealed, there are ways of bringing them to light by calling on evidence from other sources. (We might look at other literature produced by the group or person in question; their history; their political connections; and so on.) This is, perhaps, more an art than a science, and there will often be room for argument in a given case. But it is still a disciplined exercise, controlled by criteria derived from the anti-Semitic image of the "Jew," to which our working definition implicitly alludes. So far, so clear.

However, today there is a new kind of hostility to Jews *as Jews*, one that is based on the controversial nature of the state of Israel and its policies, rather than on ancient or medieval European ideas about Jews. Israel, for its part, promotes itself as the state of "the Jewish people," where in some sense this includes all Jews everywhere, even if they do not take up citizenship.⁵⁵ Reciprocally, many Jews around the world, precisely *as Jews*, align themselves conspicuously with the Jewish state, sometimes in large public demonstrations of solidarity.⁵⁶ From these facts there arises, in certain circles hostile to Israel or Zionism on moral or political grounds, hostility against *all Jews as Jews*. This is an unwarranted generalization; as such, it is a prejudice. But this prejudice is not rooted in the image of the "Jew" associated with the "familiar hatred." It is a new phenomenon.⁵⁷

Furthermore, with Israel seen as an expansionist and repressive occupying power, this hostility is sometimes associated with an image of Jews as brutal thugs who use their physical and military might to crush those who are weaker.

So, there are signs that a new anti-Jewish stereotype might be developing. But it has its own aetiology; it is not produced by *modifying* the old anti-Semitic figure of the “Jew.” It is not a *mutation* of a pre-existing “virus,” but a brand new “bug.”

We can, if we like, call this new phenomenon a “new kind” of anti-Semitism. But does this help us understand the place it occupies in the constellation of conflicts in which Jews, *as Jews*, are involved? Wittgenstein remarks, “Say what you choose, so long as it does not prevent you from seeing the facts.”⁵⁸ Given that the word “anti-Semitism” is so emotive; given that invariably it connotes “the familiar hatred of the Jew”; given the tendency to see anti-Israeli and anti-Zionist sentiment as the return of this hatred; and given that the old hatred has never gone away: given all these things, extending the reach of the word “anti-Semitism” is unwise. Or, if inevitable (because no Canute can stem the tide of language), it is unfortunate. For it is liable to prevent us from seeing the facts for what they are.

Whatever name we give it, this new and growing phenomenon—a prejudice against Jews that derives from hostility to Israel and Zionism rather than vice versa—“is what it is and not another thing” (Butler). In particular, it is not a form of anti-Semitism in the usual and established sense of that word. The same can be said for a whole host of motives and reasons that can, and frequently do, underlie the antagonism people feel towards the Jewish state or the ideology of Jewish nationalism. Put it this way: hostility to Israel and Zionism *can* be a form of anti-Semitism, but it can also express many other things: a commitment to human rights and international law; sympathy for the Palestinian cause; an Islamist agenda; an opinion about the best kind of future for Jews and Palestinians in the area west of the Jordan River; a conviction concerning the conditions for peaceful

co-existence for states in the region; a general antipathy to ethno-nationalism; a particular objection to construing Jewish identity in ethno-national terms; and so on and so forth. And *none* of these reasons or motives (whatever their validity or otherwise) is, in and of itself, a form of anti-Semitism.

For the most part, these are the kinds of considerations that move people to feel antagonistic towards Israel or Zionism; at least, this *appears* to be the case. If, however, someone thinks otherwise, if they believe that the hidden hand of anti-Semitism is at work, then the onus is on them to prove it. If they cannot do so, then the second premise in the argument that I outlined at the beginning of this section is shot. The most we can say is that *sometimes* hostility to Israel and Zionism is a form of anti-Semitism, which is a much weaker claim. With the collapse of this premise, the whole argument—one of the staple arguments for the view that anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism are inseparable—falls apart.

THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE EUROBAROMETER POLL⁵⁹

In the introductory section, I spoke of a “mindset” that distorts or even pre-empts empirical investigation of the facts concerning hostility to America, Israel and Jews. An international controversy that erupted in the autumn of 2003 illustrates the point.

To get our bearings, let us return to Joffe’s essay “The Demons of Europe” and pick up the thread of his argument at the point, near the beginning, where he gives his interpretation of the Coffrini image of the “golden calf” demonstration at Davos. Calling it “the face of the new anti-Semitism,” he explains: “Lacking certain murderous elements of the classical type, it is nevertheless rife with some of its most ancient motifs. What is new about it is the projection of these

old fantasies onto two new targets: Israel and America. Indeed, the United States is an anti-Semitic fantasy come true: the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* in living color. Do not Jews, their first loyalty to Israel, control the Congress, the Pentagon, the banks, the universities, and the media? Having obtained 'hyperpower,' do they not finally rule the world?" Then he delivers the punch line: "That at least seems to be the consensus of the Europeans, who, in a recent EU poll, declared Israel and the United States, in that order, the greatest threats to world peace."⁶⁰

The allusion is to a survey of public opinion carried out in October 2003 for the European Commission.⁶¹ The poll interviewed 7,515 citizens in fifteen European states over a period of nine days. In the context of the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, they were asked a series of questions. Question 10 presented respondents with a list of fifteen countries. For each country, they were asked whether or not, in their opinion, it presents "a threat to peace in the world."⁶² In the case of Israel, 59 percent of respondents said yes, a higher percentage than for any other country.⁶³

The poll was greeted by outrage on the part of the Israeli government and many leading Jewish organizations on both sides of the Atlantic. Sharansky, who was Israel's Minister for Diaspora Affairs at the time, saw it as "additional proof that behind the 'political' criticism of Israel stands pure anti-Semitism."⁶⁴ In the United States, Rabbi Marvin Hier, dean and founder of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, described the poll as "a racist flight of fancy that only shows that anti-Semitism is deeply embedded within European society, more now than in any other period since the end of World War II."⁶⁵ Cobi Benatoff and Edgar Bronfman, presidents respectively of the European Jewish Congress and the World Jewish Congress, made an additional point: the mere fact of publishing the poll was, in their view, an expression of anti-

Semitism on the part of the European Commission itself.⁶⁶ But Joffe's reading picks up on something else: the fact that the United States came second to Israel in the poll with a rating of 53 percent.

These reactions overlook three points. First, the question did not ask respondents which countries were to *blame* for posing a threat to peace. This should especially be kept in mind in assessing the response to Israel, since Palestine, not being a state, was not on the list. So, anyone who thought that the Israeli–Palestinian conflict destabilizes the region, and that this instability is “a threat to peace in the world,” could have answered in the affirmative—*wherever* their sympathies might lie.⁶⁷ Second, respondents were not asked to *rank* the fifteen countries on the list. So, the data does not support the claim that the respondents saw Israel and America as “the greatest threats” to world peace (let alone that this was “the consensus of the Europeans”). In other words, it is a leap to go from “more people saw Israel and America as a threat” to “people saw Israel and America as more of a threat.” The question did not ask respondents to quantify the *size* of the threat, if any, and the results do not license any inference at all about this. Third, what Joffe fails to mention is that the same percentage that said yes to America (53 percent) said yes to Iran and North Korea.⁶⁸ Does this imply that there is a European anti-Semitic consensus against Iran and North Korea as well? The mind begins to boggle.

Joffe does go on to say that “the issue is more complicated than the reconditioning of an old myth.”⁶⁹ But he does not retract or qualify his reading of the Eurobarometer poll. Instead, he offers further evidence to support his view that the “similarities” between anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism “are hard to escape.”⁷⁰ He refers, for example, to a poster at an anti-Bush demonstration in Berlin in 2002 which read

“Stop Bush’s Grab for Global Power!” and describes this as “[e]choing a classic indictment of ‘World Jewry’.”⁷¹ In a similar vein, he writes: “Franz Alt, a German author and TV moderator, denouncing Bush as the ‘greatest enemy of mankind,’ seemed to be echoing the old Nazi slogan: ‘*Die Juden sind unser Unglück*—the Jews are our misfortune.”⁷² Perhaps my ear is not as finely tuned as Joffe’s, but I think the fact that he hears these examples as “echoes” of anti-Semitism, and therefore thinks they support his position, supports mine. He is, as it were, hearing things, due to his cast of mind.

The results of the Eurobarometer poll are open to interpretation. One is Joffe’s: that there is a consensus in Europe that is animated by anti-Semitic prejudice. But there are other possibilities. Perhaps the respondents, or most of them, or just some of them, were not bigots; maybe they were normal reasonable human beings who, exercising their capacity for rational judgment, believe, on the basis of evidence, that the foreign policies of America and Israel (which are closely intertwined) are inimical to the prospects for peace and security in the world. (There *are* such people, even in benighted Europe.) Or perhaps fear, rather than reason, was at play; but fear founded on fact rather than on deep-seated paranoia about Yanks and Yids.

Which hypothesis is true—whether Joffe’s or mine or some other—is an open question. We need to look into it. And I do not see how anyone could, without further ado, jump to Joffe’s conclusion or Rabbi Hier’s, or accuse the European Commission of bigotry, unless they were seeing anti-Semitism hidden behind the veil of data *before they even began to look*. Unless, in other words, they were in the grip of a mindset that is prone to seeing hostility to Israel as the “familiar hatred of the Jew.” Joffe talks about the “projection” of anti-Semitic “fantasies” onto Israel and America.

But this works in both directions. That is to say, there is such a thing as anti-Semitism in reverse: projecting the figure of the anti-Semite onto individuals or groups who are innocent as charged.

CONCLUSION: THE IDOLS OF THE TRIBE

The view (or set of views) that I have been examining is that anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism are inseparable. It is tempting to turn this thesis around and say that, in the literature under discussion, it is the *allegation* of anti-Americanism and the *allegation* of anti-Semitism that are inseparable. This would certainly be an exaggeration, but it makes a point: that there is a propensity, in certain quarters, to see Americans and Jews as the joint victims of a global prejudice, and that this is itself a phenomenon which calls for investigation.

The point is worth making in view of what is at stake in this discussion. In their book *America Against the World*, Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes discuss the data produced by a series of worldwide public opinion surveys conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project since its inception in 2001. The aim of the book is to make sense of one of the principal findings of the project: “the rise of anti-Americanism around the world in the first decade of the twenty-first century.”⁷³ This rise comes at a time when the world is experiencing, on the political plane, the equivalent of global warming; and one of the most incandescent spots on the planet is the Middle East, where both America and Israel, separately and (to an extent) together, are involved in conflicts that are on the boil. At stake is the question of whether the political temperature of the region and the planet will continue to rise, posing a universal danger. The view that I have been examining, insofar as it conflates different kinds

of hostility and reduces them all to “prejudice,” is crude and partisan. Such a simple-minded, one-sided account is likely to inflame the situation; it is not only untrue, but unwise.

Kohut and Stokes warn that anti-Americanism is “one of the principal challenges facing the United States in the years ahead.” They go on to make, in effect, a plea for distinctions: “Dealing with it will require that Americans distinguish among the differing sources of this antagonism and address them appropriately.”⁷⁴ Much the same can be said about the antagonism that Jews in general, and Israel in particular, face today. This calls for slow, painstaking, intellectual work on the part of social scientists, historians and others; work that conduces to informed public debate and enlightened public policy.

My limited aim has been to subtract from the sum total of obstacles that stand in the way of this work. My mentor is John Locke who, in the “Epistle to the Reader” that forms a preface to his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, remarks: “’tis ambition enough to be employed as an under-laborer in clearing ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge.”⁷⁵ Among these obstacles are certain tendencies of the human mind that Francis Bacon calls “the idols of the tribe.” I am thinking, in particular, of the first two on his list: our propensity to oversimplify and our habit of selecting evidence that confirms a view that we have previously embraced.⁷⁶ If Bacon is right, then these “idols,” being deeply rooted in our nature, are even more antique than the golden calf to which the Israelites bowed down in the Bible; they are as old as Adam himself. Be that as it may, they are characteristic of the mindset that, in the course of disentangling anti-Americanism from anti-Semitism, I have been critiquing.

I do not say that the analytical distinctions made in this chapter are hard and fast, for I am certain that they need

refining.⁷⁷ But subtlety for subtlety's sake is not the point. The point is to get into a position where we can *think*, think *clearly*; and be neither in thrall to the idols in our mind, nor deceived by the appearances of words, nor dazzled by an image as brilliant and mesmerizing as the one that Coffrini captured at Davos.

NOTES

- 1 The World Economic Forum annual meeting was held from 23 to 27 January 2003. The image is available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Davos_WEF_Golden_Calf.png, last accessed 6 July 2006. The image first appeared in the *Santa Monica Daily Press*, 27 January 2003.
- 2 In some areas the identifying badge for Jews was a different color or even shape.
- 3 The literature is both popular and academic. I refer to both in the course of the chapter.
- 4 Joffe, Josef. "The Demons of Europe." *Commentary* 118, no. 1 (January 2004): 29.
- 5 Klein Halevi, Yossi. "Hatreds Entwined." *Azure* (Winter 2004): 25.
- 6 Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, "The Globalization of Antisemitism," Forward, 2 May 2003, available at <http://www.forward.com/issues/2003/03.05.02/oped1.html>, last accessed 6 July 2006.
- 7 Markovits, Andrei. "European Anti-Americanism (and Anti-Semitism): Ever Present Though Always Denied." Center for European Studies, Harvard University, Working Paper Series 108 (January 2004): 18, available at <http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/index.html>, last accessed 6 July 2006. Markovits also alludes to anti-Semitic iconography at anti-globalist meetings in Porto Alegre and Durban. He means, presumably, the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil, which "shadowed" the Davos meeting in January 2003, and the United Nations World Conference Against Racism held in Durban, South Africa, in August/September 2001.
- 8 *Ibid.*, 17.
- 9 Image available at <http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/wef/images/davos3266.jpg>, last accessed 6 July 2006.

- 10 For a general account, see "Anti-WEF protests in Switzerland," January 2003, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-WEF_protests_in_Switzerland%2C_January_2003, last accessed 6 July 2006. More images are available at <http://www.remote.ch/search/search.dbc?WHAT=wef>, last accessed 6 July 2006.
- 11 Image available at <http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/wef/images/wef3453.jpg>, last accessed 6 July 2006.
- 12 "Image talk: Davos Switzerland G8 Summit.jpg" [sic], available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image_talk:Davos_Switzerland_G8_Summit.jpg, last accessed 6 July 2006.
- 13 Cohen, Steve. *That's Funny, You Don't Look Anti-Semitic: An Anti-Racist Analysis of Left anti-Semitism* (Leeds: Beyond the Pale Collective, 1984), 86.
- 14 Boteach, Shmuley. "Anti-Americanism and Anti-Semitism are the Same Thing." (12 March 2004), available at http://www.newsbull.com/forum/more.asp?TOPIC_ID=12996, last accessed 6 July 2006. Rabbi Boteach is a nationally syndicated talk show host in the United States. He was the subject of the BBC documentary "Moses of Oxford."
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 Johnson, Daniel. "America and the America-Haters." *Commentary* 120, no. 6 (June 2006): 30–31.
- 17 Natan Sharansky, "On Hating the Jews," *Wall Street Journal*, 17 November 2003, available at <http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110004310>, last accessed 6 July 2006.
- 18 "European Anti-Americanism (and Anti-Semitism)": 12.
- 19 Ibid., 14.
- 20 Ibid., 12.
- 21 Although several of the authors in the literature under discussion refer favorably to each other's work, they do not constitute a school of thought exactly; there are significant variations in tone, views and arguments, and I shall not do enough to respect their differences. The focus of my discussion is on a common tendency that I detect in their writing.
- 22 They are connected, for example, when Osama bin Laden, alluding in 1998 to female soldiers on American bases in Saudi Arabia, says, "by God, Muslim women refuse to be defended by these American and Jewish prostitutes. Interview with al-Jazeera television, quoted in Judt, Tony. "America and the War." *New York Review of Books* 48, no. 18 (November 15, 2001), available at <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14760>, last accessed 7 July 2006. Anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism are also connected

by a vein of anti-modern sentiment among the European intelligentsia before the Second World War. Tony Judt writes: "Many critics of America, in Germany, France or Russia, were all too quick to identify the shifting, unfamiliar contours of an Americanising world with the essential traits of a homeless Jewry. "Good-bye to All That." *Prospect* (December 2004): 42. One such critic was Adolf Hitler. On the other hand, the familiar stereotype of the ugly American abroad as a coarse, brutish, swaggering ignoramus has no counterpart in anti-Semitic discourse. If anything, it is reminiscent of a common caricature of the Germans. However, by a process of selective attention—of the kind that I am critiquing in this chapter—it is possible to screen out such complications and exaggerate the claim that Americans and Jews are hated along the same lines and on the same terms by the same enemies.

- 23 Even the cautious report published by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) noted as follows: There is practically a consensus among almost all participants in the current debate on the 'new anti-Semitism' that there has been a significant increase in verbal and physical attacks directed against Jews or Jewish institutions since the year 2000—EUMC, *Manifestations of Antisemitism in the EU 2002–2003* (Vienna, March 2004), 24, available at <http://eumc.eu.int/eumc/as/PDF04/AS-Main-report-PDF04.pdf>, last accessed 7 July 2006.
- 24 The findings of public opinion surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project from 2002 to 2005 are summarized and discussed in Kohut, Andrew and Bruce Stokes. *America Against the World: How We are Different and Why We are Disliked* (New York: Henry Holt, 2006). They write, "much of the discontent that we have documented can be attributed to criticisms of U.S. policies, especially the war in Iraq," xiii.
- 25 The reference is to Bishop Joseph Butler (1692–1752). I am not aware that any definitive source for this exact form of words has been located. It is, however, in the spirit of his thought.
- 26 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *The Blue and Brown Books* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), 1.
- 27 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968), 43e, par. 90.
- 28 Wittgenstein has various terms for the hold that language can have over us due to its formal properties, including "tempt," "seduced" and "bewitch."

- 29 *The Blue and Brown Books*, 27.
- 30 *Ibid.*, 26.
- 31 "European anti-Americanism and Anti-Semitism: Similarities and Differences," an interview with Andrei S. Markovits in *Post-Holocaust and Anti-Semitism* 16 (1 January 2004), available at <http://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-16.htm>, last accessed 7 July 2006.
- 32 "The Demons of Europe," 29.
- 33 I am using the word America in the narrower sense to refer to the United States, rather than to both American continents, since this reflects the use of the term anti-Americanism.
- 34 The words themselves derive from "Shem," one of Noah's three sons, the progenitors of the rest of the human race, according to the Biblical story, Shem being the ancestor of Abraham, the father of Isaac and Ishmael, from whom Jews and Arabs respectively trace their origin in their traditions. (For the Biblical sources, see Genesis 5:32, 6:10, 9:18-19, 10: 32, 11:26; chapters 16, 17 and 21 *passim*.) Against this background, pioneers in the new science of comparative philology in the late eighteenth century adopted the term Semitic to refer to the family of languages that include Hebrew and Arabic. In the following century, race theorists took the term over and used it in their classification schemes. Hence the word anti-Semitic, which was thus originally part of a racist or racialist lexicon.
- 35 Donald Rumsfeld is not in fact Jewish. In the rhetorical context of the Coffrini image, his "yellow star" suggests that he is, as it were, a proxy Jew.
- 36 Imre Kertész, "The Language of Exile," *Guardian*, 19 October 2002, available at <http://books.guardian.co.uk/departments/general-fiction/story/0,,814806,00.html>, last accessed 7 July 2006.
- 37 This paragraph is adapted from a portion of my "The Collective Jew: Israel and the New Antisemitism." *Patterns of Prejudice* 37, no. 2 (June 2003): 117-138.
- 38 The point I am making here is about the *logic* of the stereotype, not its *genesis* or the sources on which it draws for its content.
- 39 Bauer, Yehuda. "Problems of Contemporary Antisemitism" (2003), available at <http://humanities.ucsc.edu/JewishStudies/docs/YbauerLecture.pdf>, last accessed 7 July 2006. Bauer points out that spelling it as one word matches the original German term *Antisemitismus*. The irony, however, is that Wilhelm Marr, who appears to have coined the word (in 1879), did precisely think that there was such a thing as Semitism—his term for the racialized Jewish spirit and Jewish consciousness, to which he was

- opposed. See the extract from his “The Victory of Judaism over Germandom” (1879) in *The Jew in the Modern World: A Documentary History*, eds. Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 331–333.
- 40 Manifestations of Antisemitism 227.
 - 41 Hollander, Paul. *Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad, 1965–1990* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.)
 - 42 Hollander, Paul, ed. *Understanding Anti-Americanism: Its Origins and Impact at Home and Abroad* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2004), 7.
 - 43 Ibid., 7.
 - 44 Ibid., 9.
 - 45 Ibid.
 - 46 Ibid., 12. This sentence comes immediately after the previous one quoted.
 - 47 I discuss some of the vast literature on the new anti-Semitism—which overlaps significantly with the literature on anti-Americanism—in several articles, including “The Collective Jew,” cited above, and “The Myth of the New Anti-Semitism” in *The Nation* 278, no. 4 (2 February 2004): 23–29.
 - 48 Jonathan Sacks, “The Hatred that Won’t Die,” *Guardian*, 28 February 2002, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,659149,00.html>, last accessed 7 July 2006. Sacks’s full religious title is Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the Commonwealth.
 - 49 Schoenfeld, Gabriel. *The Return of Anti-Semitism* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2004), 4.
 - 50 Sharansky, “On Hating the Jews.” This is one of several variants on a theme that appears to go back to Jacob Talmon who, writing in 1976 in response to the United Nations resolution equating Zionism with racism, called Israel “the ‘Jew’ of the nations:” see Klein Halevi, Yossi. “The Wall.” *The New Republic* (8 July 2002), available at <http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20020708&s=halevi070802>, last accessed 7 July 2006. For an extended discussion, see my “Marks of a Mindset—Seeing a Global War against the Jews” in *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch 2005 deutsche Geschichte XXXIII: Antisemitismus, Antizionismus, Israelkritik*, ed. Moshe Zuckermann (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2005), 33–49.
 - 51 Kushner, Tony. *The Persistence of Prejudice: Antisemitism in British Society during the Second World War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), 8.

- 52 It might help to consider the same logical difference at the level of an individual rather than a state. Suppose Moishe is attacked in the street by a gang of thugs. There are two possible scenarios. (a) Either the gang does not know that he is Jewish or, if they know, they do not care. Maybe they were merely looking for someone to beat up. Or perhaps they wanted to steal his wallet. (b) The gang sees that that he is a Jew and attacks him for this reason. By our working definition of anti-Semitism—hostility to Jews *as Jews*—(b) constitutes an anti-Semitic incident, but (a) does not. So, if the attack by the gang is anti-Semitic, it is not because Moishe is Jewish; it is because they attack him *for the reason* that he is Jewish.
- 53 Chesler, Phyllis. *The New Anti-Semitism: The Current Crisis and What We Must Do About It* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2003), 4.
- 54 *Guardian* (18 October 2004), available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/letters/story/0,,1329763,00.html>, last accessed 7 July 2006.
- 55 This is reflected in the Law of Return, one of Israel's Basic Laws, which (roughly) grants every Jew the right to immigrate and become a citizen.
- 56 Several such demonstrations took place in spring 2002. I discuss this in "A Time to Speak Out: Rethinking Jewish Identity and Solidarity with Israel." *Jewish Quarterly* 49, no. 4 (Winter 2002/3): 35–41.
- 57 This is not to say that the two kinds of hostility to Jews exist in isolation from each other. On the contrary, they interact and reinforce one another. But we will not be in a position to understand the complex dynamic between them if we cannot first tell them apart. (No connections without distinctions!)
- 58 *Philosophical Investigations*, 57e, par. 79.
- 59 This section is adapted from a portion of my essay "Is Europe a Lost Cause? The European Debate on Antisemitism and the Middle East Conflict." *Patterns of Prejudice* 39, no. 1 (March 2005): 46–59.
- 60 "The Demons of Europe," 29.
- 61 European Commission. *Iraq and Peace in the World: Full Report Flash Eurobarometer 151* (November 2003), available at <http://www.mafhoum.com/press6/167P52.pdf>, last accessed 7 July 2006.
- 62 There were two affirmative and two negative ratings: 1 = Yes, absolutely, 2 = Yes, rather, 3 = No, rather not, 4 = No, absolutely not. There was also 5 = don't know or not applicable (*Ibid.*, annexe: questionnaire).

- 63 Ibid., 78.
- 64 Chris McGreal, "EU Poll sees Israel as Peace Threat," *Guardian*, 3 November 2003, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,1076442,00.html>, last accessed 7 July 2006.
- 65 "A message from the Simon Wiesenthal Center," available at <http://www.wiesenthal.com/site/apps/nl/content2.asp?c=fwLYKnN8LzH&b=245506&ct=285302>, last accessed 7 July 2006.
- 66 Edgar Bronfman and Cobi Benatoff, "Europe's Moral Treachery Over Anti-Semitism," *Financial Times*, 4 January 2004, available at http://www.defenddemocracy.org/research_topics/research_topics_show.htm?doc_id=202732, last accessed 7 July 2006. The reply by Romano Prodi, European Commission President at the time, is available at <http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2004/2004001.htm>, last accessed 7 July 2006.
- 67 Arguably, this observation is supported by findings in the "15-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey" (13 June 2006), available at <http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/252.pdf>, last accessed 7 July 2006. In a question about dangers to World Peace, one of the items is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (not Israel). The figures show that almost exactly the same percentage of Americans and Turks (43 percent and 42 percent respectively) consider this conflict to be a great danger to world peace (3). Yet, in terms of their sympathies with the parties to the conflict, the two populations are almost a mirror image of each other: 48 percent of Americans sympathize with Israel, 13 percent with the Palestinians, while the corresponding figures for Turks are 5 percent and 63 percent (23).
- 68 When countries share the same rating, as in this case, they are listed in alphabetical order. So, Iran and North Korea actually appear above the United States in the table. Anyone looking at the table could hardly fail to notice this.
- 69 "The Demons of Europe," 29.
- 70 Ibid., 32.
- 71 Ibid.
- 72 Ibid., 33.
- 73 *America Against the World*, xiii. More precisely: "This book has as its principal objective to consider the difference between U.S. opinion and world opinion so as to understand global anti-Americanism," xix.
- 74 Ibid., 39.
- 75 Locke, John. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* [1706] (London: Penguin Books, 1997), 11.

- 76 Bacon, Francis. *The New Organon* [1620], trans. Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Book I, Aphorisms XLV and XLVI, 42-43.
- 77 There are also many loose ends. Among other things, this chapter has not addressed the question of what constitutes *hostility*, bearing in mind that both anger and opposition can arise out of sympathy and friendship. I have not explored the similarities and differences between anti-Semitic and anti-American stereotypes. I have said nothing about the provenance of the mindset that I describe, nor the political commitments that typically accompany it. I might have broached the controversy surrounding the paper “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy” by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (March 2006), as well as the longstanding debate over the political influence of Jewish neo-conservatives in the United States, but I haven’t. Both of these subjects call for the kind of fine-grained analysis that I hope this chapter facilitates. Many other stones are left unturned.

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This book interrogates the nature of anti-Americanism today and over the last century. It asks several questions: How do we define the phenomenon from different perspectives: political, social, and cultural? What are the historical sources and turning points of anti-Americanism in Europe and elsewhere? What are its links with anti-Semitic sentiment? Has anti-Americanism been beneficial or self-destructive to its “believers”? Finally, how has the United States responded and why?

The authors, scholars from a multitude of countries, tackle the potential political consequences of anti-Americanism in Eastern and Central Europe, the region that has been perceived as strongly pro-American



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